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INTRODUCTION
Ever since John F. Kennedy urged Americans to "ask not what your
country can do for you-ask what you can do for your country,"' public
figures and private citizens alike have expressed concern about the level
of civic commitment in the United States. In the view of many, civic life
is an untapped, or insufficiently tapped, resource for addressing many of
America's most serious ills, whether political, social, economic, or even
medical. If you were to ask these commentators about the current condi-
tion of civic life in America, you would get a wide assortment of views
as to its strengths and weaknesses. 2 And if you were to ask about the
I President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961), available at http:l/
www.bartleby.com/124/pres56.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
2 The most well known and thorough argument in support of the view that civic life
needs dramatic improvement because it has declined significantly in the last three decades is
developed in ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF COMMU-
NITY (2000) [hereinafter BOWLING ALONE] (expanding on a previous article with a similar
name: Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOC-
RACY 65 (1995) [hereinafter Bowling Alone]). See also CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND
Civic RENEWAL (Robert K. Fullinwider ed., 1999) [hereinafter CIVIL SOCETY]; DON E. EB-
ERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE RENEWAL OF AMERICAN CULTURE (1998)
[hereinafter AMERICA'S PROMISE] (describing the decline in social capital). For arguments at
the opposite end of the spectrum, see MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 294 (1998) [hereinafter GOOD CITIZEN] (concluding that citizenship in
America has added new forms but has not declined); Everett C. Ladd, The Data Just Don't
Show Erosion of America's "Social Capital," 7 PUB. PERSP. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Data Just
Don't Show Erosion] (arguing that the level of civic participation has actually increased);
James A. Morone, The Corrosive Politics of Virtue, 26 AM. PROSPECT 30, 36-37 (1996) [here-
inafter The Corrosive Politics of Virtue] (arguing that we do not have a moral crisis, a divorce
culture, or a crime rate higher than it was in 1970). For an overview of the literature on all
sides of this issue, see Dietlind Stolle and Marc Hooghe, Emerging Repetoires of Political
Action? A Review of the Debate on Participation Trends in Western Societies, April 13-18,
2004 (on file with the author).
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reasons for the strengths and weaknesses of civic life in America, you
would also elicit a considerable array of responses. 3
If, however, you were to ask about the importance of participation
in voluntary associations4 for producing, maintaining, or strengthening
the quality of civic life, you would discover a substantial consensus that,
for civic life to be strong, individuals need to take an active role in gov-
ernance, and that participation in voluntary associations is one of the
principal methods for assuring an active citizenry of this kind. 5 Conse-
quently, a significant part of the civic renewal debate revolves around
issues such as the nature of voluntary associations, the reasons people
join them, the bonds they foster among members, and the ways in which
such associations promote the well-being of their communities. These
discussions are both important and pervasive.
The purposes and activities of many such associations are highly
regulated by provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") 6 that
developed without regard to the civic concerns of the last several de-
cades. This Article examines to what extent and in what respects the
Code influences the civic potential of voluntary associations. Several
obstacles threaten any attempt to evaluate the tax law's impact on civic
engagement. First, civic renewal theory is far from uniform. Rather, it is
animated by a variety of sometimes competing goals and understandings
of the nature of civic well-being as well as by differing views about the
nature of groups, the proper role of government, and the potential for
fruitful cooperation between the private and public sectors. Second, for
many civic renewal advocates, the most salutary effects of broadening
and deepening participation in voluntary associations stem from their
3 See infra Part I.
4 For the meaning of this phrase, see infra Part II.A and note 310.
5 See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY 89-91 (1993) [hereinafter MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK]; Benjamin R. Barber, Clans-
men, Consumers, and Citizens: Three Takes on Civil Society, in CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 2,
at 9, 19-22, 23-24; John Brehm and Wendy Rahm, Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes
and Consequences of Social Capital, 41 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 999, 1017 (1997); William A.
Schambra, Is There Civic Life beyond the Great National Community?, in CIVIL SOCIETY,
supra note 2, at 89, 94-96, 107-09, 117-19; Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina, Making
Sense of the Civic Engagement Debate, in Civic ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1,
4-5, 9-10, 13-15 (Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds. 1999) [hereinafter Civic ENGAGE-
MENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY]; SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E.
BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 112-19, 309-13,
319-20, 333, 336, 338, 369-90 (1995) [hereinafter VOICE AND EQUALITY]; PETER L. BERGER
& RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE (1977), reprinted in To EMPOWER PEOPLE:
FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 157-64, 194-201 (Michael Novak, ed. 2d ed. 1996). For an
overview of the literature linking voluntary associations to positive civic outcomes, see
Dietland Stolle, The Sources of Social Capital, in GENERATING SOCIAL CAPITAL: CIVIL SOCI-
ETY AND INSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 19, 22-28 (Marc Hooghe and Dietland
Stolle, eds 2003) [hereinafter GENERATING SOCIAL CAPITAL].
6 All references to the "Code" are to the Internal Revenue Code (2000).
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role in creating generalized interpersonal trust and the inclination of as-
sociation members to cooperate with people outside their circle of friends
and acquaintances in order to improve the surrounding communities. 7
However, the provisional empirical findings discussed in this Article
suggest that the hoped-for ripple effects of participation in voluntary as-
sociations have been greatly overstated. 8 Although the empirical re-
search examining the effects of participation in associations on members
is still in an embryonic state, most of the available evidence suggests that
the attitudes and habits acquired by people prior to joining an association
constitute the larger part of the causal explanation for many of the well-
known positive correlations between those who participate in voluntary
associations and those who display a high level of civic engagement.
In response to these difficulties, this Article begins by identifying
and analyzing four different civic renewal theories, highlighting their dif-
ferent assumptions and goals and connecting these features of the theo-
ries to the character of the recommendations for civic reform made by
each. 9 Based upon an analysis of the empirical data, the Article then
seeks to clarify important limits to the productive uses of voluntary as-
sociations to achieve the goals advanced by each of the four theories.10
Finally, the Article applies the analysis to the Code's regulation of ex-
empt organizations, both to clarify the ways in which existing tax rules
further or undermine one or more civic goals and to recommend changes
to make tax law more effective in promoting the goals that it can realisti-
cally advance."
Part I distinguishes and elaborates four perspectives on civic health
that, alone or in combination, inspire most discussions about civic re-
newal. These four perspectives emphasize as the core attributes of civic
health: (1) cooperation, (2) self-governance, (3) representative institu-
tions, and (4) the moral character of the community. This Part elaborates
the idea of civic well-being developed by each perspective, contrasts the
four perspectives along several dimensions, and identifies areas in which
their priorities may be different or their policies in conflict. I argue that
both the cooperation and representative institutions perspectives are con-
sistent with political theories predicated upon the priority of the private,
self-interested purposes of individuals over societal or communal claims.
Both seek to invigorate civic life to promote such interests more accu-
rately and effectively. However, the immediate agendas of the two per-
spectives are likely to differ because of the belief on the part of the
7 See infra Part I.A.
8 See infra Part II.
9 See infra Part I.
10 See infra Part II.
11 See infra Part 1H.
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representative institutions perspective that inequities in political influ-
ence have to be tackled directly and urgently, rather than indirectly and
incrementally, through the medium of greater participation.
In contrast, the self-governance and community morality perspec-
tives are each predicated upon substantive assumptions about the attrib-
utes of individual and societal well-being rather than relying exclusively
on individuals' preferences as the baseline for public policy decisions.
For the self-governance perspective, individual autonomy and reasoned
self-governance are critical ingredients of civic health. For the commu-
nity morality perspective, a commitment to moral and public-spirited
civic norms and practices is a necessary, and often overlooked, prerequi-
site of civic well-being. Although many policies would be endorsed by
proponents of both perspectives, this Article discusses potential conflicts
between them arising from the circumstance that the former emphasizes
reasoned decision making, whereas the focus of the latter is on the moral
character of individuals and communities.
Part II reviews the empirical findings of social scientists to assess
the degree to which and ways in which voluntary associations contribute
to the goals of the four perspectives. In brief, active participation in as-
sociational life may well promote coordinated and effective collective
action on behalf of a group's specific goals and, under certain conditions,
may lead members to engage in additional acts of civic engagement. In
contrast to the expectation of civil society theorists, associations typically
do not seem to generate norms of cooperation among their members that
are generalized to persons outside the group. Rather, the primary reason
for their impact appears to be that associations provide occasions for the
recruitment and mobilization of like-minded individuals and are them-
selves vehicles that enable such groups to engage in effective group ac-
tivity or influence others who can help them. I thus question the
accuracy of portraying associational life as a critical potential source of
increased public spiritedness or of the attributes necessary for reflective
self-governance, as contrasted with their much better documented utility
for enhancing cooperation and effective collective action on behalf of the
interests of their members of underrepresented groups. The alternative
for those who see self-governance or community morality as indispensa-
ble to civic well-being is to recognize that these goals are unlikely to be
the by-product of participation in associations and to concentrate on nur-
turing the civic values critical for their civic goals in other areas of famil-
ial and social life.
Part III examines the regulation of exempt organizations under fed-
eral income tax law. This Part evaluates existing and proposed tax rules
regulating the lobbying and electoral activities of exempt organizations
in light of both the goals of the four perspectives on civic health dis-
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cussed in Part I and the empirical findings described in Part II. This
analysis highlights tax law provisions likely to further the goals of a par-
ticular perspective while simultaneously posing a threat to the goals of
one or more of the other perspectives. I argue that legislative and regula-
tory tax rules are most suited to supporting the cooperation and represen-
tative institutions perspectives, whereas the objectives of the self-
governance and community morality perspectives are the least amenable
to tax law interventions. Part III and the Conclusion offer several sug-
gestions for changes in the Code and tax regulations to achieve one or
more civic purposes, but cautions that many of the most beneficial im-
provements are not amenable to regulatory interventions and must await
widespread changes involving the acceptance of civic norms.
I. PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIC HEALTH
The expression "civic life" can be used in several ways. It can be
defined narrowly to refer to direct involvement in politics (such as vot-
ing, working for political parties or committees, attending political ral-
lies, and registering or leafleting voters) and indirect involvement (such
as reading newspapers or having discussions about public issues). Con-
strued as engagement in the political process or political institutions,
"civic life" is distinct from "civil life," which is commonly understood to
include group activity, whether of ad hoc or informal associations, on the
one hand, or formal organizations, on the other. In general, commercial
entities are not included within the purview of civil society. 12 In addi-
tion, some commentators consider the family as too private an associa-
tion to be part of civil society. 13 This exclusion, however, is
controversial, especially among those who are concerned about the moral
dimension of civic life. ' 4
The term "civic" can also be used more broadly to include both the
political and civil domains. The following discussion will use civic in
this generic sense. "Civil" will be used in contradistinction to both polit-
ical and economic, but it will include family life. The phrases "civic
decline," "civic renewal," "civic engagement," and "civic disengage-
12 See EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 2, at 22-23 (arguing that most economic
entities lack the personal loyalty, spirit of cooperation, or capacity for self-sacrifice associated
with civil society). But see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREA-
TION OF PROSPERITY (1995) [hereinafter TRUST].
13 See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Not a Cure-All, 15 BROOKINGS REV. 13, 14 (1997) (stating
that the family fits "rather clumsily" in the idea of civil society).
14 For a review of the civil society literature that classifies the family as a voluntary
association and part of civil society, see Jean Cohen, Trust, Voluntary Association and Worka-
ble Democracy: The Contemporary American Discourse of Civil Society, in DEMOCRACY AND
TRUST 208, 232-33 (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999) [hereinafter Trust, Voluntary Association and
Workable Democracy] (stating that family is widely considered to be the most important vol-
untary association in civil society).
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ment" will thus be used with reference to the entire spectrum of social,
cultural, civil, and political aspects of communal life, without differenti-
ating among the component parts.
A. THE COOPERATION PERSPECTIVE
Several discussions of civic renewal converge in the view that many
economic' 5 and social 16 problems persist primarily due to the failure of
individuals, groups, and communities to engage in cooperative and effec-
tive collective action to solve them, although commentators posit differ-
ent foundational reasons for this failure. Robert Putnam, a champion of
this view,' 7 attributes the failure to a decline in "social capital,"'18 a term
15 The primary economic ills discussed are poverty, child poverty, unemployment, and
underemployment. Although poverty and child poverty appeared to be at historic lows in the
United States in 2000, there were still more than 30 million people, many of them children,
still living in poverty. The downward trend reversed after 2000, and poverty increased during
the last two years. BERNADETrE D. PROCTOR & JOSEPH DALAKER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002, at 1 (2003) (showing that 1.7
million more people were in poverty in 2002 than in 2001, with African-Americans hardest
hit), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-222.pdf (last visited Apr. 2,
2004). For the view that the decline in poverty was overstated in the first place, see Robert
Kuttner, Editorial, The Boom in Poverty, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 1999, at E7 (arguing that
homelessness and hunger have increased and the real purchasing power of the poor was less in
1997 than in 1979 despite the improvement in poverty reported in the media).
16 Social problems range from the high rates of divorce and crime to the persistence of
racial discrimination into the twenty-first century. Although the rate of crime, including vio-
lent crime, improved in the 1990s, the absolute levels of crime are excessive even after the
decline: between 1960 and 1998, the total crime index increased almost threefold and the
violent crime rate increased more than 350%. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, Estimated Number and Rate (Per 100,000 Inhabitants) of Offenses Known to Po-
lice, FBI SOURCEBOOK, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE 275-76 (2002)
[hereinafter FBI SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/
t3109.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). Despite the disappearance of legal obstacles to citizen-
ship in the United States and the apparent nationwide consensus about the fundamental equal-
ity of races, minorities continue to experience discrimination daily, e.g., when they buy a
home, purchase a car, drive a car, or try to hail a cab. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Review of
Nissan Car Loans Finds That Blacks Pay More, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at AI; Editorial,
Taxi Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1999, at A32.
17 See PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 5, at 140-41, 148-49; Putnam,
Bowling Alone, supra note 2, at 67; Robert D. Putnam, The Prosperous Community: Social
Capital and Public Life, 13 AM. PROSPECT 35, 35-37 (1993) [hereinafter Prosperous Commu-
nity]; Robert D. Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital
in America, 28 PS: POL. SCl. & POL. 664, 666 (1995) [hereinafter Tuning In, Tuning Out].
18 PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 287. The belief that social capital has
declined is based largely on a comparison of national survey findings in the 1960s and 1970s
with those in the 1990s. The measurement of social capital was based upon the General Social
Survey question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Putnam, Tuning Iz, Tuning Out, supra note
17, at 681 n.3. But see Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, Understanding the Decline in
Social Capital, 1952-1998, at 33 (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
8295, 2001) (finding a minimal decrease in some measures of volunteering during the last
three decades of the twentieth century, a slightly larger decrease in the probability of holding a
membership in an association, and a large decline in the probability of entertaining at home),
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often used as a shorthand for a cluster of relationships among members
of a community that motivate how they behave toward and with one
another, the expectations they have of one another, and the range of atti-
tudes, feelings, or bonds that account for these relationships, behaviors,
and expectations. 19 Authors who believe in the importance of social cap-
ital for civic health argue that it makes collective action both more likely
and more efficient because, in the presence of social capital, people co-
operate with one another based upon trust rather than the threat of legal
or other formal sanctions. 20 The lack of social capital, in contrast, results
in collective action and free rider problems and, relatedly, to excessive
reliance on government and public entities to solve community
problems. 21 For example, economists have observed that economic mar-
kets that need to police compliance are less efficient than those with high
levels of interpersonal trust because it is expensive for participants in
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8295.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004); Pamela Paxton,
Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator Assessment, 105 AM. J.
Soc. 88, 104, 114-16, 121-22 (1999) [hereinafter Is Social Capital Declining?] (arguing that
social capital can be disaggregated into interpersonal trust and associational activity, that the
level of associations remains unchanged, and that trust in specific institutions has declined but
the general level of trust in institutions has not). For a critique of the assumption that answers
to the survey question quoted are reliable indicators of people's "disposition ... to be trusters
or distrusters," see Kenneth Newton, Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy, 22
INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 201, 203 (2001) (arguing that trust is not "a generalized personality trait"
and that different forms of social and political trust should be distinguished).
19 On the meanings of social capital, see JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL
THEORY 300-21 (1990); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 138
(1961) (stating that continuity in a neighborhood's networks is necessary because the "net-
works are a city's irreplaceable social capital"); Andrew Greeley, Coleman Revisited: Relig-
ious Structures as a Source of Social Capital, 40 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 587, 587-90 (1997);
Kenneth Newton, Social Capital and Democracy in Modem Europe, in SOCIAL CAPITAL AND
EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY 3, 3-8 (Jan W. van Deth et al. eds., 1999); Paxton, Is Social Capital
Declining?, supra note 18, at 91-97; Dietlind Stolle & Jane Lewis, Social Capital-An
Emerging Concept, in KEY CONCEPTS IN GENDER AND EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLITICS 195 (B.
Hobson et al. eds., 2002). For a critique of the use of the term by Putnam and others, see
Michael W. Foley & Bob Edwards, Escape from Politics? Social Theory and the Social Capi-
tal Debate, 40 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 550, 550-54 (1997).
20 See, e.g., Robert Wuthnow, The Role of Trust in Civic Renewal, in CIVIL SOCIETY,
supra note 2, at 209-10; Kenneth Newton, Social Capital and Democracy, 40 AM. BEHAV.
Sci. 575, 576 (1997).
21 See Edward L. Glaeser, The Formation of Social Capital, in THE CONTRIBUTION OF
HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITAL TO SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND WELL-BEING: INTERNA-
TIONAL SYMPOSIUM REPORT 381, 383 (John F. Helliwell ed., 2001) [hereinafter CONTRIBUTION
OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITAL], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/17/1824983.
pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004); PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 288; Claus Offe,
How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens?, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST, supra note 14, at 42,
45; Eric M. Uslaner, Producing and Consuming Trust, 115 POL. ScI. Q. 569, 574 (2000)
(stating that "[g]eneralized trust leads people to get involved in their communities, even if they
don't expect reciprocity"). See also James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of
Human Capital, in ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS, 94 AM. J. SOC. S95, S 118 (Supp. 1988)
(arguing that because social capital is itself a public good, subject to free rider problems, it
typically emerges as a "by-product[ ] of other activities").
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economic transactions to "protect themselves from being exploited" by
writing contracts "specify[ing] every possible contingency," monitoring
"partners, employees and suppliers," and seeking redress in the courts
rather than through negotiation. 22 Comparative statistics from several
countries reveal a positive correlation between economic and social de-
velopment, on the one hand, and a country's traditions of trust and coop-
eration, on the other.23 Based upon such data, Francis Fukuyama, an
economist and social theorist, argues that Americans today risk losing
their economic prosperity because of certain intellectual trends and cul-
tural developments that have lessened people's spontaneous feelings of
trust for one another. 24
Other civic renewal advocates attribute an important part of the fra-
gility or ineffectiveness of civic life in America today to the fact that
large numbers of people do not participate in decisions that determine the
conditions of their everyday lives, relying instead upon government offi-
cials, government institutions and government-funded institutions, and
other outsiders to provide for their well-being. They trace this situation
primarily to the expansion of the welfare state in the second half of the
twentieth century. 25 The welfare state, according to these authors, failed
in its stated goal of eliminating poverty and its consequences, such as
hunger, bad or non-existent healthcare, inferior education, and substan-
dard housing. 26 More insidiously, these critics argue, it has altered the
attitudes and behaviors of welfare recipients in ways that reinforce a cy-
cle of poverty, e.g., by creating expectations of entitlements and provid-
ing incentives for economic dependency and political passivity.
27
22 Stephen Knack, Trust, Associational Life and Economic Performance, in CONTRIBU-
TION OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITAL, supra note 21, at 172, 173; Stephen Knack & Paul J.
Zak, Building Trust: Public Policy, Interpersonal Trust, and Economic Development, 10 Sup.
CT. ECON. REV. 91 (2002). See also FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 12, at 27, 51, 151,
310-11.
23 See generally FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 12 (arguing that the prosperity in the
United States, Germany, and Japan is a consequence of the three countries' strong civic tradi-
tions as compared with the less prosperous economies of China, France, and Italy, which have
less robust civic traditions).
24 See id. at 5 1; see also infra note 37. Fukuyama uses the phrase "spontaneous sociabil-
ity," a generalized form of trust, to describe people's willingness "to form new associations
and to cooperate within the terms of reference they establish." Id. at 27.
25 See Michael J. Horowitz, Law and the Welfare State, in To EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM
STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 67, 68-71 (Peter L. Berger & Richard John Neuhaus eds., 2d ed.
1996) [hereinafter To EMPOWER PEOPLE]; CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN
SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 178-91 (1984).
26 See MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 25, at 135.
27 Some critics have also argued that welfare benefits encouraged the increase in unwed
mothers and fatherless homes. Given the statistical predictions of impoverished life chances
for children raised in single parent homes (all other things being equal), this ripple effect of
welfare benefits, if true, would be among the most destructive consequences of the welfare
state because of its intergenerational consequences. For the contrary view, namely that wel-
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Civic decline has also been traced to what some civic renewal advo-
cates refer to as the "therapeutic state." As it is used in the civic renewal
literature,28 the term refers to the proliferation of therapeutic profession-
als and the increasing tendency to explain or justify behavior in psycho-
logical terms. 29 Critics believe that these developments have contributed
to a "culture of narcissism and self-indulgence" 30 and that the medical
metaphor which provides the conceptual foundation for the legitimacy of
the therapeutic state undermines people's sense of responsibility for their
actions and even for their situation in life. 31 When used properly, thera-
peutic interventions and attitudes have the potential to motivate people to
take control of, and assume responsibility for, their own behaviors.
When therapeutic insights are misused, however, the result may be to
deprive people of a moral compass or erode their sense of personal re-
sponsibility for their actions or the quality of their lives.32
Some civic renewal advocates have linked the contemporary lack of
civic engagement to the frequent and excessive regard for the opinions of
experts, even in situations where the judgments of citizens may be more
useful. 33 This deference to experts dates to the Progressive era,34 when
fare benefits have not been shown to encourage illegitimacy, see Charles Murray, Does Wel-
fare Bring More Babies?, 115 PUB. INT. 17 (1994).
28 The phrase "therapeutic state" was initially coined in response to the growing practice
of the medical and other professions to characterize socially undesirable or illegal behaviors as
products of mental illnesses with organic (brain) causes. See THOMAS S. SZAsz, THE THERA-
PEUTIC STATE: PSYCHIATRY IN THE MIRROR OF CURRENT EVENTS 13-14 (1984). For Szasz,
this tendency arose, in part, to lessen the severity of criminal sanctions for such behaviors and
"to expand the scope of noncriminal social controls (to compensate for the inadequacy of
criminal sanctions as a means of controlling distressing conduct, such as depression)." See
Thomas Szasz, Myth of Mental Illness, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL HEALTH 743, 745 (1998).29 See Michael S. Joyce, On Self-Government, 90 POL'Y REV. 41, 44 (1998).
30 See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., THE THERAPEUTIC STATE: JUSTIFYING GOVERNMENT AT
CENTURY'S END 1-21 (1998) [hereinafter THERAPEUTIC STATE].
31 These critics single out members of the therapeutic professions who encourage their
clients to see their situations or problems as caused by illegitimate familial, institutional, or
moral authorities See id. at 2-4. See also id. at 15-17; William A. Schambra, By the People:
The Old Values of the New Citizenship, 69 POL'Y REV. 32 (1994) [hereinafter By the People]
(deploring the assumption that people are "helpless, pathetic victims of social forces that are
beyond their understanding or control").
32 See Derek L. Phillips, Authenticity or Morality?, in THE VIRTUES: CONTEMPORARY
ESSAYS ON MORAL CHARACTER 23, 27 (Robert B. Kruschwitz & Robert C. Roberts eds.,
1987). In addition, when superficial versions of therapeutic concepts and strategies come to
permeate popular culture, as they do in many parts of the U.S. today, the potential for their
misuse is magnified because such concepts derive from and perpetrate a questionable theory of
human identity. See id. at 34.
33 See, e.g., Michael S. Joyce & William A. Schambra, A New Civic Life, in To EM-
POWER PEOPLE, supra note 25, at 11, 28.
34 For the ideas expressed in this and the next paragraph, see id. at 15-18; William A.
Schambra, Progressive Liberalism and the American "Community," 80 PuB. Lrr. 31, 36
(1985) [hereinafter Progressive Liberalism]. See also THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SO-
CIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 35-36 (1978). For a concise description of the ascendancy of rule
by experts as a public policy ideal and as a political reality, see SCHUDSON, GOOD CITIZEN,
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the judgments of experts informed by the sciences, especially the social
sciences, came to be valued over judgments grounded in experience and
common sense. 35 At the same time, the Progressives entertained the
hope that experts would govern in the national interest, in contrast to
ordinary citizens, who are too uninformed, disorganized, or selfish to
govern properly, or too timid to counter the influence and self-serving
interests of others, particularly powerful corporations. 36 The theoretical
basis for these developments is attributed to the contemporary expansion
of rights doctrines, 37 the preference for solutions involving big, central-
ized government, 3a or the ascendancy of the idea of a national commu-
nity that vies with local communities for citizens' loyalty.
39
Whatever their view of the cause of the decline, many civic renewal
advocates concerned with civic passivity believe that increases in peo-
ple's participation in voluntary associations will be useful, even critical,
to counter the collective action problems America currently faces.
Viewed from this perspective, civic participation is sought instrumen-
tally, for the sake of enabling private parties to work together to improve
living conditions in their neighborhoods, cities, regions, and states.
40
supra note 2, at 211-19, 219-23 (describing the efforts made during the period between the
two world wars to preserve face-to-face communities).
35 See Joyce & Schambra, A New Civic Life, supra note 33, at 20.
36 See id. at 11, 14, 15-18. See also Richard Hofstadter, The Meaning of the Progressive
Movement, in THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 1900-1915, 11, 14 (Richard Hofstadter ed.,
1963). The national government was also expected to facilitate social justice, for example, by
redistributing national wealth and income through a progressive tax system. Joyce & Scham-
bra, A New Civic Life, supra note 33, at 14.
37 See, e.g., FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 12, at 314-16 (arguing that American's un-
compromising "rights-based individualism" and "rights culture" are greater threats to a healthy
civil society that is the welfare state). See also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 5 (1991) (asserting that the entrenchment of rights
doctrine in America is one reason for the weakening of local government, political parties, and
political participation since World War II).
38 See MICHAEL TANNER, THE END OF WELFARE: FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE CIVIL SOCI-
ETY 2 (1996); DAVID FRUM, DEAD RIGHT 4 (1994).
39 See William A. Schambra, Is There Civic Life Beyond the Great National Commu-
nity?, in CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 2 [hereinafter Beyond the Great National Community]
(describing Herbert Croly's call for a genuine national community); Joyce, On Self-Govern-
ment, supra note 29, at 43; Schambra, Progressive Liberalism, supra note 34, at 33-34, 37
(arguing that the idea of a national community also inspired the presidencies of Franklin
Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy and reached its heyday with the programs proposed by Lyn-
don Johnson). By "national community," these two authors do not mean simply the existence
of a strong national government. Rather, they are referring to the idea popularized by Progres-
sives at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century in America of a
community at the national level that mirrors-and rivals- small, local communities in de-
manding citizens' sense of belonging, loyalty, and sacrifice.
40 Not all analysts concerned with the impoverishment of civic life agree that the federal
government and its policies are the primary cause of civic decline or that civic decline can be
reversed by eliminating big government. See Don E. Eberly, Building the Habitat of Charac-
ter, in THE CONTENT OF AMERICA'S CHARACTER: RECOVERING CIVIC VIRTUE 41 (Don E. Eb-
erly ed., 1995) [hereinafter CONTENT OF AMERICA'S CHARACTER]; EBERLY, AMERICA'S
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Cooperation perspective authors have been at pains to explain how
voluntary associations impact collective action problems. In some for-
mal and informal voluntary associations, members may be willing to ex-
pend time, energy, and other resources because of their belief in the
power of pooled group resources, peer group pressures, acceptance of
group norms of cooperation, the visibility of each member's conduct, the
desire for approval or respect within the group, the reluctance to disap-
point other members, experience with or knowledge about others in the
group suggesting that they will not defect, or other motives deriving from
the internal dynamics of small groups. 4' However, the success of civic
renewal also depends upon cooperative action between and among
groups of varying sizes and among individuals in communities too large
for all members to know, or know about, one another directly or indi-
rectly. These settings pose different challenges for effective collective
action than do small groups because of the need for people to cooperate
with strangers in situations that lack the motivational factors common in
small group dynamics. 42
Robert Putnam and other theorists argue that in-group bonds and
attitudes will develop into generalized cooperative dispositions and be-
haviors. Putnam's account of the manner in which participation in vol-
untary associations contributes to the genesis of cooperation and well-
being is instructive.
[S]ocial capital undergird[s] good government and eco-
nomic progress[.] First, networks of civic engagement
foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity: I'll do
this for you now, in the expectation that down the road
you or someone else will return the favor. "Social capi-
tal is akin to what Tom Wolfe called the 'favor bank' in
4
PROMISE, supra note 2, at 66-67; John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Lord's Work: The Church and Civil
Society, in COMMUNITY WORKS: THE REVIVAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN AMERICA 50, 55-56 (E.J.
Dionne, Jr. ed., 1998) [hereinafter COMMUNITY WORKS] (citing Lester M. Salamon, Sen.
Daniel Coats, and William J. Bennett, who argue that government and non-government sectors
must work together).
41 See Jack Knight, Social Norms and the Rule of Law: Fostering Trust in a Socially
Diverse Society, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 354, 356-57 (K. Cook ed., 2002); Mark Granovetter,
Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481
(1985). See also infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the sociological concept of integration).
42 See, e.g., Dietlind Stolle, Clubs and Congregations: The Benefits of Joining an Associ-
ation, in TRUST IN SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 202, 211 [hereinafter Clubs and Congregations]
(demonstrating that small groups show more in-group trust than do large groups and that
strong in-group trust and generalized trust are not positively correlated); Toshio Yamaghishi &
Kaori Sato, Motivational Bases of the Public Goods Problem, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 67 (1986); see also below Part II.C.2-3.
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his novel The Bonfire of the Vanities," notes economist
Robert Frank.43
For Putnam, then, participation in groups produces norms disposing peo-
ple to repeated acts of working with others toward their mutual or respec-
tive goals. The bonds thus created and the networks of active citizens
thus formed together comprise a collective resource-social capital.
Putnam's account also makes clear that the conditions of civic
health are grounded in personal or mutual benefit, and in community
benefit insofar as it furthers personal or mutual benefit.44 An association
member's expectation of a future benefit underlies the habit of coopera-
tion ultimately formed, and it supplies the psychological basis for the
habit to endure. The end result is a society characterized by generalized
reciprocity or interpersonal trust, in which people associate their private
interests with the private interests of others and with the interest of the
community in cooperation among the various groups and individuals.
The portrait of civic life suggested by the passage quoted above
may at first seem a somewhat crass formulation of the golden rule. At
one level, there is an overarching sense of quid pro quo. Civil society
theorist Robert Wuthnow, however, argues that the reciprocity-based
sense of community common at earlier times in America's history was in
fact superior to notions of sacrifice advanced by some today because it
gave rise to a deep and natural sense of caring and camaraderie. 45 Ac-
cording to Wuthnow, people's willingness formerly to take time off from
work to help a neighbor, attend weddings and funerals, and participate in
small-town life was better not only because it was natural, but because it
had the effect of "restrain[ing] individual greed and ambition. '4 6 He ar-
gues that because caring was mutually beneficial, it was neither egoistic
43 Putnam, Prosperous Community, supra note 17, at 37; Robert D. Putnam, The Pros-
perous Community: Social Capital and Economic Growth, 356 CURRENT 4, 5 (1993). See also
JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SocIAL THEORY 306-08 (1990) (describing reciprocity
in terms of "credit slips" created by helping others and assumed to entitle the bearer to assis-
tance in the future). In BOWLING ALONE, Putnam repeats most of the passage quoted from two
of his earlier works, but he omits the adjective "generalized" and the phrase "down the road."
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 20. This may mean that by 2000, he had come to
believe that the dynamic described in the quotation accounts only for the specific form of
reciprocity that anticipates a benefit in the short-term.
44 Putnam's earlier work emphasizes the importance of economic prosperity and govern-
mental integrity as the primary goals of civil society. See generally Putnam, Prosperous Com-
munity: Social Capital and Economic Growth, supra note 43; Putnam, Prosperous
Community, supra note 17. In BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 326-35, Putnam discusses a
broader range of individual and social goals, such as physical and mental health and stable
families.
45 See Robert Wuthnow, Rediscovering Community, 31 VA. SOc. SC. J. 1, 1 (1996)
(noting that, in earlier times, "[t]ime spent helping a sick neighbor might well be repaid to-
morrow when the tables were turned").
46 Id. at 1-2.
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nor altruistic. In contrast, community activities and volunteering today
have acquired a moral symbolism that, in Wuthnow's view, arose be-
cause of, and makes sense only against the backdrop of, a materialistic
and individualistic baseline.47 Thus, he argues that the generalized reci-
procity of former times promoted a stronger, purer sense of community
than do community activities today, which are tainted by virtue of
originating in a sense of emotional neediness and guilt.48
If Wuthnow is correct,49 the reflexive sense of cooperation that Put-
nam applauds would be desirable because of its impact on people's char-
acter as well as for its economic and social consequences. However, the
concept of self-interest rightly understood, like the concept of reciproc-
ity, does not imply the desire to do something for its own sake, i.e.,
because it is the right thing to do.50 At least for some theorists, a habit of
helping that originates in self-interest would fall short of the ethic of
caring Wuthnow and Putnam seem to attribute to it. 51
47 See id. at 2, 4-5, 7. In former times, caring was normal, something people did natu-
rally; now, it is "intentional, deliberate, a matter of choice." Id. at 4. According to Wuthnow,
"serving the community through volunteer work takes on added significance today because
work itself is generally regarded as a place where caring is absent." Id. at 7.
48 See id. at 7-8.
49 Some aspects of Wuthnow's discussion raise questions. First, he frequently cites June
Cleaver and at-home housewives in his anecdotes about people who used to be available to
take care of neighbors' children, help the sick, and have personal knowledge of goings-on in
the neighborhood (although he also mentions working activists and people who stay home
from work to help others). See id. at 1-4. Cf. William A. Galston, Won't You Be My Neigh-
bor, 26 AM. PROSPEcr 16, 18 (1996) (observing that "I cannot help thinking that, as a matter
of history, the term 'social capital' refers in significant measure to the uncompensated work of
women outside the domains of both home and market"). Second, Wuthnow states that most
people today "vehemently deny that guilt has anything to do with their community service
activities." Wuthnow, Rediscovering Community, supra note 45, at 8. This statement seems
to be contrary to the facts as I know them. Above all, Wuthnow's argument depends upon a
preference for what is natural (understood as spontaneity) over what is chosen as the basis for
behavior. See id. at 4. This is an important philosophical perspective; yet its superiority to
philosophical perspectives ranking virtues that are chosen as superior to those that are natural,
is not self-evident. Without some justification (which Wuthnow does not provide), this part of
his argument for a reciprocity-based sense of community is weak.
50 Wuthnow appears to base his equation of the two concepts on the naturalness or spon-
taneity of old-style caring and community participation. See Wuthnow, Rediscovering Com-
munity, supra note 45, at 2 (normal, natural), 6 (basic to our nature). The contrast is with
much new-style charitable and volunteer activity that, in his view, is calculated to counter our
emotional voids or is driven by guilt. Even if Wuthnow's assessment of the origin of contem-
porary volunteering is accurate, he may be wrong about the past.
51 A habit ultimately based upon notions of reciprocity, in other words, is not the same
thing as a habit based upon beliefs about what is right for its own sake (or because of a divine
command). Actions based upon both appear to be sought for their own sake; only in the latter
case, however, is the origin of the habit also a belief about the intrinsic rightness of actions of a
certain kind. Wuthnow seems to acknowledge this point elsewhere, in discussing the etiology
of trust, when he says that "trust is not simply a matter of making rational calculations about
the possibility of benefiting by cooperating with someone else." Robert Wuthnow, The Foun-
dations of Trust, RP. FROM INST. FOR PHIL. & PUBLIC POL'Y, Summer 1998, at 3, 7 (contrast-
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The assumption of cooperation theorists that interpersonal trust
within an association will lead to the creation of generalized interper-
sonal trust toward people outside the group 52 has generated much com-
mentary and criticism. In addition to challenges based upon empirical
data,53 some critics have pointed to the failure of cooperation theorists to
explain convincingly the genesis of interpersonal trust that transcends the
boundaries of a particular group.54 According to one commentator, "in-
terpersonal trust ... is by definition specific and contextual," and is qual-
itatively different from the "impersonal phenomenon" that Putnam, for
example, labels "generalized trust."'55 In his later writings, Putnam at-
tempts to address this issue by distinguishing between "bonding" groups,
which can achieve their objectives without interacting with outsiders, and
"bridging" groups, which facilitate the formation of interpersonal trust
across group lines because they seek a goal that is unattainable without
the help of outsiders. 56
More than a few commentators have described Putnam's "bonding"
groups less charitably than he does, noting that they can "foster invidious
stereotypes" and engage in "subordination" of outsiders. 57 Such critics
point out that a significant number of traditional associations favored by
Putnam and other civic renewal advocates were exclusionary and that, at
times, the bonds created or reinforced among group members were based
on hostility toward outsiders-women or blacks or anyone who was not
Irish (or Italian, or Jewish, or Armenian). There is thus the possibility
that membership in the type of small voluntary associations often seen as
fertile grounds for the growth of social capital and trust could well have
the opposite effect, i.e., it could reduce the level of trust toward people
outside the group while simultaneously increasing the trust among mem-
bers of the group. 58 Other authors have recognized a distinction similar
ing trust based upon calculation with trust based upon a moral belief in the intrinsic goodness
of trust).
52 Generalized interpersonal trust is also referred to as "community-wide social capital."
The term "community" can be ambiguous, however, since a single group constitutes a commu-
nity in one sense. As used in the following discussion, "community" will refer to relatively
large aggregates of groups having potentially different interests, such as a ward, precinct,
town, county, state, region, or nation. Communities are not necessarily based upon geography.
See BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA, supra note 34, at 7, 10, 144-45.
See also infra note 59 (distinguishing between private and public social capital).
53 See infra Part II.C.
54 See, e.g., Cohen, Trust, Voluntary Association and Workable Democracy, supra note
14, at 219-223 and sources cited at 219-22 nn.10-12.
55 Id. at 221.
56 See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 22-24, 134-44.
57 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 106,
109 (1986); sources cited infra at note 59.
58 See Margaret Levi, Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's
Making Democracy Work, 24 POL. & Soc'Y 45, 47-48 (1996). See also MARY DOUGLAS,
How INSTITUTIONs THINK 1 (1986) (noting that cooperation and solidarity within a group
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to that of Putnam's bridging and bonding groups, and, like him, they fail
to explore the relationship between the two forms of social bonds, which
are arguably in tension with each other.5 9
A question remains whether participation in voluntary associations
actually produces any norms of community-wide social capital or gener-
alized interpersonal trust with regard to people outside the group.60 If it
does not, participation in traditional voluntary associations will not nec-
essarily turn members' hearts and minds toward collective action with
outsiders or other groups much less toward public welfare, and it might
even reinforce conflicts that inhibit cooperation among heterogeneous
groups. This possibility, coupled with the other difficulties discussed in
this section, constitute serious practical impediments to constructing co-
herent public policies that will invigorate and elevate the level of civil
society.
Political theorist Nancy Rosenblum challenges the assumptions of
cooperation theorists from a different direction. Unlike other commenta-
tors who have observed that participation in voluntary associations could
promote social bonds and cooperation among criminals and malcontents,
Rosenblum argues that, unless a group engages in illegal activities, the
psychological benefits to members of secret societies and some paramili-
tary groups may have a positive societal effect by reducing the members'
most extreme tendencies. 61 She maintains more broadly that even exclu-
sionary groups, such as homeowners' associations, are desirable, al-
though the cooperation they foster does not coincide with the specific
imply rejection and mistrust of outsiders); Robert W. Jackman & Ross A. Miller, Social Capi-
tal and Politics, 1 ANN. REV. POL. Scl. 47 (1998) (noting that there are "thriving voluntary
associations in ethnically divided societies" engaged in activities that are not socially desira-
ble); Alejandro Portes & Patricia Landolt, The Downside of Social Capital, 26 AM. PROSPECT
18, 19 (1996) (noting that "[t]he same strong ties that help members of a group often enable it
to exclude outsiders"); Rhode, Association and Assimilation, supra note 57, at 108-09 (dis-
cussing all-male associations and their deleterious effects-such as discrimination, fostering
social stereotypes, and denying individual women opportunities that go with membership-and
early all-female organizations, some of which challenged while others reinforced women's
traditional roles); Peter Y. Hong, Bowling Alley Tour Refutes Theory of Social Decline, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at Al.
59 For example, Dietlind Stolle and Thomas Rochon acknowledge a distinction between
"private social capital" and "public social capital." See Dietlind Stolle & Thomas R. Rochon,
Are All Associations Alike?: Member Diversity, Associational Type, and the Creation of Social
Capital, 42 Am. BEHAV. Sci. 47, 48-50 (1998) [hereinafter Are All Associations Alike?]. They
describe private social capital as the "capacity for collective action, cooperation, and trust
within the group, enabling the collective purposes of the group to be achieved more easily."
Id. at 48. Public social capital, in contrast, facilitates such things as tolerance and working
toward community based goals. Id. at 48-50. However, these two authors do not assert a
causal (or other) relationship between the two forms of social capital.
60 This question is examined infra Part II.C.
61 See NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLU-
RALISM IN AMERICA 273-75 (1998) [hereinafter MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS].
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interests of the larger communities in which they reside, because all
groups engaged in lawful activities contribute to the "moral uses of
pluralism. '62
Sociologists Michael Foley and Bob Edwards criticize this civil so-
ciety perspective based upon radically different premises. They argue
that the "cooperation theorists" have a tendency to "suppress the conflic-
tive character of civil society, seeking in society and its inner workings
the resolution of conflicts that politics and the political system in other
understandings are charged with settling or suppressing." 63 This chal-
lenge amounts to a frontal attack on one of the most basic principles of
the first perspective in the civil society debate, namely, that the proper
forum for airing and settling what are essentially public disputes should
be outside the boundaries of formal political institutions. So conceived,
the disagreement is profoundly theoretical. Curiously, however, it calls
to mind a practical shift in attitude voiced by increasing numbers of teen-
agers and young adults, namely, that they view formal political structures
as less relevant to democratic input and resolution of community
problems than are local, community-based institutions, charities, and in-
formal local initiatives.64
Foley and Edwards also argue that strong non-political voluntary
associations have the potential to undermine, and not just strengthen,
democratic institutions. They note that such associations often promote
the parochial needs of their members and, as a consequence,
"[e]stablished interests may lock up social resources and block society's
ability to meet the demands of the dispossessed .... -65 In their view,
Putnam and other cooperation theorists who fail to address the serious-
ness of potential conflicts between the special interests promoted by such
voluntary associations and community interests give a partial and overly
optimistic account of the role of these groups in a healthy civic society.
A complete account, for Foley and Edwards, would examine, from both
62 See Nancy L. Rosenblum, The Moral Uses of Pluralism, in Civn SOCIETY, supra note
2, at 255; see also Peter Swords, Pluralism As a Public Good (Feb. 2002) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the author).
63 Foley & Edwards, Escape from Politics? Social Theory and the Social Capital De-
bate, supra note 19, at 551.
64 See, e.g., LAKE SNELL PERRY & Assoc. & THE TARRANCE GROUP, INC., SHORT-TERM
IMPACTS, LONG-TERM OPPORTUNITIES: THE POLITICAL AND Civic ENGAGEMENT OF YOUNG
ADULTS IN AMERICA 10-12 (2002) (noting that young adults tend to see political activism and
community activism as separate categories and to prefer the latter) (report prepared for the
Center for Information and Research in Civic Learning & Engagement, the Center for Democ-
racy & Citizenship, and the Partnership for Trust in Government at the Council for Excellence
in Government) (on file with author).
65 Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, The Paradox of Civil Society, 7 J. Democracy
38, 45 1996, at 38. They argue that Robert Putnam fails to confront this issue sufficiently
because his definition of relevant associations emphasizes "broad, horizontally structured
groups capable of 'cutting across' salient social cleavages." Id. at 44.
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theoretical and empirical perspectives, the relationship between non-po-
litical and political organizations since the salutary effects of non-politi-
cal groups ultimately "depend upon the prior achievement of both
democracy and a strong state." 66
B. THE SELF-GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE
A second perspective animating the civic renewal discussion em-
phasizes a different aspect of collective action undertaken through volun-
tary associations. Civic well-being, as depicted by this perspective,
consists in the aggregate conditions that make possible or encourage self-
governance and autonomy. According to this view, people engage in
self-governance when they obtain control over their own lives by taking
part in decisions that will affect how they live. As a result, this perspec-
tive emphasizes the importance of local governing boards, town hall
meetings, and neighborhood associations for nurturing and giving ex-
pression to an active citizenry. 67 Purely private voluntary organizations
are also considered essential because they provide opportunities for peo-
ple to learn the skills needed in decision-making contexts in general.68
Some versions of this perspective also posit that the process of
reaching decisions should be deliberative, as well as participatory, so that
"a wide range of competing arguments is given careful consideration in
small-group, face-to-face discussion. '69 This approach rejects the identi-
fication of self-governance with "negative freedom," i.e., freedom from
external interference or constraints 70 and equates it with some form of
positive freedom, such as the freedom to pursue an affirmative goal like
self-fulfillment or self-realization. 7' So understood, self-governance en-
tails personal self-mastery and civic responsibility.72 As a consequence,
"[dlecentralization alone will not automatically lead to a revival of civic
virtue; it is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition thereof. 73 If
autonomy over one's life without more were sought, the result could be
66 Id. at 47.
67 See Joyce & Schambra, A New Civic Life, supra note 33, at 20. The authors mention
"small groups, family, neighborhood, church, and ethnic and voluntary associations" as com-
ponents of the type of "face-to-face, participatory community" that citizens need. Id. at 28.
68 See sources cited infra at notes 186, 273.
69 See JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY
34 (1995).
70 As long as it is consistent with the same freedom for others.
71 See Charles Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ISAIAH BERLIN 175, 176-77 (Alan Ryan ed., 1979).
72 See Joyce, On Self-Government supra note 29, at 46-47. See also EBERLY,
AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 2, at 13, 135, 164-65.
73 Joyce, On Self-Government, supra note 29, at 47.
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to legitimize and reinforce the push toward atomism, privacy, and sepa-
ration, which prevent or erode social and communal bonds.7 4
The self-governance perspective is espoused by political conserva-
tives as well as political liberals. For political conservatives, the neces-
sity for self-governance is the theoretical basis for their disparagement of
the welfare state, the idea of a national community, centralized govern-
ment, and the therapeutic orientation of our legal, educational, and popu-
lar cultures. In their view, these twentieth century developments have
created institutional and legal barriers to individuals taking part in public
decisions affecting their lives, and they have contributed to psychological
or internal barriers that tend to discourage people from taking active con-
trol of their lives. 75
Some liberal theorists have also rejected the equation of self-gov-
ernance with freedom from interference, arguing that the idea of purely
negative freedom is inherently incoherent 76 and that a liberal state devoid
of affirmative purposes is neither possible nor desirable. 77 The purpose
may be to realize "our highest capacities as rational and moral agents"
through political engagement. 78 Alternatively, the purpose can be cast in
private terms, e.g., as "deliberative autonomy," which one legal theorist
equates with "citizens . . .apply[ing] their capacity for a conception of
the good to deliberating about and deciding how to live their own
lives."' 79 Self-governance may also be identified with associational op-
portunities for people to express their fundamentally social natures
74 See EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 2, at 140, 154.
75 See Joyce, On Self-Government, supra note 29, at 45.
76 See Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty, supra note 71, at 179, 181-87,
191-93 (arguing that the idea of negative freedom itself presupposes valuations about
purpose).
77 See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 81-82 (1991) [hereinafter LIBERAL PURPOSES]; Russell Hittinger, Vari-
eties of Minimalist Natural Law Theory, 34 AM. J. JURIS. 133, 149-52, 163-167 (1989). Of
course, not all liberal thinkers would agree. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 55 (Edward
Alexander ed., Broadview Press 1999) (1859) (asserting that "[t]he only freedom which de-
serves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not
attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it"); Morone, The Corro-
sive Politics of Virtue, supra note 2. The classical doctrine of contract in American law is
likewise premised upon the autonomy of the individual and his right to obligate himself to
others, or obligate others to himself, as long as the parties to the contract consent. See, e.g.,
Chad McCracken, Note, Hegel and the Autonomy of Contract Law, 77 TEx. L. REV. 719,
729-30 (1999) and sources cited therein.
78 See Michael Walzer, The Idea of Civil Society: A Path to Social Reconstruction, in
COMMUNITY WORKS, supra note 40, at 123, 125 [hereinafter The Idea of Civil Society].
79 James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1995)
(describing deliberative autonomy as one of the "bedrock structures" of the American
constitution).
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through communal pursuit of their partial goods coupled with a profound
sense of their collective responsibility for one another.80
Some civil society authors have concluded that private groups, such
as voluntary associations, are well-suited to the development of publicly
responsible and deliberative policies because their focus is located some-
where between purely public and purely private concerns. In a public yet
non-political sphere, people can congregate and debate contested issues
in an open and collective forum without the pressure, felt by political
officials, to reach a final decision capable of attracting a legislative ma-
jority. Thus, according to this approach, voluntary associations are more
likely than formal political institutions to be the locus of frank and delib-
erative discussions and to govern through compromise and consent. 81
In addition, their role of providing a forum for collective decision
making outside formal political institutions enables associations (through
their members) to act as a check upon actions contemplated or taken by
formal political institutions and actors. In particular, because of the
skills, confidence, and other resources their active members acquire, vol-
untary associations have the potential to empower their members to make
salutary demands on decision makers, such as requiring them to justify
their decisions publicly and in terms acceptable to diverse groups. 82
Some have also argued that the need for officials to convey explicit and
public justifications of their actions has a tendency to induce them to
articulate their actions in terms of public purposes. Even in situations
where this public articulation is largely rhetorical, it may still have what
one commentator calls the "civilizing force of hypocrisy. '8 3
When civic health is understood as revolving around the conditions
for self-governance of citizens, two courses of action are appropriate.
First, it is necessary to maximize the situations in which citizens act as
lawmakers, i.e., there should be a presumption that members of a com-
munity should make the decisions that impact their community whenever
possible. Relatedly, citizens need to deliberate in an informed and care-
ful way as part of the local decision-making process. Second, private
and public measures should be adopted to encourage individuals to join
80 See Walzer, The Idea of Civil Society, supra note 78, at 131-43.
81 See Jean L. Cohen, American Civil Society Talk, in CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 55,
71 (arguing that deliberation plays a greater role in the "civil public" than in the "political
public").
82 See id. at 74.
83 See id. (citing Jon Elster, Equal or Proportional?: Arguing and Bargaining Over the
Senate at the Federal Convention, in EXPLAINING SOCIAL INSTrrUTIONS 145 (Jack Knight &
Itai Sened eds., 1995)). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law,
38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 78, 81 (1985) (arguing that requiring Congress to state the public pur-
pose of legislation would tend to make it more deliberative and responsible, despite the risk of
legislators advancing boilerplate statements of public purposes).
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voluntary associations, where they will learn or reinforce attitudes and
skills necessary for the active exercise of self-government.
In sum, this perspective advocates civic engagement so that citizens
will be equipped to enjoy freedom through self-governance. The focus
of this perspective is on informed and responsible participation in deci-
sion making in addition to the goal of coordinated and effective collec-
tive action-the hallmark of the first perspective. As a result, the self-
governance perspective differs from the cooperation perspective by con-
ceiving of civic engagement as both the means to and an indispensable
ingredient of civic health. Thus, the cooperation perspective sees civic
life as predominantly instrumental, whereas the self-governance perspec-
tive values civic engagement both instrumentally and as an intrinsic
good. Finally, the cooperation perspective is consistent with either an
interest-group or a more deliberative model of political life, whereas ac-
cording to the self-governance perspective, part of the essence of civic
activity is its potential to transform individuals into thoughtful decision
makers who, in the best case, will be the architects of their own freedom.
C. THE REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS PERSPECTIVE
A third perspective on civic health centers on the goal of strengthen-
ing representative institutions and democratic practices and values. At a
minimum, the democratic idea of political equality entails the right on
the part of all adult citizens to participate in making decisions likely to
affect their lives in a material way, the right to equality of representation,
or a combination of these two. Civic renewal advocates writing from
this perspective emphasize the extent to which and the ways in which
political equality so understood is currently lacking in the United States
and argue that it is unlikely to be achieved through minor adjustments to
existing political arrangements. All the data show that there are large
disparities in political participation that track individuals' socioeconomic
status. For example, although voting is currently the least unequal form
of political participation, voting rates also tend to reflect socioeconomic
differences. 84 The disparity between the participation rates of the more
and less affluent is even greater with other types of political participa-
tion.85 Considering that constituent influence is an important factor af-
84 See the sources cited in Henry E. Brady et al., Beyond SES: A Resource Model of
Political Participation, 89 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 271, 271 n.4 (1995) [hereinafter Beyond SES];
see also SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITy, supra note 5, at 189-90 (citing statistics
shoing that those who earned $15,000 or less in 1988 were roughly 3/5 as likely to vote as
those earning $75,000 or more).
85 This is partially due to the circumstance that contemporary political campaigns in-
creasingly seek contributions of money rather than time. See Louis J. Ayala, Trained for
Democracy: The Differing Effects of Voluntary and Involuntary Organizations on Political
Participation, 53 POL. REs. Q. 99, 101 (2000) [hereinafter Trained for Democracy]; Sidney
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fecting the agendas set by public officials, the asymmetry in participation
rates creates the danger that decision makers will be more concerned
with taking actions responsive to the views of those who participate
most.86 This possibility threatens the legitimacy of representative institu-
tions because there is evidence that different socioeconomic groups voice
different concerns: those at the lowest part of the socioeconomic spec-
trum "are more than twice as likely ... to discuss concerns about basic
human needs such as poverty, jobs, housing, and health," whereas those
at the high end are more likely to be "inspired by economic issues such
as taxes, government spending, or the budget, or by social issues such as
abortion or pornography. 87
Thus, low levels of political participation can both reflect and con-
tribute to civic decline by skewing public policies toward the interests of
those classes with high turnout and participation rates. In addition,
asymmetries in representation violate one of the basic axioms of demo-
cratic theory, which presupposes the equal worth of every citizen,
namely, that "[t]he needs and preferences of no individual should rank
higher than those of any other."'8 8 According to this perspective on civic
health, therefore, persistent political inequalities undermine the moral le-
gitimacy of democracy in America.89
Representative institutions are also problematic to the extent that
democratic political processes seek to reflect the will of the people. Al-
though voting for candidates for public office is typically the primary
mechanism for transmitting the will of the people in a representative sys-
tem, it conveys little specific information about the content of the will of
Verba et al., The Big Tilt: Participatory Inequality in America, 32 AM. PROSPECT 74, 75
(1997) [hereinafter Big Tilt]; Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved
Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. I, 2 n.1 (1997) [hereinafter Unequal Participation] (noting
that public financing could eliminate this source of inequality).
86 This is the case even assuming decision makers act for a variety of motives, including
the public interest (as they understand it).
87 Verba et al., Big Tilt, supra note 85, at 78; see also VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUAL-
ITY, supra note 5, at 247-51, 263-64; Lijphart, Unequal Participation, supra note 85, at 4-5.
But see Michael M. Gant & William Lyons, Democratic Theory, Nonvoting, and Public Pol-
icy, 21 AM. POL. Q. 40 (1993) (arguing that, at least at the level of electing Presidents, research
suggests that the views those who are eligible to vote but stay home mirror the views of those
who in fact vote); RuY A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 100 (1992); RAY-
MOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. RoSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 108-14 (1980) (finding no
significant difference between the candidates favored by voters and nonvoters). Arend
Lijphart, who agrees with the point of view expressed in the text, specifically challenges sev-
eral aspects of Teixeira's analysis. Lijphart, Unequal Participation, supra note 85, at 4.
88 See VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 5, at 10.
89 See id. at 10-15. See also Burt Neuborne, Making the Law Safe for Democracy: A
Review of "The Law of Democracy Etc.," 97 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1588-89 (1999) (reviewing
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS (1998)) (concluding that the consequence of "wealth driven political inequality" is a
"democratic process that is formally equal in theory, but dramatically unequal in.practice").
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the people given that most candidates campaign by declaring their sup-
port for a wide range of policies. A vote for a particular candidate thus
underspecifies the popular support for each of the policies raised during
the campaign, not to mention the positions a candidate adopts after being
elected. 90 Civic renewal thus also requires citizens to take advantage of
additional ways of communicating their ideas and preferences to
lawmakers, e.g., writing letters to members of Congress or state or local
officials, attending and speaking at hearings, submitting grass roots testi-
mony, inviting representatives to a neighborhood meeting, writing an
opinion piece for a newspaper and forwarding a copy to an official's
office, and requesting a meeting with the official's staff to discuss certain
issues (including preparing materials to send in advance of the meeting).
Because voluntary associations are established to promote one or a few
goals common to their members, they have the potential to convey more
concrete and detailed information about the will of their members than is
possible through elections alone. These organizations thus have the po-
tential to serve an important democracy-enhancing function, i.e., to en-
able citizens who make use of such nonpolitical vehicles of civil society
to communicate with lawmakers in a more precise manner than is possi-
ble when they vote. Regardless of whether one believes that lawmakers
are obligated to promote constituents' preferences to the greatest extent
possible or, rather, that their input is part of the total mix of considera-
tions a lawmaker should consider, representation will better reflect the
equal worth of citizens if the above measures become widespread.
In addition to expressing concerns about political equality, observ-
ers of American political life emphasizing the representative institutions
perspective have also argued that the health of such institutions depends
as much on the existence of dispersed, non-governmental centers of
power as it does on governmental institutions such as majority rule, the
separation of powers, and the system of checks and balances. 9' Dis-
persed sources of power, according to this view, are essential to a strong
democracy because the quality of democratic processes depends, in part,
upon citizens' ability to monitor the performance of governmental enti-
ties and demand transparency and accountability. Voluntary associations
90 For other critiques of the adequacy of the system of representation judged by demo-
cratic principles that have been put forward independent of the current civil society debate, see
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 236, 255, 260, 263 (1993) (arguing that
the will of the people is not expressed during ordinary representative politics because during
ordinary politics, the People do not speak); Cohen, Trust, Voluntary Association and Workable
Democracy, supra note 14, at 216 (arguing that the "deliberative genesis and justification of
public policies or decisions deeply affecting the public ... must be seen as constitutive of the
modem form of democracy").
91 For the ideas in this paragraph, see RICHARD A. COUTO & CATHERINE S. GUTHRIE,
MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK BETTER: MEDIATING STRUCTURES, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND THE
DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT (1999); VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 5, at 30-31.
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are well-suited to promote these goals by keeping their members in-
formed and providing a vehicle for them to influence or hold government
actors accountable more effectively than can isolated individuals. 92
Finally, a democracy must be stable for its institutions to operate
effectively. Although concern about the stability of democracy is more
frequently expressed in relation to emerging democracies than for the
United States, it is not uncommon for political scientists and social scien-
tists to argue that the creation and survival of democratic institutions de-
pend, in important part, upon both the existence of social and attitudinal
factors and a certain level of economic prosperity, in addition to the for-
mal structure of political institutions. The causal sequence between eco-
nomic development, civic attitudes, and the stability of democratic
institutions is contested. According to some, interpersonal trust and
other civic attitudes are necessary preconditions of stable institutions and
processes. 93 Others have isolated the preference for gradual political re-
form as the critical civic attitude for ensuring democratic stability, and
they argue that there is no relationship between that preference and the
possession of interpersonal trust.94 Interpersonal trust, for these authors,
is an effect, not a cause, of the longevity and level of democracy. 95
Some research affirming the causal role of civic attitudes in produc-
ing democratic stability has simultaneously confirmed a causal relation-
92 See GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL Ari-
TUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS 301 (1963) [hereinafter THE CIVIC CULTURE]; Yael
Tamir, Revisiting the Civic Sphere, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 214, 223 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1998); Michele P. Claibourn and Paul S. Martin, Information and Accountability: The Influ-
ence of Voluntary Associations on Policy Accountability, available at http://faculty-
staff.ou.edu/C/Michele.P.Claibourn- /information and accountability-v 1.pdf (working
paper).
93 See Ronald Inglehart, The Renaissance of Political Culture, 82 AM. POL. ScI. REV.
1201, 1212, 1214, 1216-18 (1988). Basing his argument on cross-cultural data, Inglehart de-
fends the proposition that in countries with the lowest levels of interpersonal trust and overall
life satisfaction, people tend to support anti-system parties such as those on the extreme Right
or the extreme Left and that countries with high levels of satisfaction and trust are "linked with
the persistence of democratic institutions." Id. at 1216. See also Ronald Inglehart, Trust,
Well-Being and Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST, supra note 14, at 88, 89 [hereinafter
Trust, Well-Being and Democracy]; ALMOND & VERBA, CIVIC CULTURE, supra note 92 (argu-
ing that, based on cross-cultural empirical data, a cluster of attitudes-a "civic culture"-was a
necessary condition for the survival of democratic political institutions). According to In-
glehart, overall life satisfaction is a far more important determinant of democratic stability than
political satisfaction, although the latter attitude may be "a better predictor of the popularity of
a given government". Inglehart, Renaissance of Political Culture, supra, at 1209. Overall life
satisfaction is influenced by economic development, but it is not determined by it. Id. But see
Edward N. Muller & Mitchell A. Seligson, Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of
Causal Relationships, 88 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 635, 637 (1994) [hereinafter Civic Culture and
Democracy] (finding, based upon their causal model and cross-national data, that years of
continuous stable democracy produce "high levels of civic culture" and that economic devel-
opment fosters civic culture indirectly, by producing stable democracy).
94 Muller & Seligson, Civic Culture and Democracy, supra note 93, at 639.
95 Id. at 645, 646-47.
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ship between economic conditions and civic attitudes. According to this
research, economic conditions have a causal relationship with the stabil-
ity of democratic institutions through their impact on civic attitudes. In
particular, poverty has been shown to be conducive to distrust because
"[u]nder conditions of extreme poverty, the loss incurred from misplaced
trust can be fatal."'96 According to the same analysis, economic develop-
ment stabilizes democracy by contributing to the spread of cultural orien-
tations that support democracy. 97 Other studies have similarly concluded
that interpersonal trust decreases with increases in unemployment and
that economic disparities-such as the fact that those with the most
wealth received almost all of the increase in total household wealth in
America in the last two decades 98-are additional sources of instability
for the country's democratic institutions.99 The level of real income is
also strongly and positively correlated with membership in voluntary as-
sociations. 100 To the extent that economic factors are a condition of, or
contribute significantly to, the stability or instability of democracy, the
representative institution perspective argues that the civic renewal debate
must address issues of economic prosperity and economic justice, e.g.,
inequalities in income, wealth, and the allocation of national resources, if
its diagnosis and recommendations are to be effective.' 0'
The representative institutions perspective on civic health empha-
sizes the importance of creating, reinforcing, and popularizing a wide
range of values traditionally associated with democratic forms of govern-
ment. Civil society authors writing from this perspective give pride of
place to the value of equality in many forms, including political equality,
equality of educational and other opportunities, and equality of respect
for individuals regardless of their ethnic, religious, or national back-
ground or socioeconomic status.' 0 2 As ethnic backgrounds, religious af-
96 Inglehart, Trust, Well-Being, and Democracy, supra note 93, at 89. See also Pablo R.
Fajnzylber et al., Inequality and Violent Crime, 45 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (2002).
97 Inglehart, Trust, Well-Being, and Democracy, supra note 93, at 97, 112. Examples are
people's trust that no individual or group will be able to retain political power in violation of
legal limitations and rules and people's deep-seated belief in the legitimacy of the regime. See
id. at 99.
98 See S. LANCE DENNING, FINDING VIRTUE'S PLACE: EXAMINING AMERICA'S Civic LIFE
17 (1999) (citing Edward N. Wolff, How the Pie is Sliced, 22 AM. PROSPECT 58 (1995)).
99 See Caroline Hodges Persell, The Interdependence of Social Justice and Civil Society,
12 SOcIOL. FORUM 149, 157, 158, 161, 163 (1997); Caroline Hodges Persell et al., Civil Soci-
ety and Economic Distress: Possible Causes and Consequences of Associational Memberships
23-24 (July 16, 1998) (paper prepared for The American Sociological Association annual
meeting) (on file with author) [hereinafter Civil Society and Economic Distress].
100 Persell, Civil Society and Economic Distress, supra note 99, at 21-22.
101 For the argument that there is no empirical evidence supporting the view that civic
attitudes are linked in a systematic way with democratic stability or economic prosperity, see
Robert W. Jackman & Ross A. Miller, A Renaissance of Political Culture?, 40 AM. J. POL.
SC!. 632 (1996).
102 See VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 5, at 1-2, 10-15.
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filiations, races, and lifestyles have become increasingly diverse,
pluralism and tolerance have become recognized as central among the
values that promote and reinforce democratic institutions and prac-
tices. 10 3 Some civic renewal authors have put forward other values, such
as optimism and interpersonal trust, as fundamental democratic
values. 104
Some features of the representative institutions perspective on civic
health are potentially in tension with one or both of the first two perspec-
tives discussed. This third perspective endorses the goal of cooperation
and collective action, but in a qualified way. Given the current relatively
high status composition of people active in civic life, simply increasing
the level of civic activity, without more, could leave intact or even in-
crease existing inequalities in representation. 105 Although authors who
stress cooperation and collective action hope for socially beneficial and
just outcomes as well as efficient processes, they appear to assume that a
more robust civic life will necessarily bring such outcomes in its wake.
From the vantage point of the third perspective, in contrast, democracy
presupposes more than formally democratic institutions and an invisible
civic hand.
In addition, in contrast to both of the previous two perspectives, the
representative institutions perspective is much more concerned with par-
ticipation in the political process and influencing lawmakers than with
nonpolitical, i.e., civil, forms of civic activity. This emphasis can be
traced to several considerations. First and foremost, "politics is the
realm for which democratic norms seem to promise a level playing
field."'1 6 Second, status-skewed participatory disparities appear to be
significantly greater for political activities than for some other forms of
civic activity.' 0 7 Third, because some critical prerequisites for enhanced
participation by populations currently unlikely to participate, such as ad-
ditional and better educational and economic opportunities, may well re-
quire the active intervention of governmental authorities, it is important,
103 It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt a comprehensive discussion of demo-
cratic values. Without question, the objectives of effective collective action, autonomy, and
self-governance by an informed and deliberative citizenry, which I have distinguished concep-
tually in the preceding two sections, fit well under this heading, as do various other notions of
freedom.
104 For optimism and generalized trust as core democratic values, see Eric M. Uslaner,
Democracy and Social Capital, in DEMOCRACY & TRUST, supra note 14, at 121, 140-44.
105 See VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 5, at 511, 512-13, 523-24. The
actual operation of associations and the composition of their memberships is far more compli-
cated than can be conveyed in this section. For a discussion of the ways in which they rein-
force, rather than weaken, political inequalities, see John B. Judis, The Pressure Elite: Inside
the Narrow World of Advocacy Group Politics, 3 AM. PROSPECT 158 (1992) and infra Part
I.C.
106 VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 5, at 513.
107 See id. at 74-79, 513.
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according to this perspective, not to minimize the role of politics and
government in enhancing civil society, nor to overstate the potential
achievements of cooperation and collective action by citizen groups.
Finally, in contrast to the self-governance perspective, the represen-
tative institutions perspective of civic health does not inquire, or ask citi-
zens to inquire, into the justification for their preferences as claims on
public resources. The legitimacy of each claim derives from the equal
respect owed to its originator. The self-governance perspective, in con-
trast, rests upon the view that individuals owe themselves, as well as
their communities, the obligation to deliberate about their goals, taking
into account the goals of others and the needs of the community at large,
before concluding that their own goals make legitimate claims on others.
As a consequence, situations could arise in which giving equal weight to
the input of all citizens would meet the standards of the representative
institutions perspective while failing to satisfy those of the self-govern-
ance approach. The failure to consider these differences may lead to
public policies that are politically palatable but conceptually problematic
or counterproductive.
D. THE COMMUNITY MORALITY PERSPECTIVE
The civic renewal literature contains a fourth perspective, which
considers people's character and their moral values and practices to be
constitutive elements of civic health. According to this perspective,
healthy civic life is impossible without widespread acceptance of a core
of moral norms and a sense of moral obligation toward oneself, others,
and the community as a whole.
Although the authors for whom these concerns are central agree
with proponents of the other three perspectives that participation in civic
life is generally important for civic health, many take the view that its
role has been exaggerated. According to Don Eberly, for example, con-
temporary declines in civic engagement are the symptom of a problem
deeper than a lack of participation; they are ultimately attributable to the
fact that American culture has lost its moral compass.' 0 8 Similarly, for
Christopher Beem, civic engagement is a necessary but not sufficient
condition of civic health.I0 9 In his view, the internal dynamic of contem-
porary voluntary associations, including families, fails to foster in people
the moral norms and core democratic values they need to contribute to an
108 See EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 2, at 15, 155, 157.
109 See Christopher Beem, Civil Is Not Good Enough, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Summer
1996, at 47-50 (including the family and all organizational life other than government and the
market in his notion of civil society). Because he includes families as well as organizations,
Beem prefers the term "civil" life to "civic" life. See id. at 47, 52.
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orderly and stable society." 0 Eric Uslander goes further and argues that
moral values and an optimistic world view are far more important deter-
minants of generalized interpersonal trust than is participation in volun-
tary associations or any other life experiences, except a person's race and
level of education."'
Many commentators recognize that voluntary associations can fur-
ther undesirable as well as desirable purposes." 2 Residential community
organizations may be cooperative, but they can also be seen as "organ-
ized and oriented around a barely hidden segregationist, even secession-
ist, agenda." '" 3 In addition, families and their values are not necessarily
sources of civic strength, especially when families impart to their chil-
dren excessively individualist or materialistic values. 1" 4 In principle,
then, the existence of strong social bonds is, in and of itself, morally
neutral unless it derives from or is accompanied by moral values. 15 Ac-
cording to these authors, it is the possession of moral values that enables
people to "look beyond our own self-interest and to longer-term
1 10 See id. at 53-55.
111 See ERIC M. USLANDER, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST 77, 84-85, 90-92,
97-98, 100-04, 106, 108, 110-11 (2002). His assessment applies to what he calls "moralistic
trust," which he distinguishes from "strategic trust." The latter is based primarily upon per-
sonal experiences and extends only to family, friends, and other non-strangers. See id. at
16-18, 21-23. See also Eric M. Uslaner, Morality Plays: Social Capital and Moral Behaviour
in Anglo-American Democracies, in SOCIAL CAPITAL AND EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY, supra note
19, at 215-16.
112 Militia groups and racist organizations are usually mentioned in this connection. See
Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out, supra note 17, at 665 (stating that whether the goals of volun-
tary associations are praiseworthy is "of course, entirely another matter"); EBERLY, AMERICA'S
PROMISE, supra note 2, at 24 (mentioning "the Mafia, militias, and racist enclaves"); Beem,
Civil Is Not Good Enough, supra note 109, at 50 (mentioning the Michigan Militia); Elshtain,
Not a Cure-All, supra note 13, at 15 (noting that local attachments can take "unpleasant
forms"). Ironically, there is evidence that the conspirators in the Oklahoma City bombing
belonged to the same bowling league. See John Clark, Shifting Engagements: Lessons from
the "Bowling Alone" Debate, HUDSON BRIEFING PAPER (Hudson Inst., Indianapolis, Ind.), Oct.
1996, at I (basing his observation upon a report by the NY TIMES, Aug. 13, 1995, at 1). See
also Beem, Civil Is Not Good Enough, supra note 109, at 54 (stating that "more mainstream
groups like the Christian Coalition, the National Rifle Association, the American Association
of Retired Persons, and The National Organization for Women, have come to reflect the bellig-
erence and inflexibility associated with this militaristic orientation").
1 13 Beem, Civil Is Not Good Enough, supra note 109, at 50; see also Daniel A. Bell, Civil
Society Versus Civic Virtue, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 92, at 239, 240, 242-47
(describing the harmful effects of residential community associations and proposing reforms to
enhance their civic benefit).
114 See INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY
NEEDS MORAL TRUTHS 19 (1998) [hereinafter CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY].
115 For a contrary view, see ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS, supra note 61, at
15-17, 50-53, 55, 61-64, 319-27 (arguing that there may be a moral aspect to engagement in
groups even when the character and purposes of the groups is offensive to democratic values
and that a healthy pluralism does not presuppose congruence between group purposes and
public purposes).
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stakes."' 16 Moral values, in short, are critical to ensure that a more ro-
bust civil society is more public-spirited, not just more spirited.
Representative of these views is the Final Report of The National
Commission on Civic Renewal (Report), a document endorsed by a wide
range of political scientists and social scientists, philosophers, and mem-
bers of the nonprofit community.' 17 The Report laments both the coun-
try's moral and its civic ills, deplores the "vulgar" aspects of popular
culture (especially popular music, movies, and television), criticizes the
easy availability of liquor and pornography, and generally decries con-
temporary sexual and material self-indulgence and gratification.' 1 8 Fur-
ther, the Report identifies the weakening of America's moral culture as a
key cause of the country's civic deficiencies.' 1 9 Thus, the Report advo-
cates measures to strengthen personal moral standards and the conduct of
individuals, including public officials, as part of the civic renewal
agenda. 120
Considerable controversy has surrounded the idea of core or com-
mon moral beliefs accepted by all or most citizens, especially when the
core beliefs are cast as "moral truths."'12 1 Critics fear that some of the
core beliefs could well conflict with many citizens' own religious or sec-
ular beliefs, or that some civic renewal advocates are simply con-
founding moral truth with traditional morality. 122 To attempt to inculcate
moral norms as part of the civic renewal agenda would, according to this
view, amount to the coercive imposition of subjective moral views on the
public at large under the ostensibly neutral banner of civic morality. In
addition, commentators have questioned whether the moral norms typi-
cally endorsed by certain segments of the civic renewal community are
in fact likely to create "civic virtue in the sense of the disposition to care
about the common good of the whole polity and the capacity to deliber-
116 Uslaner, Morality Plays, supra note 111, at 216. Uslaner also argues that in the
United States, Canada, and the U.K., "[vialues and expectations of reciprocity reinforce each
other.". Id. at 234.
117 See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CIVIC RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: How Civic
DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMER1CA AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 5-21 (1998) [herein-
after NATION OF SPECTATORS]. For the participants in the Commission and in its deliberations,
see id. at 65-66.
118 See id. at 5, 6, 7, 17-18. See also CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 114, at 5-8.
119 See NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 117, at 6-8.
120 See id. at 11- 12, 13, 14-17, 18. See also CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 114, at
12-13 (arguing that moral truths "underwrite" the civil and political goals of American democ-
racy and that they inform and ensure the Nation's commitment to individual and political
freedom).
121 See CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 114, at 12.
122 See, e.g., Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-
Revivalists, in 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 310 (2000); Nick Gillespie, Truth Squad: The Coer-
cive Agenda Behind the "Civil Society" Movement, REASON ONLINE, Aug./Sept. 1998, at 8.
See generally Morone, The Corrosive Politics of Virtue, supra note 2.
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ate about it," rather than merely addressing standards of personal moral-
ity.123 If not, the core of moral norms arrived at might not be useful for
promoting a culture of public-spiritedness or communal values such as
tolerance.
The conceptual center of the civil society movement, in contrast,
claims to be committed only to a secular and reasoned elaboration of
foundational moral principles. 124 For Don Eberly, for example, there ex-
ist certain universal ideas of right and wrong evident in the writings of
diverse peoples, Eastern and Western, ancient and modern.125 Christo-
pher Beem argues that there are moral norms that transcend particular
epochs, nations, and cultures. 126 The fact that the Judeo-Christian relig-
ious tradition supplied such values for most of the history of the United
States does not, in and of itself, make them intrinsically religious or sub-
jective. According to Eric Uslaner, generalized interpersonal trust and
the commitment to help people different from ourselves are themselves
moral values that "rest upon assumptions about human nature" that tran-
scend people's political and religious differences. 127
123 See McClain & Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, supra note
122, at 310.
124 See EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 2, at 189, 194-95. See also Beem, Civil
Is Not Good Enough, supra note 109, at 56. Beem argues that to be healthy, civil society must
have a core of common values that link citizens together sufficiently to ensure social harmony
in the face of diversity. See id. In Tocqueville's time, there was such a network of common
"regulative principles ... to help Americans distinguish between good and bad civil society."
Id. at 51. Beem calls these truths moral and philosophical principles. Id. That the founding
documents were inspired by some kind of belief in transcendence is not, in his view, a coinci-
dence; on the contrary, a purely particularist moral commitment will have difficulty surviving
the pressures that threaten it. See id. at 57 (stating that a moral consensus must be grounded in
the universal features of human existence and not merely in the belief that they are good for
Americans). Eric Uslaner adds "being married" as a source of moral commitments (based
upon 1981 survey data). Uslaner, Morality Plays, supra note 11, at 229. He also states that
in the U.K., secular morality is the main source of what he calls "self-obey commandments."
Id.
125 See Don E. Eberly, The Quest for America's Character, in CONTENT OF AMERICA'S
CHARACTER, supra note 40, at 19 [hereinafter Quest for America's Character]. Eberly calls
these "values that are universally found in successful societies," although he discusses approv-
ingly the approach of C.S. Lewis, who considered certain moral values transcendent, and that
of Ben Franklin, who considered certain virtues the values that "nourished human civiliza-
tion." Id. at 19, 21.
126 See Beem, Civil Is Not Good Enough, supra note 109, at 57 (contending that there are
"moral beliefs about human rights and equality [that] can be grounded in the universal features
of human existence"). See also EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 2, at 187 (noting that
"there is such a thing as universal moral truth ... that . .. transcends particular religious and
cultural traditions").
127 USLANER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST, supra note I 1l, at 2. Uslaner appears to
differ from Beem and Eberly in that his account of the moral foundation of civic engagement
speaks about the character of people's assumptions about human nature rather than the charac-
ter of human nature itself and attributes these assumptions primarily to early socialization
rather than to experience or reasoning. It is thus possible that, for him, moral norms are
instrumental rather than essential.
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William Galston's understanding of the source and content of the
core moral norms differs from that of Eberly or Beem. Galston argues
that the common moral norms and virtues that are necessary to ground
civil society in America are those that make possible and sustain "liberal
democracy," "self government," and "citizenship."' 28 Such norms and
virtues are "functional or instrumental,"' 29 and thus knowable by practi-
cal reason, not theoretical philosophy or revelation. As a consequence,
to discern the appropriate norms and practices requires a practical under-
standing of constitutional democracies and the American system of gov-
ernment, as well as an analysis of the observations of empiricists.'
30
The Report approved by the members of the National Commission
on Civil Renewal largely implements this functional approach. It identi-
fies as moral virtues: parents putting the well-being of their children
ahead of their "self-gratification;" acknowledging the spiritual capacity
of human beings and circumscribing our personal conduct and that of our
children in light of this human possibility; acknowledging that we have
obligations to people outside of our families and being willing, if neces-
sary, to sacrifice some of our own self-interests to the interests of others;
and acting with moderation and self-restraint in sexual matters, alcohol
consumption, and the satisfaction of physical desires in general.'
3
'
These precepts are clearly moral in character, but they are advanced
because of their usefulness for America's civic goals. For example, the
Report urges people who choose to become parents (or who fail to make
choices to prevent becoming parents) to assume the moral responsibility
of raising, caring for, and loving their children so that the children be-
come educated, caring, and willing participants in civil society. 132 How-
ever, people are not expected, much less exhorted, to become parents in
the first place, as they would be by the commands of certain religious
traditions. Again, the Report appears to urge moderation in the satisfac-
128 William A. Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and Liberal Democracy, 75 Cm.-
KENT L. REV. 603, 604-06 (2000). For a fuller discussion, see GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES,
supra note 77, at 217-28 (1991).
129 Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and Liberal Democracy, supra note 128, at 606.
Instrumental virtues can be "socially functional" without also being "advantageous" to particu-
lar individuals. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES, supra note 77, at 220.
130 See Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and Liberal Democracy, supra note 128, at
606. Liberal democracies in general, Galston argues, need most citizens to possess virtues
such as courage, law-abidingness, loyalty to the government's core principles, responsibility
for oneself, self-restraint, tolerance, entrepreneurial virtues (such as imagination, initiative,
drive, and determination), organizational virtues, a work ethic, the capacity for delayed gratifi-
cation, respect for the rights of others, virtues of citizenship and leadership, a commitment to a
politics of discussion and persuasion, and a commitment to reduce the tension between the
principles and practices of one's community. See GALSTON, LIBERAL VIRTUES, supra note 77,
at 220-27.
131 See NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 117, at 7.
132 See id. at 11, 13.
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tion of sexual and other physical and material desires because some
forms of self-restraint are essential conditions of the self-governance
upon which self-government depends. 33 To that end, it recommends
that potentially destructive (legal) substances and activities be located
away from schools and that their availability in poor neighborhoods be
limited.' 34 But there is no suggestion in the Report that abstaining from
these substances is superior to using them in moderation, as might be the
case according to some religious teachings.
Some civil society commentators refer to the moral norms necessary
for civil society as moral truths, presumably because they are the product
of reasoning about the foundational morality necessary to sustain a dem-
ocratic society. The term "truth" is preferred to "values" because, in
contemporary America, moral values are portrayed as products of indi-
viduals' belief systems or personal and subjective preferences rather than
the product of reasoned arguments open to public scrutiny and discussion
of their validity.' 35 Nothing in the civil society literature precludes the
existence of moral beliefs and practices peculiar to one or more religions
or to non-religious ethical traditions. In fact, most authors assume that
such beliefs and practices will be possessed by most citizens in addition
to, and in part overlapping with, the moral precepts necessary for a
healthy civil society. 136 For civic renewal to succeed, however, such be-
liefs and practices must be in more or less peaceful coexistence with one
another and with the moral norms necessary for a healthy civil society in
America.
In contrast to the point of view just sketched, some civil society
authors concerned about moral values believe that, for the most part,
moral norms are likely to be created and reinforced because of certain
structural features of the American system. For example, William
Schambra has argued that because America is a large commercial repub-
lic, it will have such a multiplicity of interests that local majorities will
not be able to suppress minorities.' 37 He also maintains that because of
133 See id. at 7, 8.
134 See id. at 17. Presumably illegal substances would be discouraged in any amount
because they are illegal.
135 See, e.g., Eberly, Quest for America's Character, supra note 125, at 11-13.
136 See NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 117, at 12 (observing that in general, morality
is reinforced by religious beliefs, but asserting that the moral foundation upon which civil
society depends "does not require any particular denominational creed"). See also CALL TO
CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 114, at 12 (stating that the moral truths that make possible demo-
cratic self-government "are in large part biblical and religious"). However, A CALL TO CIVIL
SOCIETY, unlike NATION OF SPECTATORS, adds that various non-religious sources also
"strongly" inform the moral truths necessary for a democratic civil society, citing the classical
(Greek) natural law tradition, the ideas of the Enlightenment, documents from America's
founding, speeches by Abraham Lincoln and George Washington, and the concept of higher
law endorsed by and materials authored by Martin Luther King. Id.
137 See Schambra, Beyond the Great National Community, supra note 39, at 92.
2004] Civic RENEWAL AND THE REGULATION OF NONPROFITs 321
the size of the commercial republic, no local community can "seal itself
off completely from the moderate habits and values of the
outside . . . world." 138 To illustrate this point, he observes that, as a rule,
merchants will have to be polite to strangers because strangers may in the
future become customers.139
Schambra readily concedes that in a large commercial republic the
marketplace will tend to encourage greed and materialism in citizens.
However, he also believes that:
surely our churches, neighborhoods, and civic associa-
tions have over time managed to temper and moderate
the harshest aspects of the marketplace's self-interest
and materialism. Generation after generation, Ameri-
cans have been taught that there are obligations beyond
mere personal gain and the pursuit of wealth-obliga-
tions to family, community, and faith-and have be-
haved accordingly. 140
On balance, he concludes, the potential mischief of the excesses of the
marketplace has always in the past been successfully offset by the indi-
vidual freedom, civic vitality, and moral community that characterize life
in America.141
Similarly, as was previously discussed, many civil society theorists
argue that participation in voluntary associations tends to generate in par-
ticipants civic virtues such as interpersonal trust, social capital, and gen-
eralized reciprocity.' 42 The civic participation/social capital thesis is
also a structural account of the genesis of virtue because it asserts that
some virtues are likely to arise automatically, as an incident of a certain
kind of behavior. However, as noted earlier, those who advance this
point of view have so far failed to explain how civic virtue developed in
138 Id. at 95.
139 See id. Schambra also notes that there is unlikely to be ethnic or religious warring
factions because the commercial character of the United States has permeated it with "sober,
stolid values." Id. at 95-96. See also MICHAEL NOVAK, BUSINESS AS A CALLING: WORK AND
THE EXAMINED LIFE 115 (1996) (arguing that "[b]usiness has a vested interest in virtue"). See
also id. at 115-168. For a contrasting view, see generally GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ONE NA-
TION, Two CULTURES (1999) (arguing that the capitalistic ethic was an important cause of the
moral decline in the second half of the twentieth century).
140 Schambra, Beyond the Great National Community, supra note 39, at 96. But see id. at
96-97 (conceding that the large commercial republic has not always been successful in curb-
ing people's immoral sentiments).
141 See Schambra, Beyond the Great National Community, supra note 39, at 97 (arguing
that it is because of the "tension between civil society and the marketplace" that the United
States has survived in as good a condition as it has).
142 See supra Part I.A.
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the service of private interests will also be exercised in the public interest
if necessary. 14 3
Civic renewal advocates promoting the fourth perspective reject the
structural approach of Schambra to the emergence of moral norms, and
many have reservations about the structural approach of Putnam as well.
Their claim is that the current weakening of civic life cannot be amelio-
rated simply through legal, policy, or economic reforms. Nor, they ar-
gue, can the problem be solved by transforming the contemporary
organization of people's social and political lives so as to maximize oc-
casions for associational interaction or decision making through old-style
voluntary associations, town councils, and small citizen meetings. In
particular, as Christopher Beem argues, participation in civil life in gen-
eral, and voluntary associations in particular, is unlikely to generate
moral norms unless the greater part of those who join them already pos-
sesses these values. 144 Implicit in this view is the conviction that an
individual's behavior is in large part determined by his or her values and
beliefs, rather than the reverse. Therefore, these theorists reject the view
that the interactions of individuals within associations or the structural
relationships among associations will, without more, give rise to the kind
of morality in members that a decent civil society presupposes. Eric Us-
lander explains the likely link between possessing moral values and be-
having in a trusting and public-spirited manner as follows:
Generalized trusters . . . believe that most people share
the same fundamental values, though not necessarily the
same ideology.. ., and that people are not predisposed to
take advantage of others .... Trusters believe that they
can right wrongs and leave the world a better place than
they found it. And this "effective citizen" is an active
participant in civic life. 145
Several civic renewal authors have asserted that the emphasis on
rights in contemporary America has contributed to the breakdown of
moral values and behavior.146 While not denying that the two phenom-
ena are related, Eberly argues that the causal sequence between rights
and moral value runs in the opposite direction, at least initially. For him,
if morality, custom, and culture in a society no longer distinguish be-
143 See infra Part II.C.
144 See generally Beem, Civil is Not Good Enough, supra note 109; infra Part III.D. See
also Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and Liberal Democracy, supra note 128, at 605 (ar-
guing that "the artful arrangement" of institutions such as checks and balances is insufficient to
sustain liberal democracy); Don E. Eberly, Correspondence: Intellectuals Prefer Culture,
WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 5, 1996, at 6 [hereinafter Intellectuals Prefer Culture].
145 USLANER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST, supra note 11l, at 79-80 (citation
omitted).
146 See, e.g., sources cited supra at note 37.
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tween right and wrong, law and the coercive arm of the state will gradu-
ally become the primary way to constrain behavior. Once that happens,
"citizens are at the same time more prone to resort to law than voluntary
conflict resolution in sorting out their differences and they are dismayed
by the overreach of the law."' 4 7
At the deepest level, therefore, the community morality strand of the
civil society debate attributes defects in contemporary civic life to chang-
ing attitudes toward specific moral codes and to the legitimacy of moral
claims generally. The embodiment of this transformation is the contem-
porary tendency of people toward self-absorption, as reflected in the
American "ideology of self-expression, self-interest, and individual enti-
tlement."' 14 To reverse this development, according to this strand of
civil society theory, civic renewal must begin by building, or rebuilding,
a public moral consensus. 149 For moral values to be recovered and ac-
cepted, however, people must abandon their cynicism and moral skepti-
cism.' 50 Finally, for this last change to occur, people must recognize,
repudiate, and "rebuild[ ] character-shaping institutions."' 5 1
Accordingly, the centerpiece of Eberly's civic renewal recommen-
dations is the reinvigoration of character-shaping institutions, most im-
portantly, the family. The family is a potentially important character-
building institution because it is usually the first institution, chronologi-
cally and psychologically, to imbue children with moral beliefs and so-
cial attitudes such as caring about the well-being of others and
interpersonal trust. He implies that the more successful families are in
building their children's moral character, the less important participation
in voluntary associations is for creating the shared moral norms that sup-
port civil society. 152 Other key character-shaping institutions are schools
147 EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 2, at 112; see also id. at 115. Eberly also
asserts that if people do not have fundamental moral beliefs to ground their actions, they will
turn to economics or science to supply them with fundamental beliefs. Id. at 195.
148 EBERLY, CONTENT OF AMERICA'S CHARACTER, supra note 40, at xii; see Eberly, Build-
ing the Habitat of Character, supra note 40, at 28 (contrasting public spiritedness with self-
absorption).
149 See EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 2, at 12, 196; see also Beem, Civil is
Not Good Enough, supra note 109, at 50. Eberly calls the combination of moral and civic
renewal, with the moral renewal triggering and informing the civic renewal, "civil society
plus." See EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 2, at 5, 15-16.
15o See EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 2, at 12.
151 See id. at 129. See also Don E. Eberly, Question: Can Government Play a Significant
Role in Restoring U.S. Families? No: New Laws Can't Remedy the Nation's Profound Cul-
tural Crisis, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1996, at 25 [hereinafter Can Gov-
ernment Play a Significant Role?]; Eberly, Quest for America's Character, supra note 125, at
6.
152 CONTENT OF AMERICA'S CHARACTER, supra note 40, at xiii. Eberly focuses on what
people think or believe insofar as it affects how they behave; thus, he applauds campaigns to
encourage teen abstinence, parental responsibility, the sacredness of marriage, and so on. See
Eberly, Can Government Play a Significant Role?, supra note 151, at 26.
324 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13:289
and faith-based institutions. At the same time, Eberly does not see the
role of character formation as wholly private. Rather, in his view, "[t]he
job of politics ... is to 'shape the public sentiments,' as Lincoln put it,
without which policy reforms will be of little effect."' 5 3
In sum, interest in community morality has been directed along two
distinct, although related, dimensions: the moral norms of individuals
that guide them in their private conduct, including the familial and social
interactions, and the moral norms of citizens. Although the two dimen-
sions of morality may at times overlap, the former norms are usually
equated with personal moral codes or ethics; the latter are more likely to
be justified in terms of the conditions for public spiritedness, which re-
quire individuals to exert themselves on behalf of or defer to the needs of
persons outside their family, church, or other kinship community. Per-
sonal moral codes, which are traceable to such things as religious doc-
trines, humanist teachings, or cultural practices, do not necessarily result
in much less encouraging public spiritedness.
As was discussed in this section, civic renewal authors writing from
the community morality perspective address personal moral norms for
several reasons. For some, there exist universal moral truths that tran-
scend cultures because they derive from an essential aspect of humanity.
In addition, some authors believe that individuals need to be committed
to certain moral norms or moral behavior to lead purposeful and produc-
tive lives, regardless of their specific goals. As a consequence, they ad-
vocate that families and schools actively seek to provide children with
character education to instill and reinforce such norms and behavior. Fi-
nally, according to commentators who emphasize the inevitable tension
between self-interest and community interest that will occur, a moderate
attitude toward physical and material self-gratification is critical for indi-
viduals to be willing and able to exert themselves on behalf of others
when necessary for public purposes.
E. CONCLUSION
This Part has explored four conceptually distinct perspectives that
figure prominently in the civil society debate. The writings of individual
civic renewal authors may incorporate concerns identified with more
than one of the perspectives described above because some of the per-
spectives are compatible with others. However, when conflicts arise,
those who prize one perspective more than others will subordinate the
latter to the former. Distinguishing these perspectives is, therefore, im-
portant because each perspective is based upon a view of the primacy of
a distinctive value (or cluster of values) over competing, possibly desira-
153 Eberly, Intellectuals Prefer Culture, supra note 144, at 6.
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ble, but nonetheless subordinate, values. As a practical matter, it is not
possible for all of these values to be public priorities simultaneously.
And when they are inherently in tension with one another, the pursuit of
some values may impede the pursuit of others. Thus, as a prelude to
evaluating such proposals, it is important both for public policy and theo-
retical reasons to understand which perspectives and values are embed-
ded in specific proposals.
Underlying the cooperation perspective discussed above is a version
of modem liberal political theory that has as its conceptual core a belief
in the primacy of maximizing individual freedom and government neu-
trality with respect to individual preferences and pursuits. Consequently,
many of the civic recommendations stemming from this perspective are
purely instrumental, i.e., in the service of ends that are not necessarily
themselves civic. The self-governance perspective reflects the concerns
of a distinct strand of liberal political theory, one that contains a particu-
lar view of the nature of human well-being, namely, the belief that in the
best case, individuals should be rational and autonomous in their own
lives and should assume some responsibility for the well-being of the
larger community in addition to their own private interests. Insofar as
autonomy is identified with self-governance, the civic recommendations
based upon this perspective are viewed as intrinsic goods. And, insofar
as the self-governance of individuals promotes collective self-govern-
ance, the recommendations are instrumental. In contrast, according to
the representative institutions perspective, democratic values, especially
equality, are constitutive of civic health. Thus, one immediate goal of
this perspective is equalizing the quantity and quality of citizen input
("voice") reaching political leaders across educational, socioeconomic,
and other status groups. Like the cooperation perspective, and unlike the
self-governance perspective, the representative institutions perspective
does not claim to know the substantive content of individual or collective
well-being, apart from its belief in the equal worth of individuals and the
political imperative of equal representation. Finally, the community mo-
rality perspective views the moral well-being of individuals and the
moral character of their social and communal relationships as paramount.
Similar moral concerns may be urged by proponents of the other per-
spectives on civic health, sometimes under the Tocquevillian rubric of
"self-interest rightly understood." 154 For some proponents of the fourth
perspective, however, people should have an interest in doing what is
right because it is right, and not because of a calculation that moral be-
havior or public-spiritedness might eventually inure to their private bene-
fit. For these theorists, then, civic life can be intrinsically worthwhile,
154 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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but only insofar as it reflects and perpetuates moral norms. In addition,
some authors who emphasize this perspective may also believe in the
intrinsic value of moral life, but they recognize clearly that, to serve as
public norms, moral values must be derived exclusively from, and justi-
fied in terms of, their functional dimension.
II. THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Before considering the implications of the differences among the
four perspectives for the regulation of voluntary associations, it is useful
to examine how and under what conditions associations can perform the
types of the citizen-enhancing work attributed to them. At a minimum,
this involves appreciating that "voluntary associations" are not mono-
lithic: they have different attributes, and some are better suited than
others to nurture civic spirit or perform community-oriented functions. It
also entails examining the empirical research that investigates the condi-
tions under which such associations achieve the hoped-for outcomes.
A. CLASSIFICATIONS OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
Voluntary associations can be classified in a variety of ways. They
are often divided into market and non-market organizations, and the lat-
ter are further divided into families and non-kinship groups formed vol-
untarily.15 5 For-profit entities are typically excluded, even though they
are voluntary associations, on the ground that they do not create or rein-
force social capital or promote civic engagement. 156 Large bureaucratic
voluntary associations with enormous membership rolls are sometimes
bracketed because they require little of their members beyond writing a
check,' 57 even though such organizations are civically active to promote
the interests of their members among lawmakers at the local, state, or
national levels. Their political leverage derives from the ease with which
155 See supra notes 12-14. Jeffrey Berry and David Arons argue that voluntary associa-
tions should be considered a subset of nonprofits. See JEFFREY M. BERRY & DAVID F. ARONS,
A VOICE FOR NoNPRoFITs 26-27 (2003). They reserve the term "voluntary association" for
organizations whose members are involved in the groups' operation and leadership. Id. They
would thus exclude organizations operated primarily by professional staffs, even if funded by
grass roots donations. Id. Most authors do no limit the use of the term this way, however,
although the civil society debate would be much clearer and more useful if they did.
156 Some scholars have argued, however, that workplaces can contribute to civic engage-
ment by giving workers skills, experiences, and networks of associates that facilitate civic
involvement.
157 See Theda Skocpol, Associations Without Members, 45 AM. PROSPECT 66, 68-69,
71-73 (1999). AARP is one such organization. Organizations that require check-writing as
the primary mode of participation need not be huge, but very large organizations on average
tend to want or need less in the way of direct participation on the part of their members than do
their smaller counterparts.
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they can, through newsletters and other communications, inform their
members about the substance and status of legislation under considera-
tion, mobilize them to favor particular positions on issues, and encourage
them to register, vote, and otherwise become politically active.
For purposes of state and federal regulation, the most basic distinc-
tion among formal voluntary organizations is between the treatment of
for-profit and nonprofit entities. Voluntary business organizations may
be for-profit companies or nonprofit groups such as trade associations,
chambers of commerce, and other professional associations. Although
the primary purpose of these nonprofit organizations is commercial, they
are regulated as nonprofits under the business and tax laws of most states
and under the Code because they do not contribute directly to the profit-
ability of any specific firm and do not themselves generate profits for
distribution to members or shareholders.1 58 Instead, such groups further
the interests of an industry or profession by collecting and providing in-
formation relevant to an entire class of businesses, establishing business
or professional standards, and lobbying government officials or the pub-
lic at large on behalf of industry positions. 159 Some types of veterans
groups, fraternal beneficiary societies, and labor organizations are also
treated as nonprofits under state and federal law. 160 Although some of
these associations may engage in ad hoc or ongoing charitable activities,
their primary goal is to improve conditions for their members, e.g., by
organizing social activities, providing insurance or other benefits to their
members at discount rates, and lobbying. By virtue of being classified as
nonprofits, these organizations receive tax benefits and other favorable
treatment under state and federal law. 16 1 In contrast to mutual benefit
158 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (2000) (identifying the organizations listed in the text as
candidates for exemption from federal income taxation). For elaboration of the characteristics
required of such organizations in order to gain federal exemption, see Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-l (1994). All of the nonprofit organizations described in the text are classified
as "exempt organizations" if they qualify for exemption from federal income taxation under
section 501 of the Code.
159 Such groups are sometimes referred to as mutual benefit organizations. See Boris I.
Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income
Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 305-06 (1976).
160 See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(5) (unions and other labor organizations), 501(c)(8) (fraternal
beneficiary societies operating under a lodge system and providing life, health, and related
benefits tot he members), and 501 (c)(23) (certain organizations for present and past members
of the Armed Forces of the United States that provide insurance-type benefits).
161 For direct links to federal and state laws regarding U.S. Nonprofit Organizations, see
Online Compendium of Federal and State Regulations for U.S. Nonprofit Organizations, at
http://www.muridae.com/nporegulation (last updated June 3, 1999). See also Miriam Galston,
Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal Revenue Code's Treatment of Legis-
lative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1296-1302 (1993) [hereinafter Lobbying and the Pub-
lic Interest] and sources cited therein; W. HARRISON WELLFORD & JANNE G. GALLAGHER,
UNFAIR COMPETITION? THE CHALLENGE TO CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 153-260 (1988)
(summarizing all the state charitable exemption laws). An organization that has nonprofit
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nonprofits, charitable entities must be operated to help charitable clas-
ses-the poor, homeless, sick, or handicapped-or engaged in a category
of activity that state or federal law has determined contributes to the pub-
lic interest. Examples of the latter type of charity are educational groups
or institutions, health care organizations, houses of worship, and muse-
ums. In addition to the tax and other benefits granted to noncharitable
nonprofits, t62 charities are entitled to receive contributions that are de-
ductible from the income of the donors, subject to certain restrictions. 63
The charitable contribution deduction tax benefit has been variously ex-
plained as compensating for charities' lack of access to capital markets,
lessening the burdens of government, taking advantage of charities' effi-
ciency in providing charitable services, or deriving from a "sovereignty"
view of the charitable sector.' 64
From the perspective of sociologists, a fundamental distinction
should be made between expressive and instrumental associations, or be-
tween associations that members join for expressive as against instru-
mental reasons. 65 In their pure form, expressive associations provide
activities that create the "satisfactions of personal fellowship" and that
members engage in primarily because they are enjoyable. 66 The mem-
status under state law will not necessarily be exempt from federal or even state income taxa-
tion. In contrast, states tend to make federal exemption from income tax a condition of receiv-
ing state income tax exemption rather than relying upon their own grant of nonprofit status.
For example, the District of Columbia grants an automatic exemption from the income and
franchise tax to any organization exempt under § 501(a) of the Code except those exempt
under § 501(c)(3). In order to be exempt from the income and franchise tax as a charity in the
District of Columbia, an organization must have both a federal tax exemption and demonstrate
that a certain percentage of its activities or expenditures benefit District of Columbia residents.
See District of Columbia Office of Tax and Revenue, Instructions for Filing Application for
Exemption (Form FR 164) (2002); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1802.1 (LEXIS 2001) (list-
ing organizations exempt from District of Columbia income and franchise tax). Revenues of
noncharitable exempt organizations that would constitute unrelated business income under
§ 511 of the Internal Revenue Code are not exempt in D.C. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1802.1
(LEXIS 2001). Similar laws exist in many states. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-
104(2) (Michie 1997). For a discussion of tax and non-tax benefits associated with exempt
status, see Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations,
28 U.S.F. L. REV. 85 (1993).
162 See supra notes 156, 158-59 and accompanying text.
163 See I.R.C. § 170(a) (2000). Other exempt entities may be entitled to receive deducti-
ble contributions. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(1), (3), (4), (5).
164 See generally Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity
Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998) [hereinafter Of Sovereignty and Subsidy].
165 See C. Wayne Gordon & Nicholas Babchuk, A Typology of Voluntary Associations, 24
AM. Soc. REV. 22, 25-26, 27-28 (1959). Even if an association is predominantly expressive
in its mission, some people may join for instrumental reasons; conversely, a person may join a
fundamentally instrumental organization for expressive reasons.
166 See id. at 27. In sociological jargon, "integration of the personality system is often
held to be the major reason for the existence of the group." Nicholas Babchuk & John N.
Edwards, Voluntary Associations and the Integration Hypothesis, 35 Soc. INQUIRY 149, 151
(1965) [hereinafter The Integration Hypothesis].
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bers derive "immediate and continuing gratification" merely from taking
part in the association's activities; the activities of such organizations are
wholly or largely contained within the organization; and the activities are
ends in themselves. 167 Examples include recreational clubs, choirs, little
league teams, and other kinds of social organization.
In their pure form, instrumental organizations enable their members
to accomplish goals outside of the organization. In particular, members
may seek to effect changes to the social, economic, or political orders,
16 8
or to maintain the status quo against a threat of change-goals that are
frequently long-term and depend upon influencing individuals, groups, or
public officials outside the group. People therefore join instrumental or-
ganizations primarily as means to some other end or ends.' 69 Examples
are the NRA, the League of Women Voters, and the Sierra Club. Some
associations may serve both expressive and instrumental purposes de-
pending upon the reasons members join.' 70
It is also common for sociologists and political scientists to distin-
guish between voluntary associations that seek to promote some aspect
of the self-interest of the members and those that cast their goals in light
of the public interest. The term "public interest" is used in a variety of
ways. For some, the term refers only to commitment to or involvement
in one's community, as contrasted with purely private activities. So un-
derstood, an organization's activities may be in the public interest even if
its members do not join for altruistic or public-spirited reasons. Rather,
they would be in the public interest if their members see public life as the
means to secure private economic goals, e.g., tax reform. If "public in-
167 Arthur P. Jacoby, Some Correlates of Instrumental and Expressive Orientations to
Associational Membership, 35 Soc. INQUIRY 163, 164 (1965) [hereinafter Correlates of Instru-
mental and Expressive Orientations].
168 See Babchuk & Edwards, Voluntary Associations and the Integration Hypothesis,
supra note 166, at 149, 151. However, the authors also mention a study finding that "upper-
class women" emphasized personal satisfaction as their reason for joining instrumental as-
sociations. In contrast, "middle-class women" emphasized association goals as their reasons
for joining voluntary associations, even though they "were mostly affiliated with expressive
associations." Id. at 152.
169 See Gordon & Babchuk, A Typology of Voluntary Associations, supra note 165, at
25-26; Jacoby, Correlates of Instrumental and Expressive Orientations, supra note 167, at
164. See also John Wilson & Marc A. Musick, Work and Volunteering: The Long Arm of the
Job, 76 Soc. FORCES 251, 253 (1997) (dividing social participation into expressive, self-inter-
ested, and helping the needy or resolving community problems).
170 See Gordon & Babchuck, A Typology of Voluntary Associations, supra note 165, at 28
(citing Kiwanis and the American Sociological Society as examples of mixed purpose associa-
tions). The authors also call Alcoholics Anonymous a mixed purpose organization, presuma-
bly because of the camaraderie that develops among those who go regularly to the same
chapter, even though the primary purpose remains instrumental. The distinction between ex-
pressive and instrumental groups is similar to, and to some extent overlaps with, the distinction
between bonding and bridging groups made by Robert Putnam. See supra note 56 and accom-
panying text.
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terest" is used in this way, advocacy groups are inherently public interest
groups, regardless of whether they pursue the personal goals of their
members. '71
Others reserve the term "public interest" for efforts by some people
to assist others because of a belief that this is the right thing to do, re-
gardless of whether they expect a private benefit. 172 Used in this way,
both pro-choice and pro-life groups might properly be called public inter-
est groups because their goals are based upon a profound belief of their
members in the correctness and benevolent purpose of their respective
missions, rather than upon personal advantage or utility. Even if the
members of such groups can be seen as seeking a self-interested goal,
theirs are self-interested civic goals rather than self-interested private,
material goals-a distinction that "matters for the political life of the
community." 173
B. WHY PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
Many commentators-both those who believe in and those who re-
ject the idea of civic decline-agree that people who participate in one
voluntary association are more likely to participate in other aspects of
civil life, broadly defined to include neighborhood involvement and other
types of informal helping or social participation, as well as in political
activities. 174 Thus, much study has focused on what motivates people to
get involved in voluntary associations in the first place.
1. Education
The most consistently documented finding in this area is that there
is a strong positive correlation between formal education and civic en-
gagement: people with some college education participate in voluntary
171 See Frank J. Sorauf, The Conceptual Muddle, in THE PUBLIC INTEREST 183, 184-85
(Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1962) (noting that some identify the public interest with "the democratic
political process of compromise and accommodation" and observing that, so understood, the
term refers to a means rather than an end and has "little to do with the wisdom or morality of
public policy itself"). See also Jane Mansbridge, On the Contested Nature of the Public Good,
in PRIVATE ACTION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 3, 7 n.8 (Walter W. Powell & Elisabeth S. Clemens
eds., 1998) (noting that "interest" in the sense of benefit evolved from its original meaning as
interest charged by lenders); id. at 9-10 (distinguishing aggregative meanings of the public
good from collective meanings).
172 See Mansbridge, On the Contested Nature of the Public Good, supra note 171, at
9-10. See also Alan Wolfe, What Is Altruism?, in PRIVATE ACTION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD,
supra note 171, at 36, 37 (quoting J. Phillipe Rushton's definition of altruism as "social behav-
ior carried out to achieve positive outcomes for another rather than for the self").
173 VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 5, at 23.
174 See David Horton Smith, Deterninants of Voluntary Association Participation and
Volunteering: A Literature Review, 23 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 243, 253 (1994)
[hereinafter Determinants]. In some formulations, this belief risks becoming a tautology. See
infra Part II.C.2.
2004] Civic RENEWAL AND THE REGULATION OF NONPROFITS 331
associations and vote significantly more than less educated groups.'
75
To some extent, this correlation is related to the correlation between civic
engagement and socioeconomic status. However, even when researchers
control for income, those with higher levels of formal education partici-
pate more in civil society.'
7 6
Education also has an impact on the manner or type of civic engage-
ment that people choose. According to one study, "[t]hose with more
formal education are more likely than those with less to direct their [vol-
unteering] activities not only to their own communities but also to other
communities." 177 Further, there is evidence that people with college or
more advanced degrees show greater interest than other people in work-
ing with serious social problems relating to disabled, disadvantaged,
abused, troubled, or neglected children and youth.1 78 In the realm of
political activity proper, education is most highly correlated with voting,
demonstrating, signing a petition, boycotting, and contacting public offi-
cials. The correlation is substantially weaker for working with others
and attending meetings and rallies.'
79
There are numerous reasons why education fosters civic engage-
ment. Education makes certain forms of engagement easier by imparting
175 See VIRGINIA A. HODGKINSON ET AL., INDEPENDENT SECTOR, GIVING & VOLUNTEER-
ING IN THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME 11 14 tbl. 1.7 (1995) (according to 1993 data collected by
Independent Sector, people with less than a high school diploma made up 12.3% of all volun-
teers, while those with some college or higher made up 52% of all volunteers); see also M.
MARGARET CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES 22-23 (1991) [herein-
after POLITICAL PARTICIPATION]. See also J. Miller McPherson, A Dynamic Model of Volun-
tary Affiliation, 59 Soc. FORCES 705, 711, 712, 715 (1981) (agreeing that education is the
"most important exogenous variable in almost all studies of affiliation," but noting that in
countries other than the United States education does not play as important a role in predicting
affiliation). In the 1950s and 1960s, people with a grade school education voted in midterm
elections at about the same rates as people with a high school education did in the 1980s; in the
1950s and 1960s, people with a high school education voted at rates comparable to the voting
rates of people with a college education in the 1980s. See CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPA-
TION, supra, at 22 tbl.2-1.
176 See CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 175, at 22 tbl.2-1; Christopher J.
Anderson, Political Action and Social Integration, 24 AM. POL. Q. 105, 116 tbl.3 (1996). For
a discussion of the relationship between education, social class, and civic engagement ("partic-
ipation in noninstitutionalized politics"), see Ronnelle Paulsen, Education, Social Class, and
Participation in Collective Action, 64 Soc. EDUC. 96 (1991) and infra note 255 and accompa-
nying text. By noninstitutionalized politics, the author means forms of collective action that
do not involve formal political institutions, e.g., "protest demonstrations and community prob-
lem solving." Id. at 96.
177 See POINTS OF LIGHT FOUNDATION, SURVEY ON VOLUNTEERING FOR SERIOUS SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 5 (Washington, D.C., September 1996) (prepared for the Inaugural Meeting of the
National Commission on Philanthropy and Civic Renewal) (noting that among volunteers for
serious social problems, 69% of college graduates volunteered, whereas 57% of those with a
high school diploma or less volunteered) [hereinafter VOLUNTEERING FOR SERIOUS SOCIAL
PROBLEMS].
178 See id. at 5.
179 Anderson, Political Action and Social Integration, supra note 176, at 114.
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useful information and skills, e.g., how to write a member of Congress,
participate in an association, work for a political campaign, or register to
vote. 180 These skills and experiences derived from leadership roles in
student activities help create a sense of political efficacy. Political effi-
cacy, in turn, is highly correlated with participation in collective ac-
tion.' 81 In addition, education also helps motivate people to become
civically engaged, presumably by teaching students to value civic in-
volvement and providing them with networks of people who are civically
involved and who invite them to join specific organizations, projects, or
events.' 82 Because people with "higher levels of education tend to come
from families in which the parents had higher levels of education as
well," values imparted by these students' parents are an additional source
of motivation for civic engagement.183
2. Religion
Religion, whether in the form of membership in a religious organi-
zation or attendance at religious services, is a close second to education
in predicting civic involvement.184 The correlation between religion and
civic engagement has been explained, in part, by the likelihood that in-
volvement in religious organizations can develop communication and or-
ganizational skills useful for effective participation in voluntary
associations of any kind. 185 For instance, churches have been found to
be especially critical for teaching skills in African-American
communities. 186
180 See Brady et al., Beyond SES, supra note 84, at 283. According to these authors,
however, the impact of education on voting turnout has been overstated. Based upon an analy-
sis of data from over 15,000 phone interviews conducted in 1989 and 1990, they concluded
that "the impact of education on voting is funneled entirely through political interest." Id.
181 See Paulsen, Education, Social Class, and Participation in Collective Action, supra
note 176, at 101, 104-06. On the importance of the sense of political efficacy in adults, see
infra notes 254-255 and accompanying text.
182 See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION,
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 76-77, 135-36 (1993); Brady et al., Beyond SES, supra note
84, at 283. See also William A. Galston, Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and
Civic Education, 4 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 224-25 (2001) (noting the positive impact of civic
education on political participation and support for democratic values).
183 CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 175, at 23. See also infra notes 223-
227, 240 and accompanying text.
184 See Robert Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic Engagement: The Changing Impact of Relig-
ious Involvement, in Civic ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 331, 333
[hereinafter Mobilizing Civic Engagement] (citing sources). See also John Wilson & Thomas
Janoski, The Contribution of Religion to Volunteer Work, 56 Soc. RELIGION 137, 138-39
(making the same point with respect to volunteering).
185 See VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 5, at 305-06, 310-11, 313; see
also Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic Engagement, supra note 184, at 346.
186 See Peter Dobkin Hall, Vital Signs: Organizational Population Trends and Civic En-
gagement in New Haven, Connecticut, 1850-1998, in Civic ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DE-
MOCRACY, supra note 5, at 211, 237 [hereinafter Vital Signs]. See also VERBA ET AL., VOICE
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This explanation does not necessarily shed light on the source of
motivation for civic engagement, however. For example, the develop-
ment of communication and organizational skills may facilitate participa-
tion in civic life among people who already want to participate by
making them more confident about pursuing civic involvement. The de-
velopment of such skills does not, however, explain the desire for civic
engagement on the part of these people in the first place.
Robert Wuthnow addresses the motivational link between religious
and civic involvement. He argues that:
[a]ctive church members are likely to be exposed to re-
ligious teachings about loving their neighbor and being
responsible citizens, they are more likely to have social
capital in the form of ties to fellow congregants that can
be used to mobilize their energies, and they are more
likely to be aware of needs and opportunities in their
communities as a result of attending services in their
congregations. 87
Based upon similar reasoning, some civic renewal writers have attributed
a significant part of the decline in civic participation to the decline in
traditional forms of religious commitment. 88 This connection has been
challenged on several grounds. As a threshold matter, there is data
showing that the level of religious engagement in the United States, mea-
sured by beliefs, practices, or a combination, has remained quite stable
for at least five decades.' 89 Some commentators, in fact, see an upswing
AND EQUALITY, supra note 5, at 320-30 (noting that participation in politics is highly corre-
lated with socio-economic status except that participation in churches increases the level of
participation of poor blacks and white fundamentalists; however, participation in churches
does not increase the participation levels of Catholics).
187 Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic Engagement, supra note 184, at 334; see also Wilson &
Janoski, The Contribution of Religion to Volunteer Work, supra note 184, at 137-38.
188 See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 69 (arguing that people joined or went
to church or other religious institutions less in the 1970s (41%) than they did in the 1950s
(48%)).
189 See Bill Broadway, Poll Finds America 'as Churched as Ever,' WASH. POST, May 31,
1997, at B7 (basing his claim that Americans are "as churched as ever" on a Gallup Poll done
for the Princeton Religious Research Center); Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic Engagement, supra
note 184, at 334-35 (1999) (arguing that religious involvement has been stable for at least five
decades, with a "temporary increase" in the 1950s, and that the way some surveys phrased the
question about religious involvement may be responsible for the decrease that Putnam asserts);
The Solitary Bowler, EcONOMIST, Feb. 18, 1995, at 21 (claiming that church attendance in
America shows the weakest decline; it has been stable at 40% since 1939); see also Ladd,
Data Just Don't Show Erosion, supra note 2, at 21 (basing his claim on data from colonial
times through 1990 and, relying on the work of Roger Finke and Rodney Starke, concluding
that the rates of religious "adherence" have been "essentially constant" at about 55% since the
1920s).
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in religious observance. 190 To some extent, this disagreement reflects
different evaluations of changing forms of religious practice and expres-
sions of religious identity that have occurred in the last several decades.
If, as Robert Wuthnow argues, spirituality has undergone a significant
shift from "habitat-based" to "seeker-based,"' 9 1 it stands to reason that
measures of religious identification based upon attendance at or involve-
ment with houses of worship will witness a decline.
The link between religion and civic engagement must be further
qualified by research showing that the link is complex and not uniformly
present across religions or religious denominations. For example, al-
though there is a strong correlation between religious engagement and
civic engagement in general, several studies have found significant dif-
ferences in the extent and type of civic activity characteristic of different
religions and denominations within religions. Some early studies found
that Catholics participated less than Protestants in civic and service orga-
nizations. 192 Data from the early 1970s, in contrast, show that Catholics,
Jews, and Episcopalians volunteered significantly more than other relig-
ious groups and denominations in addition to people claiming no relig-
ious affiliation. 193 According to data from 1991, Catholics were much
more likely to join a nonreligious voluntary association than were evan-
gelical Protestants, whereas mainline Protestant denominations were
much more likely to join such associations than Catholics.194
The disparity in civic participation as between Catholics and main-
line Protestants may come from the habits of mind that are imparted to
congregants by the different structures of the two denominations. Ac-
190 See Bill Broadway, Christian Pollster and Analyst Sees Country at Spiritual Cross-
roads, WASH. POST, May 31, 1997, at B7 (noting data collected by the Bama Research Group
to the effect that born-again Christians in the Catholic and Baptists churches have increased
significantly as has Sunday school attendance by adults).
191 ROBERT WUTHNOW, AFTER HEAVEN: SPIRITUALITY IN AMERICA SINCE THE 1950s 3-4
(1998). This is not the first time in the history of religion in America that people have turned
away en mass from formal, ritually oriented forms of religious worship to more individualistic,
spiritually or mystically oriented forms of worship. See generally RICHARD KYLE, THE RELIG-
IOUS FRINGE: A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE RELIGIONS IN AMERICA (1993); PETER W. WIL-
LIAMS, POPULAR RELIGION IN AMERICA: SYMBOLIC CHANGE AND THE MODERNIZATION
PROCESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1980).
192 See MURRAY HAUSKNECHT, THE JOINERS: A SOCIOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF VOLUN-
TARY ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 76-77 (1962) [hereinafter THE JOIN-
ERS] (distinguishing between Protestants and Catholics)); see also Hall, Vital Signs, supra note
186, at 233-34 (distinguishing between liberal and conservative Protestants and Roman
Catholics in New Haven).
193 See Wilson & Janoski, The Contribution of Religion to Volunteer Work, supra note
184, at 143.
194 See Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic Engagement, supra note 184, at 341, 343. See also
HODGK1NSON ET AL., GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 175, at
14 tbl. 1.7 (based upon 1993 data from Independent Sector, 22.4% of volunteers are Catholic
while 54.2% are Protestant).
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cording to one interpreter of the data, Protestant congregations tend to
view the clergy as serving the members, whereas it is more common for
authority in Catholic churches to be hierarchical, with the congregants at
the bottom of the authority structure.19 5 This is consistent with the find-
ings of political scientist Robert Putnam, who studied numerous districts
in Italy' 96 and found that high levels of religious observance or expres-
sions of religious identity were strongly correlated with low levels of
civic activity. 197 Putnam attributed this fact, in part, to the Italian
Church's emphasis on ecclesiastical hierarchy, in which "[v]ertical bonds
of authority are more characteristic ... than horizontal bonds of fellow-
ship."1 9 8 The demonstrated predictive value of religious affiliation for
civic engagement may, then, mask a more meaningful correlation be-
tween experiences in certain structural environments and civic engage-
ment that, in the case of religious institutions, rest on basic
characteristics of their underlying theologies.
A direct link between theology and civic engagement has been pos-
ited based on data showing that volunteering in community or secular
organizations is higher among mainline and liberal Protestants than
among evangelicals, conservative Protestants, and Catholics. 99 Re-
searchers have speculated that this difference is due to the fact that the
former denominations tend to link their theological teaching explicitly
with social activism, whereas the latter are more likely to stress piety,
personal salvation, and volunteering to the church. 2° ° One consequence,
195 See HAUSKNECHT, THE JOINERS, supra note 192, at 54-55. Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady give the same explanation for low participation rates in politics among poor Catholics.
See VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 5, at 245. Hierarchical structures are also
considered a factor reducing the likelihood of civic engagement in other contexts. See infra
notes 211-13 and accompanying text (describing the positive relationship between work that
offers employees challenge and discretion and their involvement in civic life).
196 See generally PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 5 (finding that the
difference in economic development in the northern and southern parts of Italy was directly
correlated to the differences in their civic traditions and culture and arguing that, over time,
civic engagement produced trust and other bonds among neighbors, members of groups, and
people active in other types of communities). Subsequently Putnam generalized his findings
from Italy and concluded that interpersonal trust and social capital are essential for all forms of
cooperation, whether economic, social, or political, in the United States and elsewhere. See
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 21.
197 See PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 5, at 107-08.
198 See id. at 107.
199 See Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic Engagement, supra note 184, at 341-44; see also
Wilson & Janoski, The Contribution of Religion to Volunteer Work, supra note 184, at
143-44, 148 (finding Catholics volunteer at the same rate as liberal Protestants).
200 See Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic Engagement, supra note 184, 342-44; see also Wil.-
son & Janoski, The Contribution of Religion to Volunteer Work, supra note 184, at 149-50;
Hall, Vital Signs, supra note 186, at 234; PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 5,
at 107. Wuthnow also attributes the phenomenon to the fact that evangelical churches make
very great, time-consuming demands on the members of their congregations, and they provide
them with a wide assortment of opportunities to engage their energies.
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then, of the increased popularity of fundamentalist congregations during
the final third of the last century may be a reduced level of involvement
in secular (including civil and political) organizations, as members are
encouraged to direct their energies and financial resources to their own
churches and church-related organizations and activities.
In sum, it is certainly true that religious values may lead those who
take them seriously to be concerned about the well-being of people
outside their own religious communities and to be inspired to join and
participate in civic organizations devoted to helping causes or popula-
tions regardless of their religious orientation. At the same time, the posi-
tive civic impact of religious organizations appears to depend also on the
content of the values that they inculcate. If so, when people internalize
civic values as part of their religious life, their civic commitment will be
strong. When, in contrast, religious teachings focus on the needs of spe-
cific religious communities or emphasize the virtues of piety and the goal
of personal salvation, the civic impact is likely to be negligible or even
negative.
3. Job and Workplace
Scholars have long been interested in the degree to which jobs or
careers influence the likelihood that people will be active members of
civil society and influence the type of civic activities they choose.20 1 As
a threshold matter, research shows that spending large amounts of time
on the job does not necessarily interfere with a person's willingness to be
engaged civically outside of work. In fact, according to some studies,
"among workers, longer hours are often linked to more civic engage-
ment, not less."'20 2 Although it may seem counterintuitive, women work-
ing full time for pay are more involved in formal and informal civic
activities than are women who do not engage in paid work. 203 Women
who work part-time for pay, however, are more involved in such activi-
ties than both full-time working women and women who do not have
paid jobs.2°4 This finding may suggest that working has a strong positive
effect on a person's desire for civic engagement, even though it reduces
the amount of time available for civic activities, but that full-time em-
201 See, e.g., Graham L. Staines, Spillover Versus Compensation: A Review of the Litera-
ture on the Relationship Between Work and Nonwork, 33 HUM. REL. 111 (1980) [hereinafter
Spillover Versus Compensation].
202 See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 191 and authorities cited therein.
Putnam here includes informal activities, such as having people to dinner and "schmoozing,"
in his measure of civic involvement.
203 See Kay Lehman Schlozman, Did Working Women Kill the PTA?, AM. PROSPECT,
Sept. 11, 2000, at 14 (emphasizing the positive aspect of paid work on women's political
involvement); see also PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 200-01.
204 See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 201.
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ployment cuts excessively into the hours available for outside activities,
at least for women.20 5
There is considerable interest in the relationship between character-
istics of work and the type of civic activities that people engage in
outside of work. Researchers have found that, in general, people choose
civic activities that are similar to, or build on, their work experiences
more often than they choose non-work activities that contrast with their
work experiences. 20 6 Empirical studies examining the kinds of outside
activities preferred by working women have found that many working
women are joining professional groups now, whereas previously they
tended to join service-oriented groups to a greater degree. 20 7 To the ex-
205 Men who have been employed in structured work environments for a significant pe-
riod are more likely to be engaged in civic life than those who have not. See C. Muhammad
Siddique, Orderly Careers and Social Integration, 20 INDUS. REL. 297, 303-04 (1981). See
also Harold L. Wilensky, Orderly Careers and Social Participation: The Impact of Work His-
tory on Social Integration in the Middle Mass, 26 AM. Soc. REV. 521, 530-32 (1961) (basing
his conclusion on an analysis of upper working class and lower middle-class men and finding
that men who have had orderly horizontal or vertical careers will have more memberships in
formal associations, attend more meetings, spend more time in associational activities (other
than church activities), interact more frequently with persons different from themselves, be
exposed to more of the major institutional spheres of society, and have stronger attachments to
the community than men lacking such orderly careers).
206 See Staines, Spillover Versus Compensation, supra note 201, at 112, 115, 116, 117,
123. When there are similarities between a person's work and his leisure activities, sociolo-
gists attribute this to a "spillover" or "generalization" effect, which presupposes that the skills
developed, attitudes created, roles played, and needs satisfied on the job "spill over" or are
generalized during leisure time outside the job. See id. at 112, 115. A dissimilarity between
work and non-work activities is explained as a "compensation" or "competition" effect. Id. at
114. According to this theory, people's experiences on the job satisfy some human needs but
not others. Id. at 112-14. As a result, in their leisure time people seek to compensate for the
various voids that are not satisfied through their work on the job. See id. at 115 (citing work
suggesting that this causes people to seek involvement in voluntary associations in the first
place and implying that such people will seek activities unlike those performed at work). See
also Robert Hagedom & Sanford Labovitz, Participation in Community Associations by Occu-
pation: A Test of Three Theories, 33 AM. Soc. REV. 272, 281 (1968) (finding that "isolated
occupations compensate by being high participators in community associations"). Some stud-
ies show that people who have physically demanding jobs are not only less likely to be physi-
cally active when they participate in activities outside work; they are less likely to participate
to begin with. See Staines, Spillover Versus Compensation, supra note 201, at 118-19. Alter-
natively, according to this view, people may be seeking variety in their non-work activities to
balance their work activities. See id. at 116-17; Wilson & Musick, Work and Volunteering:
The Long Arm of the Job, supra note 169, at 253 and sources cited therein. In general, studies
have found a positive spillover effect more often than a compensation effect. There have,
however, been a substantial number of studies that found a compensation effect or no relation-
ship between work and non-work activities at all.
207 See Danny R. Hoyt et al., The Voluntary Association Memberships of Women: Chang-
ing Patterns of Affiliation, (1985) (paper delivered at the American Sociological Association
Convention) (on file with author and a summary is available in Soc. ABSTRACTs, Dec. 1985,
at 1734); see also Patricia Klobus Edwards et al., Women, Work, and Social Participation, 13
J. VOLUNTARY ACTION REs. 7, 16 (1984) (noting that "working women.., are most likely to
engage in instrumental activities").
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tent that women's participation in professional groups is motivated by
the desire to refine skills necessary for their jobs or helpful for career
advancement, their desire for civic engagement is only incidental. Alter-
natively, women's turn toward professional organizations may be due to
a loss of interest in the types of groups they formerly joined, coupled
with a new interest in different types of associational activities. In this
case, a woman's job may have created a motivation for civic engagement
that did not exist previously. In that event, the finding that women work-
ing for pay are more involved in civic life than their non-working coun-
terparts20 8 may be explained by women's desire to balance work life with
experiences outside the workplace while taking advantage of expertise
gained in the workplace. Working women may also be responding to
exposure to social networks first encountered on the job. Either way, the
influx of women into the workplace would be responsible for expanding
the variety of women's civic commitments and introducing them to a
range of associational opportunities not previously encountered.
The likelihood that workers will join a union and engage in formal
union activities constitutes a special case of worker participation in vol-
untary associations. Researchers have found that the propensity of work-
ers to attend meetings or hold office in their unions is a function of two
variables: first, the degree to which individual members see themselves
as at risk and, second, the union's perceived level of effectiveness in
promoting fairness in the employment relationship. A recent study found
that ethnic-minority women were the most likely to participate in a union
perceived as effective in promoting fairness; non-ethnic minority women
were the next most likely, followed by non-ethnic minority men, and
finally ethnic-minority men. 20 9 In such cases, involvement in unions is
pursued predominantly for instrumental (rather than ideological or so-
cial) reasons.210
Highly-placed individuals in corporate America often seek out civic
opportunities, including joining charitable groups, because it is made
clear on the job that such outside activities enhance the reputation of the
company and thus may enhance the individual's chances for promo-
208 Sources cited supra at note 203.
209 See Steven Mellor et al., Unions as Justice-Promoting Organizations: The Interactive
Effect of Ethnicity, Gender, and Perceived Union Effectiveness, 40 SEX ROLES 331, 331
(1999).
210 See Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtue,
36 B.C. L. Rev. 279 (1995), reprinted in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE,
CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 131 (Mary Ann Glendon & David
Blankenhorn eds., 1995) (criticizing the decline in union membership and attributing it to the
fact that people tend to value autonomy and self-interest over other values, thereby overlook-
ing the potential of collective bargaining negotiations to be a forum for responsible self-
government).
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tion.2 1' Because voluntary organizations are often "prestige-confer-
ring," 21 2 people with a high level of occupational success may seek
parallel achievements in the institutions of civil society. The widely-
recognized strong positive correlation between high educational level
and socioeconomic status, on the one hand, and the level of civic partici-
pation, on the other, may also explain the participation of such
individuals. 2 13
There is also evidence that workplace positions demanding qualities
such as autonomy, initiative, decision making, discretion, considerable
interaction with other workers, complex tasks, and leadership correlate
positively with civic involvement. 214 It is possible that the correlation
between civic engagement and challenging jobs of the kind described
bears upon confidence more than on motivation, given that the work-
place is one of the most important places for learning and practicing
skills useful for civic engagement. 21 5 However, given that a positive cor-
relation between civic engagement and challenging jobs exists even
when the studies control for level of education, 216 it is more likely that
such jobs are responsible for motivating employees' involvement in civil
society in addition to equipping them to participate with a variety of ex-
periences and well-honed skills.
Recent research has found that the correlation between participation
in nonpolitical civic activities and participation in political activities is
far stronger than the correlation between participation in workplace ac-
tivities and political involvement. 217 The disparity was the most pro-
nounced in connection with time-consuming or volunteer-oriented
211 See Thomas Janoski & John Wilson, Pathways to Voluntarism: Family Socialization
and Status Transmission Models, 74 Soc. FORCES 271, 273 (1995) [hereinafter Pathways to
Voluntarism] (noting that membership in voluntary associations is frequently "almost part of
the job" for people in high-status occupations); see also Wilson & Musick, Work and Volun-
teering: The Long Arm of the Job, supra note 169, at 253 and sources cited therein; Staines,
Spillover Versus Compensation, supra note 201, at 115 and sources cited therein.
212 Jack C. Ross, Toward a Reconstruction of Voluntary Association Theory, 23 BRIT. J.
Soc. 20, 27 (1972).
213 See VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 5, at 189-200.
214 See Wilson & Musick, Work and Volunteering: The Long Arm of the Job, supra note
169, at 253.-54 and sources cited therein. But see Steven L. Schweizer, Participation, Work-
place Democracy, and the Problem of Representative Government, 27 POLITY 359, 368-69
(1995) (arguing that "[t]he drift of empirical research suggests that workplace democracy does
not increase external political participation").
215 See Sidney Verba et al., Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the
United States, 23 BRIT. J. POL. Sc. 453, 476-78 (1993).
216 See Wilson & Musick, Work and Volunteering: The Long Arm of the Job, supra note
169, at 253-54.
217 See Ayala, Trained for Democracy, supra note 85 (analyzing the same data base as
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, supra note 84, with some adjustments of methodology). The
author notes that the result was the same for professionals as it was for low-skilled workers.
Id. at 104.
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political activities, as contrasted with voting.218 This finding suggests
that a person's work is not as significant a factor in prompting civic en-
gagement, at least in the form of political participation, as is participation
in voluntary forms of associational life. At the same time, the author of
this research noted that the causal element had not been proven: it is
possible, given the results of the research, that the time-intensive types of
political activity might be causing the participant to engage in non-politi-
cal voluntary associations as well.
2 19
4. Friends, Parents, and Social Ties
Friends are an important source of motivation for getting involved
in civil society. People who are asked in person, or through a personal
communication, to join or volunteer, do so far more often than those who
learn of such opportunities from the newspaper or other print or broad-
cast media.220 When questioned, such joiners often respond that the pri-
mary reason they joined was the personal solicitation of a friend.221 The
powerful effect of solicitations by friends may also explain why people
who work and those who attend church have higher rates of civic en-
gagement than those who do not: most workplaces and church groups
provide an assortment of networks of people with varying interests, some
of them eager to recruit fellow workers or worshipers. Researchers have
even found that subjects in an experiment who do not have much inter-
personal trust tend to show a stronger preference for civic activities after
writing an essay on the benefits of friendship.222
Children growing up in homes where one or both parents are active
in civic associations are much more likely than children with the same
socioeconomic status and education to join civic associations or to be
civically active when they are adults. 223 When one or both parents en-
218 Id. at 106.
219 Id. at 108.
220 See S. Wojciech Sokolowski, Show Me the Way to the Next Worthy Deed: Towards a
Microstructural Theory of Volunteering and Giving, 7 VOLUNTAS 259, 272, 275 (1996) [here-
inafter Show Me the Way] (finding that solicitation increased volunteering to philanthropic
entities, although it did not increase charitable giving); Smith, Determinants, supra note 174,
at 252. According to one researcher, direct recruitment at voluntary organizations and
churches does not explain the strong correlation between involvement in voluntary associa-
tions, including churches, and voter turnout. See also Carol A. Cassel, Voluntary Associations,
Churches, and Social Participation Theories of Turnout, 80 Soc. Sci. Q. 504 (1999).
221 See Arthur P. Jacoby, Personal Influence and Primary Relationships: Their Effect on
Associational Membership, 7 Soc. Q. 76, 77-81 (1966) (noting as well that personal influence
was a much greater factor in the decision to join expressive associations than in instrumental
ones).
222 See Melanie C. Green & Timothy C. Brock, Trust, Mood, and Outcomes of Friendship
Determine Preferences for Real Versus Ersatz Social Capital, 19 POL. PSYCHOL. 527 (1998).
223 See ScoTT KEETER ET AL., CENTER FOR INFORMATION & RESEARCH ON Civic LEARN-
ING AND ENGAGEMENT, THE CIVIC AND POLITICAL HEALTH OF THE NATION: A GENERATIONAL
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gaged in helping behaviors and also had a nurturing relationship with the
children, the children were significantly more likely to become commit-
ted activists or engage in sustained helping behaviors than children with-
out such backgrounds. 224 The mechanism involved in socialization by
parents is thought to be role modeling, reinforcement of values, and pos-
sibly actual recruitment of children by their parents. 225
At the same time, some researchers have found that the impact of
family socialization varies depending upon the type of voluntary associa-
tion. Parental transmission of status has been shown to be better than
parental socialization for predicting children's participation in "self-ori-
ented" associations, such as business or professional groups, unions, or
veterans groups. In contrast, family socialization provided a better ex-
planation of children's participation in community-oriented associations
such as church, fraternal, neighborhood, and service organizations. 226
These findings are consistent with research on the pivotal effect of cul-
tural, social, or family values on levels of involvement in associations
directed toward collective goals discussed below. 227
The desire for interpersonal social relationships is another reason
for joining associations. 228 Some researchers have found that organiza-
PORTRAIT 17 (2002), available at http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/public-policy-youthcivic_
political-health.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004); Janoski & Wilson, Pathways to Voluntarism,
supra note 211, at 283.
224 See E. Gil Clary & Jude Miller, Socialization and Situational Influences on Sustained
Altruism, 57 CHILD DEV. 1358 (1986) (finding, based upon data from adult volunteers at a
telephone crisis-counseling agency, that helping behavior was twice as likely to extend
through the six-month commitment period if the volunteer's parents had been committed activ-
ists and nurturing to their children than if the parents had not been). However, the authors also
found that partially committed adults, e.g., those whose parents had preached but not practiced
altruism and had been less nurturing than the parents of the comparison group, achieved the
identical level of altruistic commitment as the others if they received highly cohesive volunteer
training prior to undertaking the volunteer work. Id. at 1362.
225 See USLANER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 92-93; Eric M.
Uslaner, Producing and Consuming Trust, 115 POL. Sci. Q. 569, 571, 575 (2000); Janoski &
Wilson, Pathways to Voluntarism, supra note 211, at 273-74, 289; Paul Allen Beck & M.
Kent Jennings, Pathways to Participation, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 94, 98-101, 104-05 (1982).
Uslaner also argues that parents are largely responsible for instilling in their children a gener-
ous attitude and a sense of optimism, including a belief in one's ability to control one's sur-
roundings and make the world a better place. See USLANDER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
TRUST, supra note 11l, at 80-81, 93.
226 See Janoski & Wilson, Pathways to Voluntarism, supra note 211, at 279-286. The
authors note that their distinction between self- and community-oriented organizations is dif-
ferent from the more commonly used distinction between expressive and instrumental organi-
zations. Id. at 274.
227 See infra II.B.5.
228 See Philip H. Pollock, III, Organizations as Agents of Mobilization: How Does Group
Activity Affect Political Participation?, 26 AM. J. POL. ScI. 485, 488 (1982) [hereinafter Orga-
nizations as Agents of Mobilization] (distinguishing between "solidary" incentives, such as fun
or conviviality, and "purposive" incentives, such as ideology or collective interest, for joining
an association).
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tions with civic purposes such as helping needy populations attract peo-
ple looking for fellowship. 229 In general, members motivated to join for
reasons of this kind tend to be committed to a group's internal activities,
but are less likely to engage in external activities connected to the group
than are those who join as a result of altruistic or ideological motives. 230
"Social ties" with a philanthropic organization are also good predictors
of volunteering and donations. 231 Such "social ties" include organiza-
tional membership, church attendance, or parents who volunteered.
232
5. Attitudes and Values
Since the pioneering work of Mancur Olson on collective action
problems, political and social theorists have often been pessimistic about
the likelihood that people will expend substantial resources to obtain a
public good in circumstances where they can expect to share in the fruits
of other people's efforts regardless of their own contribution.233 Subse-
quent studies, in contrast, have determined that people's motives for join-
ing, volunteering for, and giving money to non-economic voluntary
organizations are usually mixed, and that altruism, ideology, and the de-
sire for prestige are better predictors of certain kinds of civic activity
than are material motives.234 An analysis based on 1990s survey data
similarly found that the desire for material rewards, such as career oppor-
tunities, was not a significant predictor of the likelihood that adults
would volunteer for philanthropic activities or make charitable dona-
229 See id. at 488 (noting that "solidary rewards [can] stem from the act of association
itself").
230 See David Knoke, Incentives in Collective Action Organizations, 53 AM. Soc. REV.
311, 326 (1988).
231 See Sokolowski, Show Me the Way, supra note 220, at 275.
232 See id. at 269.
233 See MANCUR OLSON, JR, THE Locic OF COLLECTIVE ACrION 10-12, 14-15, 53-54
(1965). Differently put, Olson's theoretical model "requires substantial private-good incen-
tives to overcome the tendency of public goods to induce free riding." Knoke, Incentives in
Collective Action Organizations, supra note 230, at 326.
234 See Knoke, Incentives in Collective Action Organizations, supra note 230, at 326
(finding, based upon a study of professional, recreational, and women's organizations using
1980s data, that "[g]eneral normative principles, prestige, and status enhancements are espe-
cially potent instigators of general commitment and internal participation," in contrast to selec-
tive benefit inducements, such as services or finding job opportunities). Knoke found,
however, that normative incentives do not tend to induce participation in activities outside of
the association, with the important exception of women's organizations. Id. It is possible to
make distinctions among types of values, beliefs, or attitudes as motivators of behavior. See,
e.g., Carolyn L. Funk, Practicing What We Preach? The Influence of a Societal Interest Value
on Civic Engagement, 19 POL. PSYCHOL. 601, 602 (1998) [hereinafter Practicing What We
Preach?] (distinguishing between values and attitudes); Thomas Janoski et al., Being Volun-
teered? The Impact of Social Participation and Pro-Social Attitudes on Volunteering, 13 Soc.
F. 495, 498 (1998) [hereinafter Being Volunteered?] (quoting Paul Schervish's distinction
among "general values," "fundamental orientations," and "causes we are dedicated to"). This
article does not make such distinctions.
2004] Civic RENEWAL AND THE REGULATION OF NONPROFITS 343
tions, whereas altruism (in the sense of desiring to help others) and the
desire for self-improvement were both positively correlated with rates of
volunteering (although not with donations). 235 Similar findings led one
political scientist to conjecture that organizations attempting to attract
members with material or other individual benefits would improve their
success in recruitment and maintenance of membership by appealing to
people's societal values.2 36 Further, members who joined organizations
in order to obtain personal, utilitarian benefits tended to be more passive
and less committed to an organization than those who joined to influence
public policy. 237
The preceding findings are consistent with the results reached by
research about the impact of family, friends, and social ties on levels of
civic involvement, discussed above, 238 since these are frequently influen-
tial through instilling civic attitudes and moral values. 239 In fact, accord-
ing to one sociologist, socioeconomic status has its acknowledged
profound effect on the likelihood of political participation because of the
attitudes and orientations associated with social and economic status.240
Even when individuals join or volunteer simply in response to a personal
appeal, they may do so because of the value they place on friendship,
itself a civic value as fulsome as more obvious civic values such as vot-
ing. Further, sometimes a person joins a voluntary group for one reason
but acquires a different reason for remaining in the group,2 4' or joins a
group independently of social or civic values and then acquires such val-
ues as a result of participation in the group. 242
6. Conclusion
Several themes recur in the preceding discussion of the reasons peo-
ple participate in voluntary organizations. First, the motivation for join-
ing is often complex and multi-faceted. Second, some reasons may
themselves derive, both conceptually and in actuality, from other rea-
sons. For example, church attendance is a strong predictor of participa-
tion in civic life more broadly. But the difference in participation rates
235 See Sokolowski, Show Me the Way, supra note 220, at 273.
236 See Funk, Practicing What We Preach?, supra note 234, at 611.
237 See Knoke, Incentives in Collective Action Organizations, supra note 230, at 326.
238 See supra Part II.B.4.
239 See supra Part II.B.1, 2, 4.
240 See Pollock, II, Organizations as Agents of Mobilization, supra note 228, at 485.
241 See E. Gil Clary et al., Volunteers' Motivations: A Functional Strategy for the Recruit-
ment, Placement, and Retention of Volunteers, 2 Nonprofit Mgmt. & Leadership 333, 340
(1992); Jo Ann Gora & Gloria Nemerowicz, Volunteers: Initial and Sustaining Motivations in
Service to the Community, 9 RES. Soc. HEALTH CARE 233, 239-40 (1991).
242 For the relative impact of self-selection as against group participation on the likeli-
hood that participants in a voluntary association will be active in other aspects of civic life, see
infra Part II.C.2-3.
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among denominations has led some researchers to speculate that it is the
civic attitudes conveyed at church or friendship ties with other church
members, rather than the religious motive for church attendance, that ex-
plains the strong correlation between attendance and civic participation.
Again, the strong correlation between level of education and degree of
civic participation may derive from the content of higher education (es-
pecially civic values), the friendship ties formed at institutions of higher
learning, or civic values learned from parents who also value higher
education.
As complex as these issues of cause and effect are, they are eclipsed
by the complexity of the counterpart issues raised by the proposition that
participation in voluntary associations is itself a "cause" of additional
participation in civic life, whether political or civil. The next section
explores the empirical research devoted to assessing the role of associa-
tional participation as a source, and not merely a reflection, of an active
civil society.
C. SELF-SELECTION, SOCIALIZATION, AND MOBILIZATION
1. Introduction: Methodological Challenges
One building block for much of the civil society literature is the
documented existence of a significant positive correlation between asso-
ciation membership, on the one hand, and civic attitudes and values and
other forms of civic activity, on the other.243 At the same time, a correla-
tion between association membership and other forms of civic engage-
ment is, as a theoretical matter, open to at least three interpretations: (1)
that active association members were civically oriented before they
joined an association and joined, in part, because of that orientation (the
self-selection thesis); (2) that such members developed their civic orien-
tation primarily as a result of their association activities (through sociali-
zation2 44 or active recruitment by other members of the group); or (3)
that a combination of these two causal mechanisms is at work.
243 See sources cited supra at note 5. The discussion that follows does not apply, how-
ever, to dangerous forms of civic activity such as characterizes racist, hate, and terrorist
groups, unless otherwise noted. For groups of this kind, see supra note 112.
244 The term "socialization" is also sometimes used to refer to the process whereby child-
hood or cultural influences impart values or attitudes to people. I used the term this way in
Part II.B.4, 5. Used that way, the term refers to developments outside of associational life.
See, e.g., Beck & Jennings, Pathways to Participation, supra note 225, at 94. In this Part II.C,
in contrast, I use the term to refer to the transformation that a member may experience as a
result of participating in the activities of an association. Following sociological terminology, I
use "self-selection" or "selection" to refer to the impact on joiners of attitudes created indepen-
dent of their participation in a specific organization. Some authors also speak of "selective
recruitment" to refer to the process whereby an organization recruits members who already
display the attitudes, skills, or other qualities useful to the organization. See, e.g., Carla M.
Eastis, Organizational Diversity and the Production of Social Capital: One of These Groups Is
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Identifying which causal relationships underlie a given correlation is
complicated by the fact that empirical studies are not usually designed to
assess the relative roles of self-selection prior to joining an association as
compared to socialization or mobilization after becoming a member.
Further, self-selection can be attributed to a person's unlearned predispo-
sitions or learned attitudes and interests, whether ultimately traceable to
formal schooling or informal educational experiences that occur in set-
tings like families, neighborhoods, schools, recreational activities, or
summer camps. Mobilization, in turn, can be either direct, through ex-
press recruitment, or indirect, through the process of socialization.
Moreover, the existing research that measures and compares the relative
roles of pre- and post-joining influences is not uniform in the outcomes
studied (e.g., voting, volunteering, or some other civic activity) or the
influences measured (e.g., values, recruitment, role models).2 45 This lack
of uniformity in research design has resulted in a patchwork of incom-
plete and often incommensurable findings.
Another impediment to achieving clarity regarding the respective
roles of self-selection in joining as opposed to socialization and mobili-
zation after joining is that associational involvement, even in expressive
and other nonpolitical organizations, is itself a form of civic engagement.
As a result, there is a danger that some findings will amount to a tautol-
ogy, i.e., the equivalent of the statement that "there is a significant posi-
tive correlation between people who are civically engaged and people
who are civically engaged." Implicitly responding to this concern, some
research looks at whether participation in one type of civic activity leads
to subsequent involvement in one or more additional types of civic activ-
ity. Most often, research of this kind examines whether involvement in
nonpolitical associations leads to involvement in political associations or
in other forms of political activity.
Not Like the Other, 42 AM. BEHAV. Sc. 66, 71 (1998) [hereinafter Organizational Diversity
and the Production of Social Capital].
245 See Brehm & Rahn, Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of
Social Capital, supra note 5, at 999 (hypothesizing that "[v]ariation in social capital can be
explained by citizens' psychological involvement with their communities, cognitive abilities,
economic resources, and general life satisfaction"); Marc Hooghe, Voluntary Associations and
Democratic Attitudes: Value Congruence as a Causal Mechanism, in GENERATING SOCIAL
CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 89, 93-94, 102-03 (examining the role of both pre-existing and post-
involvement attitudes in connection with feelings of ethnocentrism); David L. Rogers et al.,
Voluntary Association Membership and Political Participation: An Exploration of the Mobili-
zation Hypothesis, 16 Soc. Q. 305, 309 (1975) (examining the impact of both self-selection
and organizational involvement on engaging in political activities such as writing elected or
agency officials, meeting with agency officials, or attending a public hearing).
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2. Provisional Findings
Some recent empirical studies have called into question the exis-
tence of a strong positive correlation between civic engagement (whether
political or not) and the presence of or increase in generalized interper-
sonal trust 246 on the part of those who were civically engaged. A survey
conducted by the Pew Research Center of adults in Philadelphia and sur-
rounding areas revealed that they exhibited high levels of civic engage-
ment, including volunteering, despite the fact that they did not possess
high levels of interpersonal trust. 247 The survey's findings are inconsis-
tent with the view that civic engagement presupposes a significant level
of generalized interpersonal trust, and they may also suggest that civic
engagement does not necessarily generate or increase such trust. These
results were largely replicated by a survey of Americans eighteen years
and older prepared for AARP by analysts at the University of Virginia
Center for Survey Research. The survey found that "social trust may not
actually be an important component of civic involvement. '248 Other data
have also failed to reveal a correlation between generalized trust and in-
volvement in civic or political groups. 249 Consistent with these findings
is research indicating that increases in interpersonal trust among people
do not necessarily translate into increased participation by them in their
communities. 250 Some cross-national empirical data suggest that the cor-
246 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of this term).
247 See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, TRUST AND CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT IN METROPOLITAN
PHILADELPHIA: A CASE STUDY 4-5 (1997) [hereinafter TRUST AND CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT] (on
file with author). The survey measured interpersonal trust and found that 54 percent of the
people surveyed believe that "one can't be too careful in dealing with other people." Id. at 5.
At the same time 57 percent of those surveyed said that people usually try to be helpful and 64
percent said "other people try to be fair." Id. Thus, the report concluded that those surveyed
were "more wary than distrusting." Id. The survey also found that the level of distrust was
higher in the city than in the suburbs and that the reasons for distrusting others included peo-
ple's fear of other people's dishonesty, as well as their fear of crime. Id. at 5. The study found
that parental warnings were the single most important factor determining whether children,
once adults, distrusted others. Id. at 8.
248 THOMAS M. GUTERBOCK & JOHN C. FRIES, MAINTAINING AMERICA'S SOCIAL FABRIC:
THE AARP SURVEY OF CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT 109 (Center for Survey Research 1997). See id.
at 89-93, 98 (finding that social trust is weakly correlated with social involvement or volun-
teering, although there is a modest correlation between social trust, on the one hand, and
memberships in associations and community attachment, on the other).
249 See USLANER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST, supra note 111, at 125-28. The author
also concluded that members of labor unions have no more generalized interpersonal trust than
nonmembers, and that there is a negative correlation between membership in religious organi-
zations and generalized trust. Id. at 127 tbl 5-1.
250 Dhavan V. Shah, Civic Engagement, Interpersonal Trust, and Television Use: An In-
dividual-Level Assessment of Social Capital, 19 POL. PSYCHOL. 469, 487 (1998) [hereinafter
Civic Engagement, Interpersonal Trust, and Television Use].
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relation between associations and generalized interpersonal trust is con-
fined to particular nations. 25 1
At the same time, some revealing correlations have been found. On
the pre-joining side, research done by one sociologist suggests that those
who join voluntary associations have more generalized interpersonal
trust prior to joining than those who do not join.252 This is the case even
after controlling for education and socioeconomic status, both of which
are also highly correlated with high levels of generalized trust.253 The
author concludes that there is significant self-selection among people
who join voluntary associations. 254 This conclusion does not necessarily
contradict the findings of the other researchers just discussed. Rather it
suggests that generalized trust may be a sufficient but not a necessary
cause of civic engagement. 255
Although less studied than interpersonal trust, empirical research
supports the view that a person's confidence or sense of political efficacy
is an important cause of civic engagement. 256 According to one analysis,
the well-documented positive correlation of socioeconomic status and
education with civic engagement can be explained by the fact that these
251 See Nonna Mayer, Democracy in France: Do Associations Matter?, in GENERATING
SOCIAL CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 43, 44-45 (noting that in France "[m]embership and trust
levels evolve in opposite directions"). Cf Dag Wollebak & Per Selle, The Importance of
Passive Membership for Social Capital Formation, in GENERATING SOCIAL CAPITAL, supra
note 5, at 67 (based upon Norwegian survey data, confirming a strong correlation between
association membership, trust, and civic engagement). See also Stolle, Clubs and Congrega-
tions, supra note 42 (analyzing differences in the impact of several types of associations in the
United States, Germany, and Sweden and finding differences based upon national characteris-
tics as well as on the characteristics of members and the type of association).
252 Stolle, Bowling Together, Bowling Alone: The Development of Generalized Trust in
Voluntary Associations, 19 POL. PSYCHOLOGY 497, 507-09 (1998) [hereinafter Bowling To-
gether, Bowling Alone] (basing these findings upon recent survey data drawn from active
members of a variety of associations in Sweden and Germany). Since Stolle was unable to
control for self-selection completely, she could not conclude definitively if people are more
trusting before they join an association or they become more trusting with the decision to join.
Id. at 507. She did not, however, find that people became more trusting after joining. See id.
at 516.
253 Id. at 508 n.16, 515, Stolle, Clubs and Congregations, supra note 42, at 229-30.
254 Stolle also found significant effects on generalized trust as a result of associational
activity in certain instances. See Stolle, Bowling Together, Bowling Alone, supra note 252, at
516-18.
255 The reason is that it can be true that people with significant levels of generalized
interpersonal trust are likely to join more often than those without such trust without it also
being true that a significant level of such trust is necessary for a high level of civic engage-
ment. Cf USLANER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST, supra note I ll, at 127 (finding that
confidence and a sense of control are themselves strong predictors of generalized trust, al-
though the same research also failed to show that generalized trust was a strong predictor of
civic engagement).
256 See USLANER, MORAL FOUNDATION OF TRUST, supra note 11l, at 100-02.
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factors create "a sense of political efficacy" in students. 257 In its study of
civic engagement among adults in Philadelphia, the Pew Research Center
also found that a large percentage of people surveyed said they were
confident they would be effective when they involved themselves in
community issues, even though many of these same people expressed a
high level of distrust of others.258 These studies suggest that, in some
circumstances, individuals' perception of their own or their organiza-
tion's efficacy may be more important than interpersonal or generalized
trust in leading them to engage in civic activity.
Turning to post-joining effects, studies suggest that associational in-
volvement can increase certain types of civic attitudes on the part of par-
ticipants. One study found that associational involvement contributes
significantly to the emergence of interpersonal trust, even though the
same research also revealed that interpersonal trust does not contribute
significantly to community participation. 259 Three studies based upon
1960s data found "positive changes in the altruist as a function of volun-
teering. '260 Other studies, in contrast, have concluded that associational
involvement does not usually increase members' generalized trust.2 6 '
However, in one of these, when the data describing groups with a high
proportion of foreigners were isolated from the rest, there was an in-
crease in generalized trust among members of groups with many foreign-
ers during the period of their involvement (as well as a significant self-
selection effect). 262 This finding suggests that involvement in voluntary
associations with members of diverse backgrounds has the potential to
increase the level of tolerance among members. Other research, in con-
trast, indicates that the associational effect may be to increase or decrease
tolerance, depending upon the dominant view within the organization.2 63
It is possible that absence of strong support for Robert Putnam's
belief that group participants are, as a general matter, likely to develop
257 See Paulsen, Education, Social Class, and Participation in Collective Action, supra
note 176, at 96.
258 See TRUST AND CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT, supra note 247, at 4. Of course, confidence
and a sense of political efficacy can also result from, as well as lead to, associational
involvement.
259 Shah, Civic Engagement, Interpersonal Trust, and Television Use, supra note 250, at
487-88.
260 These are noted in Clary & Miller, Socialization and Situational Influences on Sus-
tained Altruism, supra note 224, at 1359. The studies revealed increases in empathy, nurtur-
ing, and self-confidence and self-acceptance.
261 See USLANER, MORAL FOUNDATION OF TRUST, supra note 11l, at 128; Stolle, Bow-
ling Together, Bowling Alone, supra note 252, at 510, 516.
262 Stolle, Bowling Together, Bowling Alone, supra note 252, at 516-18; see also Stolle &
Rochon, Are All Associations Alike?, supra note 59, at 60-61 (finding that members of organi-
zations with low levels of diversity report far less generalized trust than do members of more
diverse organizations).
263 See infra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
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generalized interpersonal trust as a result of their participation in the
group may be due merely to the fragmentary state of research focusing
on this issue. Nevertheless, at this time, there is only minimal evidence
to support his belief that expressive bonding groups, like bowling
leagues and choral societies, are likely to lead to more complex interper-
sonal or public-oriented bonds among members.
264
Also on the post-joining side of the equation, there is a significant
amount of empirical research devoted to measuring the effect of involve-
ment in voluntary associations on political participation. 265 Although
numerous studies have found a strong positive correlation between in-
volvement in nonpolitical voluntary associations, including attending
church, and political participation as a generic category, 266 the results are
more ambiguous when voter turnout-a single measure of political partic-
ipation - is examined separately. One study found that participation in
both religious and nonreligious voluntary groups was a "moderately im-
portant" predictor of turnout, and that the "participatory predispositions"
toward civic engagement of those that joined these groups explained very
little of the correlation. 267 The inference is that their engagement in as-
sociational activities (through socialization or recruitment) influenced
members to vote. Other research has concluded that participation in as-
sociations had no impact on the likelihood of members voting, 268 or that
264 For a different view of the civic contribution of members of bowling leagues, see THE
BIG LEBOWSKI (Universal Studios 1998). For a comparison of the pre- and post-joining attrib-
utes of members of two choral groups, one organized to perform the sacred music of a fif-
teenth century Flemish composer and the other to perform an evening of songs from Broadway
musicals, published by a participant observer, see Eastis, Organizational Diversity and the
Production of Social Capital, supra note 244.
265 There is also research exploring situations in which social interactions other than orga-
nizational involvement increase the likelihood of political activity, and some have argued that
social environment can influence political involvement even in the absence of concrete social
interactions. See Anderson, Political Action and Social Integration, supra note 176, at I11.
Marvin Olsen, in contrast, found no correlation between informal social interactions and voter
turnout after controlling for other participation factors. See Marvin E. Olsen, Social Participa-
tion and Voting Turnout: A Multivariate Analysis, 37 AM. Soc. REv. 317, 323 (1972) [herein-
after Social Participation and Voting Turnout]. Because of the focus of this Article on
associations, this research is not considered.
266 See VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 5, at 338-39; ROSENSTONE &
HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 182, at
83-88; DAVID KNOKE, ORGANIZING FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF
ASSOCIATIONS 17, 193-95 (1990); Olsen, Social Participation and Voting Turnout, supra note
265.
267 See Cassel, Voluntary Associations, Churches, and Social Participation Theories of
Turnout, supra note 220, at 509-10, 514 (basing her findings upon her analysis of National
Election Study (NES) data and controlling for other influences, Cassel concluded that only
education and age had more of an effect on voter turnout in presidential elections from 1972-
1992 than did predispositions).
268 Pollock, HI, Organizations as Agents of Mobilization, supra note 228, at 500 (finding
that there was a causal relationship between the SES of people who joined solidary organiza-
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only engagement in religious institutions, but not other forms of associa-
tional involvement, has a strong effect on members voting. 269 The view
that only a weak link exists between participation in nonpolitical associa-
tions and voting is consistent with empirical work by two political scien-
tists who found that more than half of the decline in voter turnout in
presidential elections between 1960 and 1988 was due to a "decline in
mobilization" of voters through personal contacts in favor of media ad-
vertising (especially television advertising); the increasing numbers of
primaries, which diluted scarce resources; and states changing their elec-
tions for governor to off-years. 270
A study of the relationship between nonpolitical voluntary associa-
tions and what the researchers classified as "intermediate" political activ-
ity, namely, attempts to influence government officials, as contrasted
with lower levels of political activity, such as voting, reading about polit-
ics, or discussing politics, 27' concluded that both self-selection and orga-
nizational involvement explain the extent of people's intermediate forms
of political participation, but that mobilization within an association ac-
counts for a larger effect.272 Other researchers credit the positive impact
of associational involvement on subsequent political engagement to the
information and skills members acquire through participation in the ac-
tivities of an association. 273 The connection between participation in
voluntary organizations and political engagement may also be a result of
the fact that people who participate in voluntary associations are more
tions and their voting, but finding no effect on people's voting behavior because of their partic-
ipation in such associations, whether by unintentional or intentional mobilization of members).
269 See VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 5, at 359.
270 See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY, supra note 182, at 183-84, 214-18. "Mobilization" is used by this author to refer to the
efforts of people (whether or not affiliated with associations) to get citizens to vote and not as
the term is used in this section, i.e., for the efforts of some members of an association to recruit
others or the more subtle socializing effect of an organization on its members. See also Rich-
ard M. Valelly, Couch-Potato Democracy?, AM. PROSPECT, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 25 (agreeing
with Rosenstone and Hansen and emphasizing that "parties, groups, and movements" used to
make personal contact with voters and draw them into elections, as did unions, which have
also declined).
271 See Rogers et al., Voluntary Association Membership and Political Participation,
supra note 245, at 309.
272 See id. at 314. This study is one of the few to compare the post-joining outcomes with
the parallel relationship between self-selection (a combination of SES and political attitudes).
See also Ayala, Trained for Democracy, supra note 85, at 104, 108, 109 (finding that the
impact of participation in voluntary associations on political participation rivaled the effect of
SES).
273 See Jan Leighley, Group Membership and the Mobilization of Political Participation,
58 J. POL. 447, 448, 453 (1996); cf Sidney Verba et al., Race, Ethnicity and Political Re-
sources: Participation in the United States, 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 453, 473-78 (1993) (report-
ing the results of empirical studies showing that membership in a nonpolitical organization
imparts civic skills to members but noting that people are much more likely to acquire such
skills in the workplace).
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likely to see themselves as having control over their lives, develop the
ability and the desire to think through issues and problems that affect
them, assume responsibility to solve such problems, be willing and able
to work with others to implement their decisions, and have more and
more enriched interpersonal relations than their non-participating coun-
terparts.274 Whatever the mechanism of this causal process, it seems that
members must be active participants, at least for a significant period of
time, for beneficial effects of association membership to occur.
27 5
The empirical evidence is even clearer that involvement in advo-
cacy, political, or politically-oriented organizations, as contrasted with
nonpolitical organizations, causes additional political engagement. This
is probably because leaders within such groups deliberately seek to mo-
bilize members to engage in political activity outside the group to further
the group's objectives. 276 As a consequence, mobilization within a polit-
ical association is an effective mechanism for promoting additional civic
involvement, especially engagement in politics.
In sum, based upon current empirical studies, there is some evi-
dence that participation in a voluntary association will induce or cause
further civic activity on the part of the participant, but the causal link
appears to be weaker than is often assumed. Moreover, where a causal
link between the two has been documented, the effect seems to be attrib-
utable to mobilization by group members, especially group leaders, to a
far greater degree than to skills, confidence, or civic attitudes acquired
through participation in the "first" association. In addition, confidence in
a person's own or his or her organization's political efficacy rather than
generalized interpersonal trust appears to be the attitude most likely to
prompt civic engagement. Given the embryonic state of empirical re-
search in this area, for the time being it seems prudent to assume that
future research is likely to find that the relative importance of pre- and
274 See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, supra note 182, at 14-16, 79.
275 See SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DE-
MOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 184 (1972) (concluding that members must be active in an
organization in order to acquire the skills that make increased political engagement likely);
Stolle, Bowling Together, Bowling Alone, supra note 252, at 515. For the view that there is no
meaningful difference between the level of social capital displayed by active and passive
members, see Dag Wollebwek & Per Selle, Voluntary Associations and Social Capital: Does
Face to Face Interaction Really Matter (2000) (paper presented at the European Consortium
for Political Research Workshop, "Social Capital and Interest Formation," on file with author).
276 See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, supra note 182, at 83. The efforts of leaders of an association to encourage the
political participation of members may extend beyond the members' original incentives in
joining in the first place. See also Leighley, Group Membership and Mobilization, supra note
273, at 452.
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post-association factors will turn out to be context-dependent and not
uniform.277
3. The Role of Integration in Socializing Members of
Associations
Sociologists also study how participation in voluntary associations
influences members' attitudes and conduct. Central to this research is
the concept of "integration," a term of art referring to the way in which
bonds form among people. Voluntary associations can be viewed as in-
tegrative in two ways. 278 First, when members of voluntary associations
develop bonds with one another through their common activity and
goals, the process is referred to as "social-psychological integration. '2 79
The bonds thus created constitute what Robert Putnam calls the interper-
sonal trust of "bonding groups. '280 Because people who bond with each
other through expressive associations, 28' such as weekly bridge games or
square dancing, are not likely to be concerned with community issues by
virtue of their group bonds, the expectation is that their social-psycholog-
ical integration within the group would prompt little or no social integra-
tion outside the group and, similarly, little or no civic engagement. 282 As
was noted in Part I, some commentators have argued that intra-group
bonds may actually interfere with the formation of bonds to the larger
community.2 83
It would seem that intra-group integration will also occur in instru-
mental associations, but that social integration with a larger community
will occur as well, given that, by definition, such groups seek to influ-
ence people or policies external to the group to achieve their objec-
tives. 284 As a consequence, members of instrumental groups need to
recognize and operate in accordance with external cultural norms and
practices, and they may also need to develop certain "activist-type"
skills, including a sense of the effectiveness of working together as a
group to accomplish their common purpose. Belonging to instrumental
voluntary associations should, therefore, both equip and enable members
277 See, e.g., Hooghe, Voluntary Associations and Democratic Attitudes: Value Congru-
ence as a Causal Mechanism, supra note 245, at 106.
278 See Babchuk & Edwards, The Integration Hypothesis, supra note 166, at 149 n.l.
279 See id.
280 For this term, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
281 For the distinction between expressive and instrumental associations, see supra Part
II.A.
282 Of course, their participation in expressive or bonding groups does not preclude their
participating in other types of groups.
283 See supra note 58.
284 See Babchuk & Edwards, The Integration Hypothesis, supra note 166, at 149 n.l.
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to be civically active.285 Empirical research confirms this expectation to
some extent, but it suggests important limits on the type of social integra-
tion members acquire.
An early study of students was designed to test the proposition that
members of instrumental associations were more likely than members of
expressive groups to be oriented toward "community activities that may
not provide much immediate gratification but which are generally con-
sidered worthwhile and desirable." The data revealed that student sub-
jects who joined associations for instrumental reasons were, in fact, more
likely than their expressive counterparts to be civically engaged, e.g., to
vote, watch educational and documentary television programs, and read
newspapers and news magazines thoroughly and daily.286 Contrary to
the study's hypothesis, however, the instrumentally-oriented students did
not participate more in service organizations or give blood in greater
numbers than students in expressively-oriented groups. 28 7 Based upon
this and other findings, the study considered the possibility that "itihe
instrumental association member may well be an interested and con-
cerned citizen, but the interest and concern appears to be self-oriented
and rather impersonal in nature. People are important primarily as ob-
jects to be manipulated to serve one's own ends. '288 If accurate, partici-
pation in voluntary associations is unlikely to facilitate the creation of
generalized interpersonal trust even if it succeeds in causing members to
be civically active.
In THE CIVIC CULTURE, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba sug-
gested that participation in voluntary associations is correlated with dem-
285 See Jacoby, Correlates of Instrumental and Expressive Orientations, supra note 167,
at 165; see also Bartolomeo J. Palisi & Perry E. Jacobson, Dominant Statuses and Involvement
in Types of Instrumental and Expressive Voluntary Associations, 6 J. VOLUNTARY AcTION
RES. 80, 86 (1977) [hereinafter Dominant Statuses]. The data in both articles were based upon
student responses to questionnaires.
286 They were also more likely to receive good grades and feel disappointed when they
did not get them. Jacoby, Correlates of Instrumental and Expressive Orientations, supra note
167, at 165.
287 See id. at 171.
288 See id. at 172. The data also showed that students who joined expressive voluntary
associations lived with other people significantly more and reported having many more friends
than did students who preferred instrumental associations. Id. at 166. The author opined that
people who join expressive associations or view the associations they join as expressive do so
because they value or need human relationships, in contrast to loners, who appear not to pos-
sess such values and needs to the same degree. Jacoby, Personal Influence and Primary Rela-
tionships, supra note 221, at 82. This is consistent with the possibility that people who
participate in expressive voluntary associations may be more civic minded than they would be
if they preferred solitary recreation, like watching television or computer games, because
group activity develops or reinforces personal ties and, as a consequence, a form of social trust
or social capital. See Babchuck & Edwards, The Integration Hypothesis, supra note 166, at
150, 151; see also PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 149.
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ocratic attitudes. 289  However, more recent studies exploring the
relationship between association participation and social integration have
discovered that associational life often replicates and reinforces socio-
economic inequalities. In one, the data showed that associations made
up primarily of high-status individuals are more influential than those
whose members are low status290 and that voluntary associations "which
have high levels of affiliation also appear to allocate that affiliation in
ways which reinforce, rather than counteract, the distribution of inequal-
ity in society."'29 ' Other research showed that dominant status stu-
dents292 were more likely to be members of instrumental associations
than were subordinate-status students; dominant-status individuals were
much more likely to join voluntary associations whose goal was to obtain
benefits for their members than groups devoted to accomplishing some
goal for the outside community; and when dominant status individuals
did join instrumental voluntary associations with a community orienta-
tion they participated at a rate lower than the average participation rate
for instrumental associations overall. 293
The status reinforcing aspects of voluntary associations294 may be a
result of their tendency to be "overwhelmingly homogeneous," which
inhibits contacts among dissimilar people.295 According to the authors of
research on the composition of voluntary associations:
[v]oluntary association homogeneity magnifies social
differences, rather than mitigating them. When people
289 See ALMOND & VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE, supra note 92, at 300-01, 307, 318-21.
290 See McPherson, A Dynamic Model of Voluntary Affiliation, supra note 175, at 720,
724.
291 Id. at 721; see also id. at 720, 724. In the article, McPherson still acknowledges the
integrative effect of voluntary associations, even though he argues that the case has been over-
stated. Id. at 705 (citing studies that demonstrate societal integration). He refines his reserva-
tions in Pamela A. Popielarz & J. Miller McPherson, On the Edge or In Between: Niche
Position, Niche Overlap, and the Duration of Voluntary Association Memberships, 101 AM. J.
Soc. 698 (1995) [hereinafter On the Edge or In Between].
292 The researchers distinguish "dominant" status people from "subordinate" status people
based upon income, education, occupation, gender, age, marital status, and religion. See Palisi
& Jacobson, Dominant Statuses, supra note 285, at 82-83. The authors develop the distinction
in Mona Lemon et al., Dominant Statuses and Involvement in Formal Voluntary Associations,
1 J. VOLUNTARY ACTION RES. 30 (1972).
293 See Palisi & Jacobson, Dominant Statuses, supra note 285, at 83, 86. Because this
study was of students, the level in school, major, and grade point average were also compo-
nents of dominant and subordinate status. The study found that they participated more in "for
self' voluntary associations than in "for other" associations. Id. at 86. The study also deter-
mined that the students were no more likely to participate in such organizations than other
people. Id.
294 See id. at 86 (citing Chapter 3 of EDWARD C. BANFIELD, TiE UNHEAVENLY CITY
REvisrED (1974)).
295 See Popielarz & McPherson, On the Edge or In Between, supra note 291, at 698-99,
704.
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are segregated into homogeneous groups, access to the
important resources that these groups afford inevitably
becomes concentrated in small social circles rather than
dispersed in the general population. These resources in-
clude new social network ties (and the information and
support that they provide), as well as other forms of so-
cial capital and political influence. 296
Voluntary association homogeneity, in turn, is the norm because "new
members replicate the sociodemographic characteristics of old ones. '297
Even when people relatively dissimilar to existing members are in fact
recruited, members at the periphery of an association's "niche" tend to
leave the association sooner or at a higher rate than those in its core.2 98
Thus, if homogeneous when first organized, organizations are likely to
remain that way, thereby limiting the possibility of "cross-category
contact."
299
In contrast to the preceding, research based upon Belgian survey
data showed that associations such as human rights organizations, envi-
ronmental groups, and school boards, whose members are highly edu-
cated, tended to be less ethnocentric than other associations and reduced
the level of prejudice among members even after controlling for the ef-
fect of the higher educational levels of the members. However, associa-
tions dominated by blue collar workers did not have a democratizing
effect even though they explicitly voiced anti-discrimination policies. 30 0
296 Id. at 699.
297 Id. at 701. To test their hypothesis, the authors used gender and education, two easily
identifiable dimensions of network ties. Id. at 710. They also conjectured that future studies
will show that different dimensions exert different amounts of pressure on members. Id. at
716.
298 Id. at 702-704. The authors' explanation of this phenomenon is that "[flor individuals
at the center of the niche, the group is an integral part of the social structure of relations. But
for those at the edge of the niche, the group divides the social world rather than reinforces it."
Id. at 704.
299 See id. at 717. The authors also found that competition among the groups for mem-
bers was most successful when a competing group sought to lure away members of another
association that were most dissimilar from those at the center of the target association, assum-
ing the members on the periphery of the first organization also happen to be in the niche of the
competing organization. Id. at 704-05. The authors found that the people especially vulnera-
ble to being lured away are those who are at the periphery of the niche of group one and also
within the niche of group two ("niche overlap"). Id. The consequence of competition among
groups, therefore, is that the duration of memberships for those on the periphery is shorter than
the durations for those at the core. Id. at 715. In short, both the effect within associations and
the effect among associations act as homogenizing mechanisms for voluntary associations. Id.
300 See Marc Hooghe, Socialisation, Selective Recruitment and Value Congruence: Vol-
untary Associations and the Development of Shared Norms 15-19 (2000) (paper delivered at
Workshop 13, "Voluntary Associations, Social Capital and Interest Mediation: Forging the
Link," European Consortium for Political Research, April 14-19, 2000) (on file with author)
(concluding that there is "value congruence" under such conditions); Hooghe, Voluntary As-
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The study concluded that, while individuals usually choose to associate
with people of similar educational levels and attitudes, they are also in-
fluenced by the views of other members after they join. In particular, the
study found that members experience "an enhancement of previously ex-
isting value patterns" converging on the dominant rather than an average
value and, thus, members' democratic attitudes will increase and their
prejudice be reduced only in associations where the dominant views are
democratic. 30' These findings are consistent with Swedish and German
data that showed increased generalized interpersonal trust and significant
self-selection in groups with a large percentage of foreigners.
30 2
In sum, empirical research thus suggests that the expectation that
voluntary associations will likely integrate individuals within a group
into a diverse larger community has been overstated. To the extent that a
voluntary association exhibits homogeneity or favors dominant-status
people, it is not likely to create generalized interpersonal trust, i.e., social
bonds connecting its members to people outside the group. It is possible
to speculate that this is because interpersonal trust within an organization
is, in fact, based upon an expectation of reciprocity, however inchoate. If
that expectation is based upon a member's experience with other mem-
bers of the group and an awareness of their common goals, there is no
reason to suppose it would spontaneously lead to a form of interpersonal
trust extending to individuals outside that member's experience and not
necessarily sharing those goals. The theories that attempt to bridge the
gap between interpersonal trust specific to an organization and genera-
lized interpersonal trust by positing norms and networks somehow com-
mon to both are not borne out by the empirical data. Intuitively, it would
seem that norms of cooperation are less suited to bear the weight of these
theories than would be norms of public-spiritedness or altruism, i.e.,
civic norms with moral content. In any event, for voluntary associations
to have the effect hoped for by optimistic civic renewal advocates, their
composition and dynamics need to be studied in greater depth. Further-
more, stratagems need to be designed to counteract the tendency of as-
sociations toward homogeneity and high-status influence so that
participation may reduce the stratification of people by education, in-
come, and status that already permeates other areas of life.
sociations and Democratic Attitudes: Value Congruence as a Causal Mechanism, supra note
245, at 100-04.
301 See Hooghe, Voluntary Associations and Democratic Attitudes: Value Congruence as
a Causal Mechanism, supra note 245, at 105-07. See also id. at 93-94. Through the same
dynamic, associations can increase "unsocial capital." Id. at 92, 106-07.
302 See supra text accompanying note 262.
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11. CIVIC RENEWAL AND THE REGULATION OF
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
The civic renewal debate is a work in progress. There is evidence
pointing to a long pattern of decline in significant areas of civic life, yet
there is also evidence that the decline has been sporadic, is limited in
scope, has been misinterpreted, or has turned the corner.30 3 Thus, civic
life may have deteriorated since the 1960s or, alternatively, it may sim-
ply not be as robust as we would want or expect in a country of wide-
spread economic prosperity and increasing levels of education. There is
also evidence that the locus of civic engagement has shifted, not de-
clined, as many individuals have come to view civic engagement
predominantly in terms of civil or social involvement or other face-to-
face encounters, rather than political activity.
Among those who believe that civil society has in fact witnessed a
decline or displays a lack of robustness, there is disagreement as to the
causes. Political institutions, social movements, restructuring of the la-
bor force, growing disparities in income and wealth, television, new
technologies, individualism, materialism, and other cultural ideas and
changes are the most frequently mentioned candidates. Although there is
general agreement that civil society and civic life would benefit if people
were more civically engaged, the review of the four perspectives in Part I
revealed that the ultimate goal of civic reform (civic health) is also sub-
ject to varying interpretations.
Given the uncertainty as to the existence of and reasons for civic
decline, in addition to the differing goals that reformers seek, it is diffi-
cult to chart a direction, much less design concrete steps, for improving
civic life. In addition to this uncertainty, there is a deep disagreement
among those who concur on the need for civic life to be more robust as
to the appropriate roles of governmental and private actors. Some view
government action in general, and specific government actions in the last
century, as a large part of the problem. 3°4 Others believe that whatever
the source of the problem, legal enactments are not part of the solu-
tion.305 Still others argue that laws and other government actions inevi-
tably influence social, economic, and political norms, even if that is not
the intent of those who drafted them.30 6 If so, it is irresponsible to ignore
the potential impact of government action at the national, state, or local
levels; instead, attention must be paid to the many ways in which govern-
303 See sources cited supra at note 2.
304 See supra Part I.A.
305 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553 (2001). Ribstein con-
cludes that law "does not increase" either the strong or semi-strong forms of trust.
306 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2023, 2025, 2031-32, 2045, 2047-50 (1996).
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ment action and norms interact, so that public actors play a constructive
role in helping to ensure that the interactions benefit, rather than under-
mine, civil society. 30 7 Finally, there are civic renewal advocates who
believe that public and private actors working together or working con-
currently in their respective spheres are a necessary part of the
solution. 30 8
This Part focuses primarily on one aspect of the role of law and
civic renewal, namely, the legal regulation of nonprofit institutions. In
particular, this Part will analyze the federal income tax rules governing
the status and activities of what are called "exempt organizations" in the
Internal Revenue Code (Code). 309 The decision to concentrate on this
subset of a much larger topic is based on four considerations. First,
many civic renewal advocates believe that participation in voluntary as-
sociations can, in certain circumstances, improve civic life, whether be-
cause such participation is intrinsically valuable, because of its
instrumental value in furthering the goals sought by associations, or be-
cause of the effects it has upon members. Second, although the subset of
groups that request and receive exemption from federal income taxation
does not exhaust the larger class of voluntary organizations, 310 it ac-
307 See Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2055, 2067-76 (1996) (arguing that law and policy can destroy social capital by design-
ing streets and neighborhoods without informal places for people to congregate, by violating
norms of fair dealing in its interactions with citizens, and by injudicious attempts to incorpo-
rate social norms into law in situations where social enforcement of them is preferable).
308 See, e.g., PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 403, 405, 413-14; Putnam, Bow-
ling Alone, supra note 2, at 76-77; E. Schukoske, Community Development Through Garden-
ing: State and Local Policies Transforming Urban Open Space, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 351 (2000) (arguing that state or local legislation could greatly facilitate private trans-
formation of vacant urban land from dangerous eye-sores to community gardens conducive to
community development by authorizing access to resources and protecting gardeners from the
threat of legal liability). See also supra note 40.
309 See supra note 158.
310 Voluntary associations can be informal or formal. Informal voluntary organizations
may be subject to state law regulation, but they are not necessarily required to file or register
with the a state agency simply because they exist. For example, a duplicate bridge club or a
garden club need not register or file unless, for example, they desire to solicit contributions
subject to state solicitation laws. Formal voluntary organizations, in contrast, typically have
some kind of organizing document, such as articles of association, a charter, or articles of
incorporation filed with a state agency. An organization seeking to be recognized as a non-
profit under state law is usually required to file its organizing documents with the state and
comply with any other reporting requirements. A copy of an entity's organizing documents
must be provided to the Internal Revenue Service as part of the process of applying for an
exemption from Federal income taxation or for charitable status. See I.R.S. Forms 1023 (Ap-
plication for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3)), 1024 (Application for Rec-
ognition of Exemption Under Section 501(a)) available at http://www.irs.gov/formspubsl
index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). At the same time, most states make the receipt of
Federal income tax exemption a condition of receiving state income or sales tax exemption
(although not a condition of merely organizing as a nonprofit within the jurisdiction), or at
least accept a Federal determination letter as sufficient to apply for tax benefits in the state.
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counts for a large proportion of all formal voluntary associations. Third,
the regulation of exempt organizations under the Code is the single most
comprehensive regulatory structure governing the character and content
of the operations of these voluntary associations, as well as their struc-
tural and financial arrangements. Finally, federal tax rules constitute the
primary source of regulation of exempt organization advocacy, lobbying,
and campaign activities-topics of obvious relevance for a discussion of
the role of voluntary associations in civic life and their potential utility as
vehicles for civic engagement. 3 11
A. THE COOPERATION PERSPECTIVE
As was discussed in Part I, one perspective animating the civic re-
newal debate starts from the belief that a major purpose of an active civil
society is to breed interpersonal trust, social networks, and civic norms
among people so as to facilitate cooperation and collective action di-
rected toward resolving societal problems and to make government bod-
ies responsive and accountable to citizens and citizen groups.
Participation in associational life is, thus, an instrumental good that de-
rives its value from the desirability of the economic, social, and political
outcomes it furthers.
1. Voluntary Associations and Cooperation
As was discussed in Part II, empirical research supports the thesis
that voluntary associations can facilitate the twin goals of cooperation
and effective collective action associated with the first perspective on
civic health discussed above 3 12 even though their impact on the develop-
ment of civic attitudes has been exaggerated. Small, instrumental volun-
tary associations may provide a forum for people already predisposed to
undertake a community-based or public mission to come together, de-
velop a plan for influencing those outside the group who are in a position
to further their mission, and allocate among the members tasks condu-
cive to persuading and motivating outside parties to act on their behalf.
The internal dynamic of such associations leads the members to have a
reasonable expectation that the other members are committed and willing
to expend their personal resources to achieve the goal they share. As a
result, the members are likely to acquire confidence in their own ability
For an overview of state law regulation of nonprofits and their staffs, see JAMES J. FISHMAN &
STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 60-316 (2d ed.
2000).
311 The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000), is also
important, especially for the advocacy of activities of exempt organizations. An analysis of
the impact of FECA provisions is, however, outside the scope of this Article.
312 See supra Part I.A.
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and the ability of their organization to influence decisions related to the
group's concerns.
Based upon the empirical research discussed in Part II, the basis of
this expectation is not yet understood. 3 13 It may be a calculation that
relies heavily on the face-to-face character of members' interactions and
the visibility of members' actions in a small group. It may be a sense of
trust that members had prior to joining the group, or one that arose or
was strengthened from interactions within the group. It may be a transi-
tory sense of common norms coupled with the confidence, based upon
experience with that or other groups, that the impact of unified and per-
sistent groups is in general far more effective than the efforts of a single
person, however knowledgeable and sophisticated.
Large instrumental voluntary associations, including checkbook or-
ganizations or "associations without members," can also function as ve-
hicles for effective collective action by virtue of the financial resources
they possess to spend on a paid staff, professional lobbyists, Madison
Avenue advertising agencies, telemarketers, and mass mailings to their
members and others to galvanize them into an outpouring of grass roots
activity. 314 Because of their greater resources, large associations may be
more effective at the national level or in circumstances requiring simulta-
neous, coordinated action in a large number of states than are small in-
strumental organizations. Large voluntary associations can thus achieve
a powerful external effect even if they have little or no impact on the
skills or civic engagement of their members apart from eliciting financial
support. In fact, from the vantage point of "getting things done," such
associations may frequently be more effective-especially at the federal,
regional, or state level-than small instrumental organizations made up
of members who participate actively. 31 5
Small instrumental and large non-participatory organizations are
thus well-suited to address and influence the resolution of many societal
ills. Even class action litigation may be considered a voluntary associa-
tion vehicle with great potential for cooperation and effective collective
action, as can be seen from the many successes of civil rights, environ-
mental, and tort class action suits brought in the second half of the twen-
tieth century. 316 This is the case even though it is rare for more than a
handful of the members of the class to participate in the litigation in a
313 Supra Part II.C.
314 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
315 See generally Newton, Social Capital and Democracy in Modern Europe, supra note
17 (distinguishing an organization's internal impact from its external impact).
316 SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 2, at 249-52. Most civic renewal advo-
cates, however, consider the American litigious culture as part of the problem, not the solution.
See FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 12, at 51.
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way that would engender any of the attitudes, habits, skills, or behaviors
often attributed to involvement in voluntary associations.
Civic renewal advocates writing from the cooperation perspective
also expect that participation in associations will increase the generalized
interpersonal trust of the members, i.e., that it will extend their intra-
group interpersonal trust to trust of people and groups outside the group,
thereby enhancing the reservoir of social capital in the larger communi-
ties of which they form a part. The emergence of some kind of ripple
effect is a critical component of the cooperation perspective argument,
even if it is not stated explicitly, because it is the predicate for believing
that participation in voluntary associations will lead to more efficient and
effective cross- or inter-association cooperation and correspondingly
broad community outcomes. 3
17
We have seen, however, that some empirical research supports the
premise of social integration or the emergence of generalized interper-
sonal trust resulting from associational involvement, but that much re-
search does not. 31 8 One possibility discussed in the preceding sections is
that people join voluntary organizations because they are predisposed to
join, i.e., they already have the attitudes or habits disposing them to civic
engagement. 3 19 To the extent that this is the causal sequence, in order to
ensure a robust civil society, civic renewal efforts need to focus on the
process whereby such attitudes or habits are formed prior to joining. Re-
search to date has revealed that education, social class, and attitudes and
values learned at home, from friends, and at schools are the most impor-
tant sources of the disposition to join.320 Another finding was that,
where voting was concerned, direct mobilization by friends or activists in
face-to-face encounters was the most successful strategy, and that this
was true regardless of the associational involvement of the person re-
cruited. Direct mobilization within groups also tended to generate civic
engagement outside the groups if members were specifically recruited
for that purpose. Such mobilization occurred primarily in instrumental
voluntary associations, where a common, relatively specific goal rather
than a deep-seated or generalized norm of cooperation seemed to be the
motivating force. At the very least, empirical research has so far failed
to document that there is a significant transformative effect on partici-
pants in most instrumental voluntary associations, i.e., that members ac-
tive in one association develop such habits of mind and behaviors that
317 Some kind of ripple effect would explain Putnam's conviction that there are bridging
effects of certain bonding associations such as choral societies and bowling leagues. See Putr-
NAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 22-23.
318 See supra Part II.C.
319 See supra notes 181-83, 187, 200, 223-25, 234 and accompanying text. See generally
supra Part II.C.2.
320 See supra Part II.B.
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they come to view civic engagement as an integral part of their lives. 32'
Similarly, there have been conflicting accounts of the potential of non-
instrumental or expressive groups for generating generalized interper-
sonal trust outside the group. 322 Thus, based upon the current state of
research, civic renewal measures embodying the first perspective should
aim at increasing the amount of mobilization within and by groups (and
other face-to-face requests) for all kinds of civic engagement. In addi-
tion, future research should focus directly on which non-associational
factors create the disposition in people to join which types of groups.
2. The Regulation of Exempt Organizations
The general contours of the current system of regulation of exempt
organizations are largely consistent with this understanding. First and
foremost, the Code affords exemption from income taxes to mutual bene-
fit organizations as well as to charities and other entities dedicated to
enhancing social welfare. Mutual benefit organizations include associa-
tions that represent an industry (thus indirectly benefiting individual
members of the industry), as well as groups that benefit individuals di-
rectly. Examples of the former are trade associations and chambers of
commerce; examples of the latter are certain fraternal lodges, recrea-
tional groups, cemetery companies, and veterans' organizations. 323 La-
bor unions, which are exempt under section 501(c)(5) of the Code, can
be seen as benefiting both individual union members and the industries
the unions represent. 324
Some might question the rationale for giving a tax-favored status to
mutual benefit organizations, given that they exist to provide direct or
indirect benefits to their members rather than to confer a public benefit.
From the cooperation perspective, however, group membership is pre-
sumptively beneficial for civic life, and groups that enable people to
combine to achieve a collective purpose that improves the members'
lives is an important part of a robust civil society, both because of its
accomplishment of the goals of members and because of the emergence
of an ethic of reciprocity, interpersonal trust, or confidence among the
members. These organizations may act more efficiently on behalf of and
be more responsive to the needs of their members than would compara-
ble government programs. In addition, mutual benefit organizations
often sponsor formal and informal activities, both of which can be effec-
321 See supra Part I.C.3.
322 See supra Part II.C.3.
323 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(6), (7), (8), (13), (19) (2000).
324 See Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues,
36 B.C. L REV. 279, 298-301 (1995) (arguing that unions, especially their collective bargain-
ing negotiations, benefit members by enabling them to engage in self-governance as well as by
affording them economic benefits).
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tive in creating social ties. The fact that mutual benefit groups primarily
further the economic or social interests of their members, rather than
engage in charitable or community endeavors, should not bar their
favorable tax treatment given that civic life, according to the cooperation
perspective, should be the main vehicle for groups to address collective
problems in a mutually beneficial and cooperative fashion. 325 The coop-
eration perspective thus affords a strong justification for this feature of
the tax law treatment of voluntary organizations.
326
Although the broad structure of exemption from taxation under the
Code for certain kinds of noncharitable and charitable nonprofit organi-
zations thus gains support from the cooperation perspective, other fea-
tures of federal tax regulation of exempt organizations do not necessarily
further its vision of civic health, and some might even actively obstruct
its attainment. For example, tax law does not distinguish between orga-
nizations whose members are passive and those in which members are
active participants. As was noted earlier, recent decades have seen an
expansion of what Theda Skocpol calls "associations without members,"
i.e., associations whose members "participate" primarily by writing
checks to fund activities carried out exclusively by the organization's
professional staff and paid contractors, such as advertising, telemarket-
ing, and lobbying firms.327 Members of such organizations are kept ap-
prised of issues of importance through the organization's newsletter or
other mailings. They thus have information for acquiring some expertise
about these issues, the positions taken by the organization, and its efforts
to influence public policy, private actors, and the legislative process.
However, they are not expected to participate in any of these efforts un-
less the leadership asks them to vote in an election or ballot measure,
send a check to the organization, or write letters or make phone calls as
part of a grass roots lobbying campaign. All of these are activities that
people can undertake as private individuals and, with the exception of
voting, while remaining at home. Thus, at their most active, members of
such organizations acquire information, write checks, contact officials or
individuals (often using boilerplate messages conveyed to them by the
organization), and vote. 328 They may acquire confidence in the ability of
elites within their groups or professionals hired by their groups to
325 Of course, some mutual benefit associations do engage in charitable endeavors that
help people outside the group; however, that is not the primary reason for their creation and
maintenance.
326 A second major respect in which the Code's treatment of exempt organizations other
than charities impacts objectives of the cooperation perspective involves the advocacy rules,
discussed infra notes 341-356 and accompanying text.
327 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
328 There is evidence that the flow of information from association leaders to members
can create significant member loyalty and that, in certain situations, it can offset the effects of
centralized decision-making power and oligarchic staffing in an association. See David
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achieve certain goals on their behalf, but they will not participate in a
manner calculated to build interpersonal trust, social networks, the ethic
of reciprocity, or the habit of cooperation with one another, much less
generalized interpersonal trust. 329 In short, according to the cooperation
perspective, associations whose members participate in only a minimal
way are unlikely sources of civic renewal, which presupposes relation-
ships that arise primarily in settings where people work together in com-
mon activities toward common goals.
For the tax law to encourage the development of civic engagement
according to this point of view, it would have to acknowledge the impor-
tance of participation, as contrasted with mere membership. The Code
could do this by favoring, through tax benefits, organizations in which
significant participation is a prerequisite of membership or those in
which, as a historical matter, a significant portion of members do partici-
pate actively in the work of the organization. Several scholars have rec-
ommended that federal and state law be revised to classify nonprofits
based upon the level of member participation in the governance structure
of the organization so that groups with governing boards composed par-
tially or exclusively of members would be subject to less onerous state
and federal regulatory burdens and be granted enhanced tax benefits. 330
Alternatively, the tax law could favor, through tax benefits, the individu-
als who participate or who participate significantly in exempt groups.
Under the present system, individuals are entitled to deduct from their
gross income the dollar value of contributions of property, in cash or in
kind, made to organizations acknowledged as charities by the Internal
Revenue Service. 33' There is no contribution deduction, however, for
rendering services to or volunteering for a charitable entity except for
Knoke, Commitment and Detachment in Voluntary Associations, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 141,
143-44, 153-54 (1981).
329 See Jeffrey M. Berry, The Rise of Citizen Groups, in Civic ENGAGEMENT IN AMERI-
CAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 367, 369, 389-90 (noting also that members of such as-
sociations may participate in other groups where social capital is formed).
330 Dana Brakman Reiser makes several such proposals and reviews the literature advo-
cating reform of nonprofit governance to make nonprofit decision making structures more
democratic. See Dana Brakman Resier, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of Inter-
nally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. Ruv. 829 (2003). She argues that the failure of
nonprofits to include members in their governing bodies deprives society of the potential in-
crement in social capital and civic skills individuals would acquire through participating in
governance. Id. Under current federal income tax law, a member of a charity is someone who
pays dues, makes a donation that is not nominal, or volunteers for more than a nominal amount
of time. Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-5(f)(1) (1990). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(7)(iii)
(2002) (defining a charity's support, in part, in terms of membership fees made "to provide
support for the organization rather than to purchase admissions, merchandise, services, or the
use of facilities").
331 See I.R.C. § 170(a) (2000). The amounts that can be deducted as charitable contribu-
tions by individuals are limited to a percentage of an individual's adjusted gross income and
are restricted by the type of property contributed and by certain attributes of the charitable
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documented expenses incurred while volunteering, e.g., for transporta-
tion or purchases.
332
The reason for this disparity is often stated in terms of the adminis-
trative difficulty of valuing people's services. For example, how would
the Service value one hour of a lawyer's time donated to a charity? By
the going market rate? If so, which market rate? The market rate for
entry level attorneys? For attorneys with the same qualifications as the
attorney-donor? For attorneys with the same qualifications as the attor-
ney-donor in big firms? In small firms? Based upon averages in big
cities? In all cities? Including average rates for attorneys with similar
experience in the public sector?
Although this valuation problem is real, the argument against a tax
benefit for participating in or volunteering for charities that is based upon
administrative difficulty is not as persuasive as it first seems once one
considers the counterpart difficulty of valuing many forms of in-kind
contributions of property, e.g., works of unknown artists, libraries of
used and out-of-print books, stock in closely-held corporations, or sec-
ond-hand clothes-the value of all of which are entitled to a charitable
contribution deduction under the Code. 333 To avoid administrative diffi-
culties in valuing services donated, tax law could allow those who volun-
teer in charitable organizations serving the disadvantaged, for example,
to receive a tax deduction in acknowledgment of the time and effort
donated, using a standard rate per hour set by the Service based, perhaps,
upon the average hourly compensation for American workers. 334 Using
donee. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1). The charitable contribution deduction for corporations is simi-
larly limited. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2).
332 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-I(g) (1996); Levine v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 209
(1987). Individuals are not, however, allowed to deduct out-of-pocket expenses incurred while
taking part in a charity's lobbying effort. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(6) (2000). An alternative to the
suggestion made in the text would be to revise the Code to permit the deduction of such out-
of-pocket expenses. I am indebted to Greg Colvin for this suggestion as well as for the propo-
sal, made in the Conclusion, to standardize the definitions of lobbying and the exceptions to
them.
333 See JOHN D. COLOMBO AND MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION
203--04 (1995) (proposing to include the value of labor donated to an organization along with
the value of money and other property in determining whether the organization should be
entitled to tax exemption as a publicly supported charity).
334 Such a flat rate option is currently available for certain business deductions. See Rev.
Proc. 2001-54, 2001-48 I.R.B. 530 (permitting taxpayers to calculate the deduction using the
I.R.C. standard mileage rate or actual costs). The proposal in the text would not permit an
"actual costs" option. See Mark A. Hall and John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the
Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 1379, 1459 (1991) [hereinafter Donative Theory].
Hall and Colombo would prefer to measure the value of donated labor by "what the labor
would have cost the recipient [organization] on the market," because this more appropriately
reflects what the organization has "saved" and more fairly estimates "the 'opportunity cost' of
a volunteer's time (e.g., what they would receive if they sold the same services in the labor
market)." Id. at 1459, n.247.
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a single flat rate would have the egalitarian effect of assigning an equal
value to one hour of anyone's efforts as a volunteer in such a charity.
Some charities already keep records of the number of hours worked by
volunteers for various purposes, 335 and they would probably find such
recordkeeping cost-effective if it elicited a higher rate of member partici-
pation. The provisions of charitable tax law as currently structured, in
contrast, appear to favor the value of property over the value of work.3 36
In any event, because data show that people who volunteer (and their
households) contribute significantly more money than donors who do not
volunteer,337 both the goal of increasing revenues donated to charities
and according equal value to volunteering and making financial contribu-
tions to charity suggest adopting public policies that somehow encourage
the former as well as the latter.
A second argument against allowing a charitable contribution de-
duction for volunteering at a charitable organization rests upon notions of
tax neutrality. The existing deduction provisions are neutral as between
someone who volunteers at a charity for a day instead of working for pay
and someone who works a day and donates her earnings for the day to
the charity and then takes a deduction.338 Were tax law to authorize
charitable contribution deductions for volunteering, in other words, it
would upset the existing tax neutrality by favoring those who contribute
time rather than those who work and receive taxable income.339 The
335 For example, some states require students to engage in community service for a cer-
tain number of hours in order to graduate from high school. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 13A,
§ 03.01(F)(1 1) (2003) (encouraging each local high school system to include activities, pro-
grams, and practices that "provide appropriate opportunities for students to participate in com-
munity service") and infra note 428. Because students are required to document their service
with a written statement from each facility where they volunteer, these charities have already
established procedures for record keeping.
336 Arguably this favoritism is compounded by the tax-favored status of charitable gifts of
appreciated property. See I.R.C. §170(e)(l). Ellen Aprill argues, in contrast, that from the
perspective of dollar efficiency and price elasticity, which could influence taxpayer behavior,
those who itemize experience a tax neutral outcome, whereas for those who do not itemize,
"the income tax system creates a distortion in favor of gifts of time." Ellen P. Aprill,
Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 843, 863
(2001). My argument, however, assumes a decision made by someone who works full time for
pay and is trying to decide to give money or time to a charity. Assuming the taxpayer is not
also an economist, the contribution alternative may look superior because it generates a contri-
bution deduction. Economists are themselves in disagreement as to the likelihood that the
contribution deduction actually affects the level of charitable contributions, especially among
low and middle-income taxpayers with relatively low marginal rates. See id. at 856-61.
337 Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, supra note
336, at 863-64.
338 See id. at 862-64.
339 See Hall & Colombo, Donative Theory, supra note 334, at 1449, n.243 (arguing that
the net effect would be to confer a "double tax benefit" on those who contribute labor). In
contrast to the situation described in the text, the Code is not neutral if the hypothetical tax-
payer is a non-itemizer. The Code "creates a distortion in favor of gifts of time" for non-
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neutrality upon which this argument is constructed, however, is in regard
to dollar efficiency, so that the Code is neutral as between two equally
efficient uses of dollars. The civil society argument, in contrast, would
not take its bearing by dollar efficiency exclusively. Rather, it would
seek to compare the direct impact of a tax provision in creating ineffi-
ciency with the potential indirect positive civic impacts, one of which
would be increased cooperation, leading to increased civic outcomes, in-
cluding an increment in effective collective action. Depending upon the
outcome of this calculation, instituting a deduction for contributions of
services might further the goals of the cooperation perspective by creat-
ing a tax incentive for individuals to participate actively in charitable
organizations. Given that participation in civic organizations in general,
not just participation in charities, promotes civic engagement, coopera-
tion theorists might also favor tax incentives for volunteering for exempt
organizations other than those exempt under section 501(c)(3). 34
0
Another area where the tax law may not further the cooperation per-
spective on civic health, one in which the tax law arguably obstructs the
attainment of cooperation, is its regulation of lobbying and political cam-
paign activities by charities. Under current law, public charities are per-
mitted to attempt to influence legislation only if their lobbying is not
"substantial," 34 ' and private foundations are not permitted to lobby at
all. 342 There is an absolute prohibition against either public charities or
private foundations engaging in political campaign activities. 343 Other
itemizers. See Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, supra
note 336, at 863.
340 1 am grateful to John Colombo for calling my attention to the possibility that the
cooperation perspective would favor tax incentives to voluntary associations as a group to
avoid creating a disincentive to participating in mutual benefit and other noncharitable entities.
Cooperation theorists might nonetheless make distinctions among categories of exempt organi-
zations, especially if they also hold views associated with one or more of the other perspec-
tives on civic health. See also Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society, supra note 330,
at 829-93.
341 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (requiring that "no substantial part of the [entity's] ac-
tivities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation
(except as otherwise provided in subsection (h))"). Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (1990)
elaborates on this restriction, as do I.R.C. §§ 501(h) and 4911 and the regulations thereunder.
I.R.C. §§ 501(h) and 4911 apply the "no substantial part" test by establishing a maximum
percentage of an organization's expenditures for its exempt purposes that can be spent on
attempting to influence legislation. An organization must elect to have its legislative activities
judged under this test. I.R.C. §§ 501(h), 4911 (2000). Otherwise, the Service and the courts
will assess the substantiality of an organization's attempts to influence legislation under the
case law, possibly including the centrality of such attempts relative to the organization's pur-
pose(s) and the extent of volunteer activities as well as the amount of its expenditures in the
calculation.
342 See I.R.C. § 4945(d)(1) (2000) (imposing on private foundations a tax on any taxable
expenditure, which includes any amount paid "to carry on propaganda, or otherwise to attempt,
to influence legislation").
343 See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 4945, 4955 (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(i), (iii).
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exempt organizations, in contrast, are generally permitted to engage in
lobbying or take part in political campaigns, although some restrictions
may apply to individual categories of exemption. 344 Given the impor-
tance for the collective action perspective of learning civic (including
political) skills, attitudes, habits, and practices, and of being able to en-
gage in cooperative efforts to influence public policy, this aspect of the
regulation of charitable organizations seems to deny an effective means
of securing their goals to those organizations dedicated to providing pub-
lic goods, like education, protecting the environment, or improving the
lives of disadvantaged third-parties rather than the lives of their mem-
bers. The consequence is to deprive people desiring to engage in public-
spirited or altruistic behaviors of an important collective opportunity to
influence the political process. It also impairs the ability of non-affluent
people to influence the political process through churches, which are
often their primary associational affiliation. 345 Finally, these restrictions
deprive charitable institutions desirous of promoting the special interests
of the disadvantaged from engaging in advocacy to the same degree as
their self-interested, mutual benefit or recreational exempt counterparts
can. Given that high-wealth individuals can exert influence on political
decision-making through their personal expenditures and campaign con-
tributions or through noncharitable exempt organizations, such as trade
associations or social clubs, that are not subject to the lobbying and cam-
paign restrictions on charities, the existing tax law limitations on chari-
ties appear to create an unfair playing field against organizations
presumptively acting in the public interest and in favor of the affluent
and the associations they support.
The lobbying restrictions on public charities and private foundations
are, of course, a product of several public policies embodied in the tax
law346 which might outweigh the public policy implications of the coop-
344 See Melissa Waller Baldwin, Comment, Section 501(c)(3) and Lobbying: The Case
for the Local Organization, 23 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 203, 212-13 (1996); Galston, Lobbying and
the Public Interest, supra note 161, at 1276-77 (summarizing the lobbying regulations for
exempt organizations other than charities). The Code and Treasury regulations are silent on
political campaign activities undertaken by noncharitable exempt organizations other than
those described by section 501(c)(4). See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1990). This
implies that any restrictions on the lobbying or political campaign activities of noncharitable
exempt organizations would thus be derived exclusively from the nature of their exempt pur-
poses and thus would not be likely to intrude on their ability to pursue their missions.
345 On the desirability of religious institutions engaging in political activities, see infra
notes 457-67 and accompanying text.
346 See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Non-Profit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501
(1990); Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy, supra note 164, at 585; John D. Colombo,
The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating The-
ories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 667-89 (2001);
Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Health Care
Delivery Structures; A Regeneration of Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1995);
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eration perspective on civic health. A major stumbling block to assess-
ing the competing policy claims arises from the fact that the tax law
advocacy restrictions were evolving and becoming codified during the
first six decades of the twentieth century, in a period prior to the time
during which a decline in civic engagement is said to have occurred. 347
It is thus unlikely that the need to adopt measures to encourage civic
engagement and advocacy was a factor in the policy considerations.
Nonetheless, before concluding that the current restrictions on the
advocacy by public charities and private foundations should be relaxed,
several additional aspects of tax regulation of these entities should be
considered. First, public charities are already permitted to attempt to in-
fluence lawmakers as long as such activities do not constitute a substan-
tial part of their operations. 348 Thus, in assessing the policy question, it
is necessary to ask whether the existing regulation of lobbying by chari-
ties affords them sufficient opportunity to enable their members to en-
gage in cooperative practices and effective collective action in pursuit of
their goals. The answer may well depend on the size and other character-
istics of the organization, as well as on whether the organization has
made the section 501(h) election. For example, consider a public charity
with an annual budget of no more than $500,000. It is possible that the
current section 501(h) election expenditure limit of 20 percent of the
charity's annual expenditures would be adequate to enable its members
to lobby lawmakers effectively, especially if the lobbying were done by
staff or volunteers rather than by hired lobbyists. 34 9 To stay within the
Ira Mark Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 80 MICH. L. REV. 999 (1982);
Hall & Colombo, Donative Theory, supra note 334; Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Ex-
empting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981);
Frances R. Hill, Targeting Exemption for Charitable Efficiency: Designing a Nondiversion
Constraint, 56 SMU L. REV. 675 (2003).
347 For the development of the policies underlying the lobbying restrictions, see Laura B.
Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J.
201, 215-20 (1987); Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest, supra note 161, at 1282-85
(describing the evolution of the neutrality justification for the restrictions on lobbying by sec-
tion 501(c)(3) organizations).
348 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3); supra note 341.
349 For this limit, see I.R.C. § 4911 (c)(2) (2000). Exempt purpose expenditures include
most of an organization's annual expenditures other than certain expenses of fund-raising. See
I.R.C. §491 l(e)(l). The costs of informing organization members about legislation of direct
interest to the organization are not in general considered lobbying (or grass roots lobbying)
expenses unless the organization also urges its members to communicate with lawmakers or to
urge others to do so. Thus, the charities in question could inform their members about legisla-
tive matters of interest to them without incurring costs that count as lobbying expenditures. In
addition, lobbying actions that members take without having been urged to do so are unlikely
to be attributed to their organizations. As was noted earlier, the analysis would need to take
more than revenue expenditures into account if the organization had not made the election and
thus would be judged under the "no substantial part" test. See supra note 341.
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lower grass roots lobbying expenditure limit, 350 however, would be diffi-
cult because this limit is permitted to be no more than one fourth of the
overall lobbying limit. The organization would have to restrict the fre-
quency of its mailings, use volunteers to phone or canvass neighbor-
hoods, use the internet for many of its communications, or avail itself of
some combination of these methods, and it still might exceed its grass
roots lobbying limit. This circumstance points to the desirability of re-
cently introduced legislation that would eliminate the distinction between
direct and grass roots lobbying, enabling an electing charity to use any or
all of its permissible lobbying expenditures for grass roots lobbying.35
1
Would the imposition of the restriction on a hypothetical organiza-
tion with a $500,000 annual budget, $100,000 of which could be spent
on lobbying, interfere with its potential as a breeding ground for habits of
cooperation and an ethic of reciprocity among its members? This ques-
tion is impossible to answer without knowing the histories, operations,
and dynamics of actual organizations with the annual exempt purpose
expenditures described and without knowing the relative effectiveness of
expensive, professional communications as compared to inexpensive,
volunteer and Internet communications. In principle, the lobbying ex-
penditure caps imposed on a charitable organization making the section
501(h) election could have a salutary effect by forcing it to rely on its
members and provide them with opportunities to participate actively in
its internal and external affairs. To be effective grass roots lobbyists,
volunteers would have to be informed enough to answer the questions
posed by individuals whose votes they seek to influence. If they were to
go door to door or buttonhole people at the supermarket to communicate
their message, they would be more actively involved in face-to-face dis-
cussions than they would be watching the news or campaign advertise-
ments on television at home or even writing a letter to the editor of the
local newspaper.
The desirability of the lobbying limitations on charities cannot,
however, be determined in a vacuum. Organizations entitled to a charita-
ble exemption are not the only players seeking what are often scarce
public resources. Non-charitable organizations frequently devote ex-
tremely large sums of money to lobbying campaigns, and they avail
themselves of professional lobbyists, buy radio or television time, hire
telemarketing firms, and the like. 352 Although legislative battles are not
350 See I.R.C. § 4911 (c)(4) (calculating the grass roots lobbying cap for electing charities
as one-fourth of the overall lobbying cap).
351 Charitable Giving Act of 2003, H.R. 7, 108th Cong. § 303 (2003).
352 This discussion is limited to lobbying by exempt organizations. The implications are,
however, broader than first appears because corporate funds in legislative battles are fre-
quently funneled through exempt organizations, especially section 501 (c)(6) trade associations
and section 501(c)(4) advocacy organizations. Business interests use them for advocacy be-
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always won by the biggest spenders, it would nonetheless not further the
goals of the cooperation perspective if collective actions by engaged and
active citizens were routinely overwhelmed by the sophistication and fi-
nancial resources of professional elites. Whether the lack of symmetry in
the tax law restrictions on lobbying in fact has this effect is an empirical
question, and the answer may depend on the legislative forum (local,
state, or national), the subject matter of the legislation, or the type of
decision maker involved, e.g., an official, a formal body, or the public
itself, as in an initiative or referendum.
To a certain extent, the federal tax law already addresses the poten-
tial problems arising from asymmetries in the regulation of lobbying by
charities as compared with other exempt organizations. As was noted
above, section 501(c)(4) organizations are permitted to lobby without
limit, as long as most of the lobbying is related to the groups' exempt
purposes. 353 Public charities and private foundations are permitted to
establish section 501(c)(4) affiliate organizations, and the latter can, for
the most part, share their name,3 54 board of directors, officers, premises,
and so on, as long as no funds of the charity are used to assist the section
501(c)(4) organization in any way and the officers and directors of each
organization satisfy their fiduciary responsibilities to the groups as sepa-
rate legal entities. Thus, a section 501(c)(4) organization must pay fair
market value to its affiliated section 501(c)(3) charity for such things as
rent, the use of office support, and the use of the charity's list of contrib-
utors, and board meetings for the two entities must be kept wholly sepa-
cause this enables businesses to pool their funds and coordinate their efforts so as to maximize
their impact. Business interests may prefer exempt advocacy groups even when the legislative
issues involved are at the state level and the trade association, for example, is national, because
members of an industry in all parts of the country are frequently concerned about the fate of
legislation or a referendum in one state. As a result of legislation passed in 1993, there is no
longer a business expense deduction for the cost of lobbying. See I.R.C. § 162(e) (2000).
When business interests contribute to (noncharitable) organizations, they are permitted a busi-
ness expense deduction for the amount contributed except for any portions of the contribution
that are earmarked for or in fact used for lobbying. See id.
353 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2) (1990); see also Rev. Rul. 71-530, 1971-2 C.B.
237 (holding that a section 501(c)(4) organization may have lobbying for social welfare as its
sole purpose). Although the amount of such an organization's lobbying is not limited, its
character is: to qualify for section 501(c)(4) status, its activities must be primarily directed
toward "promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the people of the
community." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i).
354 Under the laws of a number of states, the names of the two entities must be suffi-
ciently distinct that third parties will not be confused. Save the Long-Haired Chinchillas, Inc.
and Save the Long-Haired Chinchillas Advocacy, Inc. would satisfy this requirement. See,
e.g., Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 4.01(c), cmt. 2 (noting that one corporation's name need
only be "distinguished from other corporation[']s upon the records of the secretary of state").
This standard is to enable state and taxing authorities to avoid confusion and "to permit accu-
racy in naming and serving corporate defendants in litigation." Id. The Model Code provision
superseded an earlier standard prohibiting "deceptively similar" names, which was designed to
prevent unfair competition between similarly named corporations. Id.
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rate even if the directorates are overlapping. 355 Affiliations of this kind
are common. An established section 501(c)(4) entity is also entitled to
create a companion 501(c)(3) organization to engage in useful non-advo-
cacy activities, such as issues research, distribution of issues information,
and other educational endeavors that can be funded with charitable con-
tributions. 356 Thus, as long as the regulations governing the various rela-
tionships between the two entities are carefully observed, charities can
influence the public policy process through their sister section 501(c)(4)
advocacy organizations.
In short, the limitations on lobbying by charities do not seem to
prevent them from engaging in legislative advocacy. Rather, the primary
effect is to deprive such entities of the ability to lobby a substantial
amount with funds favored by the charitable contribution deduction.
Where the Code is deficient is in its failure to privilege associational
participation over mere membership. To encourage participation through
tax incentives, the tax law could privilege exempt organizations that are
predominantly participatory, even if they are not exempt as charitable
entities, or it could offer a deduction to the people who participate, possi-
bly requiring a minimum level of participation within a specific time
frame (an average of five hours a week for forty weeks, for example) to
increase the likelihood that participation will promote civic objectives.
Alternatively, tax law could limit the amount of legislative activity en-
gaged in by all exempt organizations, i.e., by the non-charitable associa-
tions currently under minimal or no restrictions, for example, by creating
dollar or percentage caps. These suggestions could have the salutary ef-
fect of encouraging noncharitable exempt organizations to rely to a far
greater degree on volunteers and other low-cost personal contacts rather
than on television advertising, telemarketing, and professional lobbyists.
The last suggestion, however, would be virtually impossible to imple-
ment for political reasons, since noncharitable exempt organizations al-
ready have an entrenched interest in the current regulatory scheme.
Further, the suggestion could possibly raise constitutional issues relating
to the rights of free speech and free association.
355 For examples of the possible relationships between section 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4)
organizations, see GREGORY L. COLVIN & LOWELL FINLEY, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, THE
RULES OF THE GAME: AN ELECTION YEAR LEGAL GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
42-44 (1996) [hereinafter RULES OF THE GAME] (copy on file with author). There are detailed
regulations governing such relationships, including the use section 501(c)(4) organizations can
make of the research or work product of a section 501 (c)(3) organization without jeopardizing
the charity's exempt status.
356 See id. at 45-46.
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B. THE SELF-GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE
1. Voluntary Associations and Self-Governance
The notion of civic health as cooperation and effective collective
action is consistent with the theoretical view that the purpose of political
life is to translate the preferences of citizens into public outcomes-be
they laws or policies or allocations of resources-as faithfully and effi-
ciently as possible. An active citizenry is important for the cooperation
perspective to achieve this end. According to the self-governance per-
spective, 357 in contrast, to be meaningful, civic engagement should ex-
pose people to participatory and deliberative endeavors rather than
merely to cooperative and collective ones. Participatory associational ac-
tivities are necessary because self-governance presupposes that citizens
engage in the decision making, whether formal or informal, that will
structure and give content to important aspects of their lives. Delibera-
tive communications are also important, according to this perspective, to
assure that people's decisions are informed and that discussions take into
account a variety of interests and viewpoints. This perspective thus as-
sumes that, in connection with some issues, people's understandings of
their own purposes may change through discussion and deliberation. In
some situations, deliberation will expose not only conflicts among sepa-
rate interests, but also conflicts between some or all of the separate inter-
ests (and coalitions of such interests) and what is arguably the public
interest-fair allocations of resources, intergenerational justice, and jus-
tice between developing and developed nations, for example.
From the self-governance perspective, then, the goal of cooperation
and effective collective action would fall short of the civic ideal if it only
entails influencing social or political outcomes by exerting pressure on
communities, institutions, and leaders without at the same time providing
an occasion for citizen participation and reflection on both means and
ends. Small voluntary associations are thus in general preferable to large
or "checkbook" organizations because the former are more likely to pro-
vide opportunities for participation by members than the latter. Large
and other nonparticipatory organizations usually have professional staffs,
contracts with lobbyists, and even public relations companies to help
them achieve their goals. Although "associations without members" 3 58
may be extremely effective vehicles of collective action, they provide
few opportunities for members to contribute to or learn from the associa-
tion's decision-making process.
357 See supra Part I.B.
358 This is the phrase of Theda Skocpol. See supra note 157 (referring to large, bureau-
cratic voluntary associations with very large membership rolls that require little of their mem-
bers beyond writing a check to help support the organization's activities).
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There is little empirical research devoted to the deliberative charac-
ter of participation in voluntary associations. However, the proposition
that voluntary associations in general, and small organizations in particu-
lar, tend to be homogeneous and to recruit members that share one an-
other's views has been confirmed empirically. 359 This fact suggests that
deliberative opportunities within small organizations will tend to be cir-
cumscribed because of the similarity of the members' views on issues
important to the organizations. The homogeneity of members' views,
especially as relates to an organization's purpose, in turn, virtually en-
sures that discussions will be about means, rather than ends, and even
discussions about means may be limited by a common orientation on the
part of the members (ethnic, religious, liberal or conservative, or con-
sumers versus business).
At the same time, many voluntary associations disseminate newslet-
ters to their members that contain information useful for gaining an in-
formed understanding of the organizations' positions and many organize
lectures, panels, and debates. Some voluntary associations engage in ef-
forts to disseminate information on a range of topics in an accessible
way,360 including the use of web sites that can reach shut-ins and others.
Were these associations to undertake to host, publish, or otherwise pro-
voke "a wide range of competing arguments" in circumstances capable
of eliciting "careful consideration," 36' they could contribute to the crea-
tion of a culture of deliberation among their members and other audi-
ences. Absent a deliberate effort to promote balanced information and
discussion, however, voluntary associations are likely to produce a
stream of information that is not calculated to encourage debate and that
could discourage it if the "facts" and "arguments" presented in communi-
cations were targeted to members or recipients already sympathetic to the
organization's views and goals. The latter possibility is, in fact, what
most organizations intend when they buy the mailing lists of other
groups known to target comparable populations.
2. The Regulation of Exempt Organizations
As was noted above, participation in certain types of voluntary as-
sociations-such as neighborhood organizations and parent-teacher
groups as well as some local chapters of labor unions and trade organiza-
tions-appears to further civic health, as understood in terms of auton-
omy and self-governance, by providing a forum for members of
geographical or other communities of interest to debate, design, and pro-
mote specific public policies and public practices that they consider ben-
359 See supra notes 294-299 and accompanying text.
360 See infra notes 373-377 and accompanying text.
361 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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eficial to their respective groups. 362 Although there is obvious overlap
with the ends and means characteristic of the collective action perspec-
tive, the conceptual core of the self-governance perspective is to nourish
problem solving at the community or local level in a manner that maxi-
mizes thoughtful and responsible decision making. 363
The federal tax law regulating exempt associations makes possible
the formation of community groups capable of solving local problems on
their own by providing a mechanism for pooling individuals' resources
without certain adverse tax consequences that would apply, were it not
for their exempt status. For example, without exempt status, charities,
fraternal societies, veterans organizations, social welfare groups, and
other mutual benefit organizations would be unable to collect and invest
dues from members for funding long-term projects without being subject
to income taxation on their annual net income. 364 Exempt status thus
enables individuals to pool their financial resources efficiently, i.e., with-
out penalizing members for saving pooled amounts. The ability to save
pooled amounts makes it possible for exempt entities to aggregate larger
amounts than would be possible on an ad hoc basis at the time an actual
expenditure is under consideration and to engage in long-term planning,
such as creating a sinking fund for capital expenditures by a homeown-
ers' group or accumulating unemployment or strike funds for union
members. 365
These features of tax law do not guarantee the development of self-
governance in the comprehensive sense discussed earlier, i.e., as includ-
ing both a sense of obligation and informed deliberation. 366 In fact, the
very same features of tax law facilitate both the existence of well-en-
dowed groups with no sense of, or inclination for, deliberation or com-
munity-oriented decision making as well as other groups with the
362 See supra Part I.B.
363 This is not inconsistent with the collective action perspective, but neither is it required
by it. See infra page 382.
364 See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(1)-(28) (2000). Homeowner groups are similarly exempt from
taxation on such income, although their exemption is not authorized by I.R.C. § 501(a). See
I.R.C. § 528 (2000).
365 Some commentators have argued that not much tax is actually forgiven as a result of
the exemption under section 501(a) as long as an organization's revenues can be offset by
administrative and program expenditures. See John G. Simon, The Tax Treatment of Nonprofit
Organizations: A Review of Federal and State Policies, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK 67, 73-75 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987). See also John M. Colombo, Why
is Harvard Tax Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private Educational
Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 857-61 (1993) (analyzing and criticizing the income mea-
surement theory of tax exemption of Boris Bittker and George Rahdert). Recent statistics
based upon Forms 990 and 990EZ suggest the opposite. See Paul Arnsberger, Charities and
Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, 1997, STAT. INCOME BULL., Fall 2000, at 47, 50 fig.D. The
"excess of revenue over expenses" in Figure D does not include investment income, which is a
substantial source of income to some charities, such as colleges and foundations.
366 See supra Part I.B.
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purpose and ability to devise thoughtful and long-term plans to
strengthen a community. However, without the ability to form associa-
tions with substantial and dependable resources, it would be difficult for
private parties to undertake and coordinate long-term, community-wide
solutions to local problems. Further, without this ability, it would be
impossible for such groups to dilute the power of centralized government
bodies and to prevent them from imposing solutions on local communi-
ties from above. In short, organizations often need the opportunities pro-
vided through federal income tax exemption to perform both functions
deemed critical to the self-governance perspective, i.e., informed deliber-
ation about community-wide policies and serving as a counterpoise to
centralized government actions.
The federal income tax treatment of charities provides an additional
tax advantage that assists the accumulation of revenue and long-term
planning. The charitable deduction provision encourages private individ-
uals who itemize deductions to support- charitable entities engaged in the
type of public benefit considered important to them, e.g., education,
health, social services, religion, or cultural activities.367 The charitable
contribution deduction is frequently defended on the ground that the sup-
port of private individuals enables charities to undertake different kinds
of projects than would government decision makers. 368 Specifically,
charities can take risks, consider novel, experimental, or unpopular ideas,
and in other ways enhance the diversity of efforts to improve social wel-
fare. 36 9 Correspondingly, association members can also have the luxury
367 The extent of the incentive effect is extremely controversial. See CHARLES T.
CLOTFELDER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING (1985) (examining the "relation
between federal taxes and charitable giving," using econometric evidence); JOSEPH CORDES,
THE COST OF GIVING: How Do CHANGES IN TAX DEDUCTIONS AFFECT CHARITABLE CONTRI-
BUTIONS? (Urban Institute, Emerging Issues in Philanthropy Seminar Series, 2001), available
at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/philanthropy-2.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004) ; Louis
ALAN TALLEY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS: PROS AND
CONS OF DEDUCTIBILITY (1990); Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution
Deduction, supra note 336, at 856-67; George McCully, Battle in the Bay State and Beyond:
Charitable Tax Incentives Are Worth Fighting For, PHILANTHROPY, May-June 2002 (finding
that states with an income tax but without charitable tax incentives scored among the lowest in
charitable giving), available at http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/magazines/2002/may/
mccully.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2004); Robert C. Ricketts & Peter H. Westfall, New Evi-
dence on the Price Elasticity of Charitable Contributions, J. Am. TAX'N ASS'N, Fall 1993, at I
(finding that charitable contributions are affected by the contribution deduction but not by tax
rate differences).
368 See JAMES DOUGLAS, WHY CHARITY? THE CASE FOR A THIRD SECTOR 133-37 (1983)
(arguing that foundations are not subject to the same time constraints as government actors);
John G. Simon, Foundations and Public Controversy: An Affirmative View, in THE FUTURE OF
FOUNDATIONS 58, 82-83 (Fritz F. Heimann ed., 1973) (arguing that the need to be reelected
frequently prevents lawmakers from sponsoring controversial projects).
369 See DOUGLAS, WHY CHARITY?, supra note 368, at 133-37; Earl F. Cheit & Theodore
E. Lobman III, Private Philanthropy and Higher Education: History, Current hnpact, and
Public Policy Considerations, in 2 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC
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of making decisions slowly, if necessary, and seeking out information
without the political pressures that can overwhelm public officials.370 To
the extent that these possibilities are realized, charitable associations will
contribute importantly to informed and thoughtful collective actions both
because of donors who scrutinize the goals and operations of potential
recipients and to the ability of recipient organizations to be more deliber-
ative and innovative than government officials.
The preceding discussion highlights the opportunities for enhancing
self-governance that the tax law governing exempt organizations may
facilitate. However, the charitable contribution deduction rules do not
guarantee such outcomes or even predispose organizations and their
members and donors in that direction. 37' In contrast, in one area the
regulations are drafted so as to encourage informed and deliberative con-
sideration of issues. As was noted earlier, tax law prohibits lobbying by
private foundations, permits lobbying by public charities with a section
501(h) election as long as lobbying expenditures do not exceed a per-
centage of exempt purpose expenditures, and permits lobbying by non-
electing public charities as long as it does not constitute a substantial part
of the organization's activities. 372 The tax law also provides that a cer-
tain kind of informational communication made by private foundations
or public charities to their members, lawmakers, or the public in general
is not considered lobbying, even if the communication goes so far as to
advocate a particular position or viewpoint on specific legislation:
so long as there is a sufficiently full and fair exposition
of the pertinent facts to enable the public or an individ-
NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 453, 492, 493 (1977); Albert M. Sacks, The Role of Philanthropy:
An Institutional View, 46 VA. L. REV. 516, 524, 531 (1960). Not all commentators agree that
charities are especially open to innovation and experimentation. See Mark P. Gergen, The
Case for a Charitable Contribution Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1410 (1988).
370 See supra note 368. Of course, there can be pressures involved in meeting the de-
mands of large private donors as well.
371 The tax rules impose financial accountability standards and other organizational and
operational requirements, but they do not in general require qualitative judgments as to the
desirability of specific charitable purposes or specific projects undertaken by charitable enti-
ties. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l (1990). When the IRS departs from substantive neutral-
ity in applying the exempt organization rules, it almost always gets in trouble, sometimes
deservedly so (in this author's view), as when it denied charitable status to associations de-
voted to issues concerning homosexuals. See Tommy F. Thompson, The Availability of the
Federal Educational Tax Exemption for Propaganda Organizations, 18 U.C. DAvIS L. REV.
487, 525 (1985). In the last two decades, the IRS's battles with the Church of Scientology
have been widely documented. See Editorial, Intimidating the IRS, St. Petersburg Times, Mar.
I1, 1997, at 12A; Frank Rich, Scientologists Scare Even IRS, So. BEND TRIB. (Ind.), Mar. 20,
1997, at A]5; Lisa Stansky, Scientology Tax Case Before 9th Circuit; IRS is Demanding Tens
of Thousands of Documents; Church Calls It Harassment, RECORDER, May 6, 1992, at 3; Todd
Woody, War of Words; The Scientology Church Wants Filings Containing 'Atrocious Lies'
Sealed, RECORDER, Nov. 22, 1995, at 1.
372 See supra notes 341-344 and accompanying text.
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ual to form an independent opinion or conclusion. The
mere presentation of unsupported opinion, however,
does not qualify .... 373
This is known as the exception from the definition of lobbying for "non-
partisan analysis, study, and research." To qualify for such favorable
characterization, a charity is required to convey full and fair information
about both the case for and the case against the legislation in question in
its communication. 374 There is an additional exception from the defini-
tion of lobbying for communications by charities that examine or discuss
broad social, economic, or similar issues, even if the discussions are di-
rected toward the public or the communications are with lawmakers, and
even if "the general subject ... [discussed] is also the subject of legisla-
tion before a legislative body. ' '375 This exception does not require a
charity to meet the standards associated with the exception for nonparti-
san analysis, but it is not applicable if the communication mentions the
merits of specific legislation along with its discussion of broad issues, or
if the communication in question urges people to take action with respect
to legislation.
Because of the monetary and other quantitative restrictions on their
lobbying activities, charities typically strive to have as many communi-
cations to their members, the public, and public officials as possible
373 Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(1)(ii) (1990). The regulation also provides that communi-
cations that are published or broadcast as part of a series will usually be judged together to
determine if the nonpartisan standard has been met. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(l)(iii).
Thus, if a charity produces a two-part series on the effect of pesticides on agriculture, and the
first program develops the case in favor of pesticide use and pending legislation approving its
use while the second portrays the conflicting research and arguments opposing the legislation,
the series will qualify for the nonpartisan study, analysis, or research exception, assuming that
the two programs occur within six months of one another and during comparable television
time slots. See Treas. Reg. § 56.491 l-2(c)(l)(iii), (vii) exs.6, 7.
374 See Treas. Reg. § 56.491 l-2(c)(1)(vii) ex.2. Although the communication is also al-
lowed to contain a view for or against specific legislative proposals under consideration by
lawmakers, it is not allowed to encourage lawmakers or the public to take action with respect
to the legislation favored by the charity, e.g., it cannot say, "Write Congressman X and tell
him to vote against HR 66." The organization is, however, free to identify public officials in
support of or opposed to the legislation. Treas. Reg. § 56.491 l-2(c)(l)(vi). These regulation
provisions apply to charities making the section 501(h) election. For the counterpart exception
for nonelecting charities, see Rev. Rul. 66-258, 1966-2 C.B. 213; Rev. Rul. 64-195, 1964-2
C.B. 138. For the counterpart exception for private foundations, see I.R.C. § 4945(e), (f)
(2000). Both the IRS and the courts have used the definitions in the regulations for private
foundations and electing public charities when they analyze parallel issues for nonelecting
public charities. See Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1141-44 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Gen.
Couns. Mem. 36,127 (Jan. 2, 1975).
375 Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(2). For the counterpart exception for nonelecting charities,
see Rev. Rul. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B. 210. For the counterpart exception for private foundations,
see Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(d)(4) (1990).
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qualify for one of the lobbying exceptions. 376 If they are successful, the
associated costs of the communications will not be counted as lobbying
expenditures against their lobbying limit, and these costs may even en-
large the baseline against which the extent of lobbying will be compared.
In the case of private foundations, which are not permitted to engage in
any amount of lobbying, the lobbying exceptions constitute the sole
means available to them for communicating with lawmakers and the pub-
lic with respect to legislative matters without risking the loss of their
exemption. Thus, whatever the underlying rationale for the lobbying ex-
ceptions, 377 their effect is to encourage charitable organizations to strive
towards reasonably balanced presentations of topics associated with
ongoing legislative efforts.
By the same token, one of the great weaknesses of the tax law gov-
erning exempt organizations from the self-governance perspective is that
it imposes no restrictions encouraging balanced presentations on the part
of any exempt organizations other than charities. The usual justification
for this discrepancy is that charities alone are restricted in the amounts
and kind of lobbying permitted because they are the main exempt entities
entitled to receive contributions that are deductible to their donors.
378
Historically, the coupling of the entitlement to charitable contributions
and the limited entitlement to lobby (and the absolute prohibition against
intervention in political campaigns) was justified by the view that chari-
table contributions constitute a government subsidy and that the govern-
376 See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(2). There is also an exception from the definition of
lobbying for responses to requests for technical assistance made by lawmakers to charities at
the lawmakers' initiative, even if a charity makes a recommendation in support of or in opposi-
tion to specific legislation as part of its communication. See Rev. Rul. 70-449, 1970-2 C.B.
112; Treas. Reg. §§ 56.4911-2(c), 53.4945-2(d). In addition, public charities and private foun-
dations can lobby on any issue affecting the entity's own survival, powers, or tax status with-
out it counting as lobbying. For this "self-defense" exception to the lobbying rules, see I.R.C.
§ 4945(e); Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4945-2(d)(3), 56.4911-2(c)(4); Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,289 (May
8, 1970).
377 It would seem that the examination and discussion of broad social, economic, and
similar issues should not be considered lobbying even without the exception, given that, by
definition, the exempt organization does not express a view with respect to specific legislation.
Perhaps the exception is intended to preclude implying that an organization has expressed a
view when it discusses broad issues, inasmuch as there is often specific legislation on impor-
tant issues pending or under consideration. In the case of the exception for nonprofit analysis,
study, and research, in contrast, there appears to be a clear conflict between the desire to avoid
federal subsidies of advocacy and the desire to permit and even encourage the dissemination of
materials that address the pros and cons of important issues in a careful and even-handed way.
378 See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2000). Also entitled to receive deductible contributions are
government units, if the gift is "for exclusively public purposes," I.R.C. § 170(c)(1); certain
posts or organizations of war veterans, I.R.C. § 170(c)(3); fraternal lodges, if the contribution
is to be used exclusively for charitable purposes, I.R.C. § 170(c)(4); and certain member-
owned cemetery companies, I.R.C. § 170(c)(5).
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ment should not be in the business of subsidizing private advocacy.37 9
However, this rationale overlooks the circumstance that exemption from
federal income taxes by itself is also a subsidy and that the exemption
subsidy is often critical to the survival and effectiveness of many exempt
organizations that have no entitlement to charitable contributions. 380
Another anomaly in the taxation of exempt organizations from the
self-governance perspective is the fact that the lobbying restriction for
charities includes only attempts to influence "legislation," i.e., action to
be taken "by the Congress, by any State legislature, by any local council
or similar governing body, or by the public in a referendum, initiative,
constitutional amendment, or similar procedure."' 38' As a definitional
matter, communications made to influence actions of administrative, ex-
ecutive, or judicial bodies, are not considered lobbying. 382 Administra-
tive and executive bodies include "school boards, housing authorities,
sewer and water districts, zoning boards, and other similar Federal, State,
or local special purpose bodies, whether elective or appointive. '383 For
purposes of the self-governance perspective, the definition of lobbying
would be more beneficial to civil society interests if it included commu-
nications with federal and state entities within the purview of lobbying
while excluding county and other local officials and bodies. So defined,
public charities would be able to engage in attempts to affect public out-
comes more or less freely in a local context, which is precisely the forum
most suited to making decisions directly affecting the affairs of associa-
tion members.
In regard to the self-governance perspective, as was discussed in
connection with the collective action perspective, charities can avoid the
need for nonpartisan analysis and communication by establishing a sec-
tion 501(c)(4) advocacy organization with strong ideological ties to the
charity to lobby on its behalf.38 4 Thus, the Code enables groups to ac-
quire the resources necessary for productive civic engagement, but it
only encourages informative and balanced communications in the limited
379 See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512 (1959); see also Slee v. Comm'r,
42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930); H.R. REP. No. 100-391, at 1624-25 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-1204 to 2313-1206.
380 See Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest, supra note 161, at 1287-1302 (arguing
that the difference in the situations of charitable and noncharitable exempt organizations does
not justify the extent of the differences in the lobbying regimes applicable to them).
381 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (1990).
382 See id; Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(d)(3) (1990). Note, however, that lobbying includes
contacting "any government official or employee ... who may participate in the formulation of
the legislation, but only if the principal purpose of the communication is to influence legisla-
tion." Treas. Reg. § 56.4911 -2(b)(1)(i)(B) (emphasis added); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-
2(a)(1) (1990) (stating a similar rule for private foundations).
383 Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(d)(4).
384 See supra notes 353-356 and accompanying text.
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situation where an organization seeks to engage in advocacy using funds
that are charitable contributions deductible to the donors. In practice,
this does not create any incentive for noncharitable exempt entities to
relinquish their ability to engage in one-sided, and sometimes inflam-
matory or misleading, communications in the heat of a legislative battle.
To transform the current culture of partisan advocacy would require
changes in attitudes and values far beyond the powers of the Code. The
most that the tax law could do would be to require all legislative advo-
cacy by all exempt organizations to meet certain informational or educa-
tional criteria, such as those required to meet the exception for
nonpartisan study, analysis, or research, or a looser standard requiring
reasoned argument in support of, or opposed to, specific viewpoints.
38 5
In the absence of such a radical change, the present federal income tax
regulation of voluntary associations does not further, and may well
thwart, the kind of civil association hoped for by adherents of the self-
governance perspective of the civil society debate.
As a theoretical matter, the principles and aspirations of the self-
governance perspective are not inconsistent with the aspirations of the
collective action perspective. Indeed, some civil society writers adopt
both perspectives, and some do not seem to recognize that the underlying
premises and ultimate aspirations are distinct. However, the collective
action strand emphasizes the character of individuals (trusting and con-
nected) and casts intermediate steps in terms of an ultimate value that is
social (effective action and solving problems), whereas the self-govern-
ance strand emphasizes the cognitive attributes of individuals (informed
and deliberative) and considers collective activity as an intermediate step
in making possible the desired outcome for individuals (that they live as
autonomous and self-governing beings). Further, the two perspectives
could lead to conflicting recommendations. Although the collective ac-
tion perspective is not necessarily at odds with the self-governance per-
spective, the latter perspective identifies more rigorous conditions as
preludes to civic health than does the former. For example, if it could be
shown that adherence to standards of nonpartisan analysis and communi-
cation in advocacy communications by charities does not promote the
ability of groups to act effectively and achieve their purposes, then the
collective action perspective would not endorse those regulations.
385 For further elaboration on this point, see the proposal in Galston, Lobbying and the
Public Interest, supra note 161, at 1343-46.
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C. THE REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS PERSPECTIVE
1. Voluntary Associations and Representative Institutions
As was discussed in Part I, according to the representative institu-
tions perspective, civic health presupposes political equality in the sense
of a system of representation that is not biased in favor of, or against, any
citizen or class of citizens, the dispersal of decision making power, ac-
countability of governmental officials to citizens, institutional stability,
and attitudes supporting all these goals. 386 The empirical research re-
viewed in Part II.C suggests that voluntary associations can further sev-
eral of these objectives.
Political equality is unlikely to be achieved in practice until political
participation and political representation become more egalitarian. This
can occur through the increased input of those who currently fail to exer-
cise their legal rights as well as through the increased responsiveness of
representatives to populations that are currently underrepresented be-
cause of their silence, their ineffective modes of communication, or their
lack of influence even when they do communicate. 387 Voluntary as-
sociations are well-suited to alleviate some of these circumstances. Em-
pirical evidence shows that small, participatory voluntary associations, or
small group settings within larger associations, provide opportunities for
members to learn communication and organizational skills.388 Such set-
tings may also instill confidence in individual members in their own or in
the organization's ability to make their point of view heard by others,
including public officials, or actually to influence the formation of public
policy. Research also shows that this kind of confidence may be a condi-
tion, and possibly a cause, of civic engagement, even in the absence of
interpersonal trust. 389 The combination of skills and confidence learned
through participation thus has the potential to prompt previously inactive
people to become more politically active, e.g., by writing or otherwise
contacting lawmakers and other officials, joining grass roots initiatives,
serving on political committees, and working in their own neighborhoods
to encourage others to register, vote, or become civically active in other
ways. 390
Voluntary associations can also play an important and direct role in
improving the socioeconomic status of disadvantaged populations by
386 See supra Part I.C.
387 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
388 See supra notes 185-186, 273 and accompanying text.
389 See supra notes 256-258 and accompanying text.
390 However, an increase in voting among those who currently do not vote without in-
creases in other forms of political participation is unlikely to achieve the amount and kind of
democratic outcomes essential to the democracy enhancing perspective. See supra pages 310-
11.
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providing services like job training and placement, low-cost housing, day
care, transportation, shelters for the homeless and victims of domestic
abuse, and health care for the poor, sick, or disabled. Although only a
small portion of the wealth and income of charities is currently devoted
to such activities, 391 such assistance improves the lives of the needy in a
direct and tangible fashion. In addition, some voluntary associations
have historically championed causes of underrepresented populations, es-
pecially children and others who do not themselves participate or have
political clout with lawmakers. Such efforts can be very successful in
giving a voice to the concerns of these populations in a politically effec-
tive fashion. Thus engaged, voluntary associations have the ability to
make political institutions more representative and improve the living
situations of targeted beneficiaries even when they do not operate in a
fashion valued by the cooperation or self-governance perspectives, i.e.,
by involving the beneficiaries in the process of procuring goods and ser-
vices. It is possible, however, that such efforts by associations will, over
time, enhance the representative character of institutions in other ways,
given that empirical research has demonstrated a strong positive correla-
tion between education and socioeconomic status, on the one hand, and
civic engagement, on the other.
Although research suggests that the act of participating in an associ-
ation will probably not create civic attitudes in favor of participation as
such,392 it has been shown that participants in instrumental and advocacy
organizations are likely to be mobilized to engage in civic activities
outside the group, if only to advance the group's mission.393 Since em-
pirical evidence also shows that people join associations or participate in
their activities when others solicit their participation, 394 participation in a
voluntary association may beget more participation even without a major
change in civic attitudes, e.g., when those who are civically engaged ask
their friends, neighbors, co-workers, and family members to help out.
However, such a ripple effect can augment the egalitarian character of
the political process only if, and to the extent that, the organizations in
question seek out participation by, or further the interests of, under-
represented groups. Churches and community organizations in poor
neighborhoods are especially likely candidates for activities of this kind,
as are parent associations in districts with substandard or poorly-served
schools. In short, even though the evidence shows that voluntary as-
sociations are typically the beneficiaries of civic attitudes rather than
391 See EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 2, at 67-70 (citing statistics suggesting
that most volunteering never reaches the poor and homeless and that a large part of the funding
of charities engaged in social services comes from government, not private sources).
392 See supra notes 247, 249, 261, 272, 300-301 and accompanying text.
393 See supra notes 272, 276 and accompanying text.
394 See supra notes 220-221 and accompanying text.
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their source, it is also the case that the recruitment and mobilization func-
tions of voluntary associations can promote more representative institu-
tions by drawing larger numbers of non-participants into civic life.
On the negative side, empirical research has so far failed to show
that voluntary associations have potential for creating or strengthening
democratic values, however, because of the frequency with which par-
ticipants self-select for organizations that share their values and because
organizations themselves engage in selective recruitment. 395 In addition,
the composition of most voluntary associations tends to be especially
homogeneous along dimensions related to the organizations' purposes, 396
further reducing their utility as "schools for democracy" 397 in the sense
of teaching participants values different from those they possessed when
they joined.398 There is even a danger that encouraging greater participa-
tion on the part of citizens generally (as contrasted with targeted in-
creases in the participation of politically underrepresented groups) could
accentuate existing distortions in representation. 399 Finally, voluntary
associations that are successful often grow large and hierarchical, hire
professional staffs, and rarely solicit the input of their own constituen-
cies, thereby reinforcing their tendency to speak for more educated and
higher status individuals. In short, voluntary associations have the poten-
tial to promote more representative institutions and democratic norms
and practices, but pursuing a more "robust civic life," without more, does
not adequately capture their usefulness for these purposes.
2. The Regulation of Exempt Organizations
There are several ways in which the current regulation of exempt
organizations affects the goal of reducing inequalities in participation
and representation. First, many exempt organizations are active in regis-
tering voters and encouraging and enabling them to get to the polls. Fed-
eral tax law permits most exempt organizations, other than charities, to
engage in registration and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) activities without re-
strictions. 4° ° Charities are treated differently, however, because of the
395 See supra notes 297, 300-301 and accompanying text.
396 See supra notes 294-299 and accompanying text.
397 For this idea, see PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 2, at 338-39.
398 But see ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS, supra note 61 (arguing, based upon
her own experience researching the effect of membership on members' morals, that belonging
to groups and participating with like-minded people in common enterprises furthers demo-
cratic values even if the values and practices of the groups are not themselves democratic).
399 See Verba et al., Big Tilt, supra note 85, at 77 (noting that the policies favored by the
dominated groups are different from those favored by the dominant groups).
400 Among the non-charitable exempt organizations, only social welfare organizations are
limited in registering voters and getting them to vote since only these are subject to limitations
on the amount of campaign activities permitted to them. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-
l(a)(2)(ii) (1990) (stating that the political campaign activities of organizations described in
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prohibition against engaging in any political campaign activities whatso-
ever.40 1 Nonetheless, tax law permits registration and GOTV activities
on the part of public charities, as long as a charity's activities are not
partisan, i.e., not biased for or against a political party or a candidate for
office.402 This means, among other things, that a charity's registration
and GOTV efforts cannot be confined to potential voters of a single party
or for a specific candidate or candidates, and public charities must en-
courage people to register and vote based upon "neutral" reasons, e.g., a
person's civic duty to vote or his or her self-interest.40 3 At the same
time, charities are permitted to target students, minorities, immigrants,
low-income groups, or women, despite the likelihood that voters in these
groups will tend to favor a particular party or candidate. 40 4 It is also
possible for them to call the attention of potential voters to specific issues
and highlight the importance of the election for their resolution. 40 5 Pri-
vate foundations are also required to act in a nonpartisan fashion in regis-
tering voters and encouraging or enabling them to get to the polls.
However, the guidelines for their activities were laid out by Congress
and are more restrictive than the IRS's rules for public charities.40 6
By their terms, the voter registration and GOTV rules do not ad-.
dress the problem of inequality of political representation because noth-
ing requires charities or other exempt organizations to target
underrepresented populations. In fact, the exempt organizations most
likely to register underrepresented populations and encourage them to
vote are charities; yet because of the prohibition against charities engag-
ing in political campaign activities,40 7 they risk losing their exemptions if
section 501(c)(4) cannot be considered part of their exempt purpose and requiring that their
exempt purpose be their primary purpose).
401 See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
402 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFES-
SIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTnON PROGRAM 427 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 CPE
TEXT] (on file with author); Milton Cerny, Current Issues Involving Lobbying and Political
Activities As They Affect Exempt Organizations, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 8, 1998, Doc. 98-
20145 [hereinafter Current Issues], available at LEXIS, 98 TNT 130-11. For a clear and
nontechnical description of the rules for charities engaged in registration and get-out-the-vote
activities, see COLVIN & FINLEY, RULES OF THE GAME, supra note 355, at 21.
403 For a detailed account of acceptable target groups, see Cerny, Current Issues, supra
note 402.
404 See id. (citing Priv. Let. Rul. 92-23-050 (Mar. 10, 1992) and Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,811 (June 30, 1989)).
405 See COLVIN & FINLEY, RULES OF THE GAME, supra note 355, at 21. According to the
IRS, the FEC criteria for determining whether registration and get-out-the-vote activities are
nonpartisan are similar to the factors used in the Service's inquiry. See 1993 CPE TEXT, supra
note 402, at 427-28 (citing II C.F.R. §§1 14.4(b)(2), (c)(1)).
406 See I.R.C. § 4945(0 (2000); Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-3 (1972).
407 See sources cited supra at note 340. There is no de minimis exception to the provision
prohibiting charities from participating or otherwise intervening in a political campaign. See
United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1101 (7th Cir. 1981). In practice, however, the
Service appears to take into consideration whether the violation is intentional. See 1993 CPE
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their registration and get-out-the-vote activities are found to be partisan
under the tax law. To the extent of this risk, the Code's regulation of
exempt organizations may, as a practical matter, be tilted against in-
creased representation of disadvantaged groups in the political process.
Any asymmetry in treatment between charities and other exempt organi-
zations is accentuated by the fact that charities are not allowed to estab-
lish PACs, or affiliated organizations exempt under section 527 of the
Code, to engage exclusively in political activities. 40 8 Thus, unlike sec-
tion 501(c)(4) organizations, charities do not have a vehicle for avoiding
the prohibition against political campaigns. These tax law restrictions on
charities are, however, largely offset by the fact that a charity can usually
form an affiliated section 501(c)(4) organization to engage in political
campaign activities or to set up a PAC as long as the charity prevents any
of its funds from being used by the affiliate of its PAC.40 9 The net effect,
then, of the asymmetry in regulatory regimes appears to be that charita-
ble contributions entitling taxpayer-contributors to deduction from in-
come cannot be used to fund political campaign activity directly or
indirectly, but they can be used by charities to engage in nonpartisan
voter registration and GOTV efforts.
One way for federal tax law to create the socioeconomic conditions
that are correlated with participation would be to afford favorable tax
treatment to the flow of funds to charitable entities actively engaged in
improving the lives of needy populations. This could be achieved by
treating contributions to entities engaged in direct services to the needy
more favorably than other contributions, for example, by allowing a tax
credit rather than a deduction for such contributions or for contributions
that are earmarked for direct services to any charity committed to using
them in the manner provided. 410 The Code already contains provisions
favoring donations to public charities as compared with private ones.
Section 170 contains a two-tier system that allows individuals to lower
their taxable income by deducting a maximum of 50 percent of their
contribution base for donations made to public charities, as compared
with 30 percent of that base for private foundations. 41' The rationale for
TEXT, supra note 402, at 418-19. See also Lee A. Sheppard, Big Bird Is a Democrat; And the
Consequences, 25 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 373, 375 (1999) (describing two Technical Advice
Memoranda in which organizations that violated the prohibition repeatedly were fined under
I.R.C. § 4955 rather than losing their exemptions).
408 See Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(g) (1980).
409 The leading case in this area involved lobbying, not political campaign activities. See
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
410 For a legislative proposal to this effect, see Charity To Eliminate Poverty Tax Credit
Act of 2001, H.R. 673, 107th Cong. (2001).
411 See I.R.C. § 170(b)(l)(A), (B) (2000). See also I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(E) (authorizing the
higher limit for certain foundations). For charitable contributions by corporations, see I.R.C.
§ 170(b)(2).
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the law as written appears to be favoring charities with public support
over those funded by a single high-wealth individual or family. In prac-
tice, however, it takes very little in the way of public support to qualify
an entity for public charity status.41 2 More importantly, nothing in any
of the public support formulas ensures that a charity thus funded will be
devoted to activities on behalf of chronically underrepresented groups.41 3
For political reasons, it is unlikely that the present, generous treat-
ment of charitable contributions could be reduced for any charities based
upon the nature of an entity's mission. Nonetheless, it might be politi-
cally feasible to allow tax credits rather than deductions for contributions
to charities devoted to helping underrepresented populations, as might a
proposal to link an increase in the contribution cap for donations to such
charities. 41 4 Similarly, a tax credit for donations segregated by charities
to fund direct services to needy populations (earmarking), rather than
requiring the charities themselves to devote themselves to such services
to the exclusion of other types of activities, could attract political
support.
Tax law could also encourage more direct-service charitable activi-
ties by permitting noncharitable exempt organizations to receive charita-
ble contributions deductible to the donors for funding direct assistance to
needy populations as long as such funds were segregated from the orga-
nizations' other funds and used only for such purposes. A chamber of
commerce exempt under section 501(c)(6) would, then, be able to use
tax-favored contributions to establish or assist a training program for un-
employed or unskilled workers, a food program, a homeless shelter, etc.
The Code already contains a precedent for conferring special tax treat-
ment on funds targeted for certain charitable activities by entities that are
not themselves charities. Under current law, donors can take charitable
contribution deductions for contributing to certain types of fraternal soci-
eties, as long as the contributions entitled to this treatment are earmarked
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
412 See Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy, supra note 347, at 285 (noting that
public charity status can be obtained when there are fewer than 20 contributors annually). See
also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3) (2002) (providing that an alternative to the usual public
support formula can be satisfied if only 10 percent of the annual revenue of a charity is from
public support as long as certain facts and circumstances are met). If the facts and circum-
stances are met, the 10 percent public support test could be satisfied with a minimum of five
donors. See id.
413 See Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy, supra note 347, at 284-87. Professor
Chisolm's proposal is to deny charities the ability to lobby unless they represent under-
represented groups. See id. at 287-88.
414 If the charitable contribution deduction limit for people entitled to the credit was cor-
respondingly reduced, the savings would partially offset the cost of the credit, thereby shifting
charitable dollars into charities for the needy from other charities described as exempt under
section 501 (c).
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purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.41 5 To
encourage charitable efforts to help needy populations, a comparable ac-
tivities-based deduction could be introduced and made available to select
categories of noncharitable exempt organization.
The optimal strategy for encouraging exempt organizations and
their donors to address social and economic inequalities would therefore
be for tax law to connect the deduction for charitable contributions as
closely as possible to certain types of activities rather than to certain
types of entities. Such activities would include direct assistance to the
unemployed, the working poor, the hungry, the homeless, the abused, the
disabled, and the sick. For efforts of this kind to have long-term effects,
they should be designed to enable the recipients to acquire the skills and
experience necessary to become self-supporting, increase their job and
income levels, and have more stable homes. Social service programs in
the wake of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcil-
iation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) provide a few models of comprehensive
support, including transportation, health, and child care subsidies during
the transition from welfare to work, that have enabled large numbers of
individuals and families formerly receiving welfare payments to improve
their standard of living.416 In sum, society as a whole and individual
communities must address the types of inequalities that undermine the
representative nature of the political process. Exempt organizations, in-
cluding but not limited to charities, are well-suited to play an important
role in this effort. Optimally, these organizations as a group need to be
better educated so that they recognize the potential they have to improve
the circumstances of low-status individuals and educate them about ef-
415 See I.R.C. § 170(c)(4).
416 See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Workforce Dev., Wisconsin Works (W-2) Program Resource
Page (describing Wisconsin's benefits program available to employed individuals and their
families), available at http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/dws/w2 (last updated Jan. 21, 2004); Press
Release, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, Minnesota's Welfare Reform
Brings Dramatic Results for Long-Term Recipients and Their Children (describing the Minne-
sota Family Investment Program, Minnesota's pilot welfare reform program in effect from
1994 to 1998), at http://www.mdrc.org/PressReleases/mfip-pr.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
The positive long-term effects of PRWORA on reducing poverty have been mixed. See CHRIS-
TINE DEVERE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WELFARE REFORM RESEARCH: WHAT Do
WE KNOW ABOUT THOSE WHO LEAVE WELFARE? (Penny Hill Press 2001) (on file with au-
thor); Melissa G. Pardue, Sharp Reduction in Black Poverty Due to Welfare Reform, BACK-
GROUNDER (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), June 12, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.
heritage.org/research/welfare/bg1661 .cfm (last visited Mar. 12, 2004). At the same time, the
situation of black children in extreme poverty has worsened. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND,
ANALYSIS: NUMBER OF BLACK CHILDREN IN EXTREME POVERTY Hrrs RECORD HIGH (2003),
available at http://www.childrensdefense.org/familyincome/childpoverty/extremepoverty.pdf
(last revised May 28, 2003). Of course, the fact that the minimum wage has not changed since
1997, among other factors, makes it difficult for those at the bottom of the economic ladder to
climb up very many rungs.
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fective ways to influence the political process or other aspects of civic
life.4 17
D. THE COMMUNITY MORALITY PERSPECTIVE
According to the fourth perspective on civic engagement, civic re-
newal will never succeed in the absence of concurrent moral renewal,
and participation in voluntary associations by itself is inadequate to de-
velop the necessary moral foundation for civic life. 418 As noted above,
the moral renewal project is far more controversial than other aspects of
civic renewal because of the wariness in a democratic society of using
legal institutions to encourage values or attitudes linked to one or more
specific understandings of human well-being or fulfillment. Democratic
societies, especially liberal democratic societies, tend to demand substan-
tive neutrality from public policy and government actors in situations
where moral and other human purposes are at issue.4 19
Those who advocate invigorating the moral culture in the United
States believe that there exists a core of common values that the vast
majority of Americans accept, or could be persuaded to accept, without
acting contrary to their existing beliefs, including those associated with
their religion or other comprehensive views. 420 As noted above, these
values fall under the headings of our responsibilities to ourselves, to our
families, and to our communities.42' As a consequence, these thinkers
seek to identify the elements of a secular moral consensus that is capable
of commanding widespread allegiance without sacrificing the country's
commitment to the separation of church and state or imposing a specific
idea of goodness or well-being on the population as a whole. To be
successful, these efforts must influence people's behaviors as well as
their values and opinions.
The civic renewal perspective advocating moral renewal exhibits a
range of views concerning the degree to which government actions and
public officials, as contrasted with private parties, can or should seek to
encourage particular moral beliefs and practices. Some civic renewal ad-
vocates emphasize the role of institutional or governmental actions.
Among these are efforts to use tax incentives and appropriations to en-
courage individuals and companies to adopt practices deemed beneficial
417 For example, charitable entities desiring to help lessen economic and social inequali-
ties could add to their mission statements increasing opportunities for members of under-repre-
sented groups to acquire civic skills and attitudes, preferably through participation in the
management or operations of the charitable entities themselves.
418 See supra Part I.D.
419 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12 (1980).
But see supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
420 See supra notes 120-136 and accompanying text.
421 See supra note 130.
390 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13:289
to the moral fabric of society, especially in the area of family policy.
422
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), for example, has been widely
hailed for increasing employment among the poor and enhancing family
stability in addition to its direct economic effect of alleviating poverty.
42 3
Because employment and family stability are themselves civic goods
with potential ripple effects on both the non-civic and civic well-being of
individuals, as well as on their families and neighborhoods, continuing
and enlarging the program's scope has attracted bipartisan support 424 and
induced at least sixteen states to design similar credits. 425
Marriage and divorce concerns have also given rise to repeated at-
tempts on the part of state legislatures to adopt family-friendly policies.
For example, Louisiana, Arizona, and Arkansas have passed legislation
creating an alternative, lifetime commitment marriage license that re-
quires those who elect it to undergo extensive preparation before getting
married, sign a legally enforceable document binding the parties to seek
counseling to preserve the marriage if marital difficulties develop, and
agree to an extended waiting period for a divorce except in extreme
cases, e.g., if one spouse abuses the other or the children or if one spouse
422 Using the tax code to promote public policy has long been controversial. See Charles
A. Borek, Comment, The Public Policy Doctrine and Tax Logic: The Need for Consistency in
Denying Deductions Arising from Illegal Activities, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 45, 49-56 (1992)
(examining the development of the public policy doctrine with respect to the tax code).
423 The credit provides a cash wage supplement to low-income working individuals and
families. It was initially enacted in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 § 204, 89 Stat. 26, 30, and
greatly expanded in 1993. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 § 13131, 26 U.S.C.
§ 32 (2000). See NICHOLAS JOHNSON, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, A HAND
UP: How STATE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITS HELP WORKING FAMILIES ESCAPE POVERTY IN
2001, at 6 (2001) [hereinafter A HAND UP] (noting that EITCs have been enacted in states
with Republican, Democratic, and bipartisan leadership). See also Anne L. Alstott, The
Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 533, 533 (1995) (noting that the EITC has "assumed a central role in U.S. social welfare
policy").
424 See ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, SHOULD EITC
BENEFITS BE ENLARGED FOR FAMILIES WITH THREE OR MORE CHILDREN? 1 (2000); JOHNSON,
A HAND UP, supra note 423, at 6.
425 As of the end of 2001, sixteen states had enacted state EITC credits. See JOHNSON, A
HAND Up, supra note 423, at 6.
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goes to jail for a serious crime. 426 Less controversial 427 are state efforts
to include a course on marriage skills as part of the high school curricu-
lum. 428 In one county in Michigan, the mayor, college presidents,
judges, attorneys, business leaders, and clergy have established a com-
munity marriage policy that seeks to raise public awareness regarding the
value of marriage, as well as to provide counseling and other services
similar to those provided in other states. 429 Perhaps the most well known
legislative efforts to strengthen families are the various federal and state
426 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-272, 9-273, 9-307 (1997); ARIz. REV. STAT. Ann.
§§ 25-901, 25-903, 25-904 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-803 (1998). For in-depth analysis
of Louisiana's covenant marriage law, see Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Mar-
riage: Social Analysis and Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63 (1998); Joel A. Nichols,
Comment, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward a More Robust Plural-
ism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929 (1998) [hereinafter Louisiana's Cove-
nant Marriage Law]. Similar bills have been introduced in numerous state legislatures, so far
with little success. See Nichols, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law, supra, at 973-74 (not-
ing twelve states in which covenant marriage bills were introduced in 1998); H.J. Cummins,
Covenant Vows Would Make Parting Harder, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 5, 2000, at LA
(noting that covenant marriage bills were considered by the legislatures in 17 states in 1999,
although none was enacted). For a current and comprehensive list of bills introduced, see
Americans for Divorce Reform, Covenant Marriage Links, available at http://www.divorcer-
eform.org/cov.html#anchorl274910. Estimates are that only three percent of couples mar-
rying in Louisiana or Arizona have chosen covenant marriages. See Pam Belluck, States
Declare War on Divorce Rates, Before Any 'I Dos,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2000, at AI [herein-
after States Declare War]. Ten percent of those who participate in state sponsored counseling
break the engagement, and in one town, the divorce rate dropped forty percent in ten years.
See Nichols, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law, supra, at 977.
427 The Louisiana law has been criticized by clergy, feminists, the ACLU, and constitu-
tional scholars. See Nichols, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law, supra note 426, at 952-67.
428 In Florida, for example, a course on marriage and relationship skills is a requirement
for graduation. See Marilyn Gardner, An 'I Do' that Lasts, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 23,
1999, at 15. Utah insures that marriage education courses are available in high schools, but
does not make them mandatory. See Belluck, States Declare War, supra note 426, at Al
(discussing efforts in several states to strengthen marriage through educational measures).
One state currently offers financial incentives to encourage low-income married couples to
stay married by relieving some of their financial distress. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-6
(2003) (authorizing up to an extra $100 a month in aid to married parents who receive cash
assistance from the state). In its 2001 budget request, the Bush administration included $100
million for state programs to encourage welfare recipients to get or stay married. See WHITE
HousE, WORKING TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 19-21 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2002/02/welfare-reform-announcement-book-all.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2004). Opponents of such programs believe that the financial incentives may lead abused
wives to stay in abusive relationships. See Patricia Harrison, Marriage Initiatives Deserve Our
Support, GREENVILLE NEWS (S.C.), Oct. 6, 2002, at 3G. Supporters argue that the marriage
education classes funded by the programs will reduce the amount of domestic abuse. See id.
429 See Roger Sider, Grand Rapids Erects a Civic Tent for Marriage, POL'Y REV., July-
Aug. 1998, at 6. This marriage strengthening project is unusual in concluding that success
depends in part on persuading professionals to recognize their role in strengthening or weaken-
ing marriages. The Michigan effort has asked divorce attorneys to reflect upon the potential
tension between their economic self-interest and the interests of children and other members of
the community, and it has sponsored educational events for mental health professionals to
increase their awareness of their potential role in educating their clients about their responsibil-
ities to other members of their families. See id.
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family and medical leave laws. 430 Government efforts to increase civic
values directly through education have also been undertaken repeatedly
in the last two decades, especially at the local level, through changes in
the curriculum 4 3' and public service requirements. 432
Many advocates of moral renewal prefer private solutions to moral
concerns, whether on grounds of efficiency or ideology. Legislation and
other official acts seem especially unsuited to achieve the core objective
of increasing the pervasiveness of public-spirited attitudes. 433 This
strand of the moral renewal perspective views parents as potentially the
most effective and appropriate repository of moral education of any
430 See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; National Con-
ference of State Legislatures, State Family and Medical Leave Laws, available at http:Hwww.
ncsl.org/programs/employ/fmlachart.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
431 One trend in this connection consists of proposals to increase character education
among children by expanding the moral content of school curricula, e.g., by introducing ser-
vice learning as a component of the curriculum. See generally B. DAVID BROOKS & FRANK G.
GOBLE, THE CASE FOR CHARACTER EDUCATION: THE ROLE OF THE SCHOOL IN TEACHING VAL-
UES AND VIRTUE (Studio 4 Productions 1997) (1983); KEVIN RYAN & KAREN E. BOHLIN,
BUILDING CHARACTER IN SCHOOLS: PRACTICAL WAYS TO BRING MORAL INSTRUCTION TO LIFE
(1999); Thomas Lickona, The Decline and Fall of American Civilization: Can Character Edu-
cation Reverse the Slide?, WORLD & I, June 1996, at 285. Character education has been
described as "not a separate course ... rather, it's a whole-school effort to create a community
of virtue where moral behaviors such as respect, honesty, and kindness are modeled, taught,
expected, celebrated, and continuously practiced in everyday interactions." Id. at 299. See
also Christian Educators Association International, Character Education Links and Resources
(listing links to web sites with character education materials), available at http://www.ceai.org/
members.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
432 Hundreds of school boards and municipalities now have mandatory public service
requirements for students in primary or secondary school. See Sumathi Reddy, Helping Out Is
Required to Graduate, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 22, 2000, at B3; Marina
Dundjerski & Susan Gray, A Lesson in Mandatory Service, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Septem-
ber 10, 1998, at 1. See also Janoski et al., Being Volunteered?, supra note 234, at 516-17
(concluding that "encouraging children to get involved in social clubs and community service
organizations while in school" can be beneficial in later years). To date, the only state to
mandate community service as a condition of graduation is Maryland. See MD. REGS. CODE
tit. 13A, § 03.01(F)(1 1) (2003) (providing that each local high school system should include
activities, programs, and practices that "provide appropriate opportunities for students to par-
ticipate in community service"). This mandate, passed in 1992, was first applied to the high
school classes graduating in 1997. Maryland Student Service Alliance, Maryland's Service-
Learning Graduation Requirement, available at http://www.mssa.sailorsite.net/require.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2004). In implementing the mandate, the Maryland State Board of Edu-
cation gave all twenty-four school districts the option of having students complete seventy-five
hours of service, including "preparation, action, and reflection components and that, at the
discretion of the local school system, may begin during the middle grades" or devising their
own student service program, subject to approval by the Superintendent of Schools. See id.
For details of the variety of models chosen by the local school districts, see id.
433 For example, many camps, scout groups, and little league teams communicate the
importance of good character and behavior by conferring honors upon children who are known
for their tendency to help others alongside of those who excel in sports or other skills. Many
primary and secondary schools similarly reward with public praise or a trophy children who
stand out for their helping behaviors alongside of those who excel in academics. It is hard to
imagine a governmental entity competing successfully with the opinion of one's peers.
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kind.434 Groups of concerned parents have, in fact, been the driving
force behind numerous projects to improve the moral climate of the
neighborhoods in which they live and their children grow up. Regardless
of whether they turn to market 435 or legal4 36 strategies, such efforts are
animated by a belief that some materials and environments are inappro-
priate for children if they are to grow into morally healthy adults. An-
other recent private initiative, the public journalism movement, resulted
from a collaboration among parents, community leaders, and the media.
By making a commitment to give more prominent coverage to topics
such as community efforts to solve local problems and profiles of indi-
viduals who are active on behalf of their communities, this movement
has attempted to combat public cynicism and increase people's sense of
responsibility, awareness of public problems, and confidence in their
ability to influence the quality of their surroundings.
4 37
These brief observations illustrate how complex and multidimen-
sional the civic response to any aspect of community morality concerns
must be. They also raise in a concrete fashion a question as to the utility
of participation in voluntary associations for the moral renewal
enterprise.
1. Impact of Voluntary Associations on Community Morality
The empirical evidence regarding the impact of participation in vol-
untary associations on the moral values and behaviors of participants
lends support to the view of those civic renewal advocates who believe
434 See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON Civic RENEWAL, NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 117,
at 6, 8, 9-10, 12-13; INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note
114, at 7, 19-20; supra note 152 and accompanying text.
435 The software industry has responded to parents' desire to keep pornography, violence,
or other offensive material out of the surroundings of their children by marketing special com-
puter filtering software. Examples of such efforts include rating systems for movies, records,
books, television, and computer games to enable adults to screen these items before permitting
their children to see or hear them. For links to voluntarily adopted ratings systems for movies,
television, records and CDs, and computer, video, and Internet games, see ParentalGuide.org,
Parental Media Guide, available at http://www.parentalguide.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
436 The Federal Trade Commission monitors annually the entertainment and other indus-
tries' compliance with their self-regulating standards, including the standards against advertis-
ing R-rated products in magazines and other media with a significant under-age audience. See
FED. TRADE COMM'N, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A REVIEW OF
SELF-REGULATION AND INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC RECORDING &
ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES (2000). For a list of available Internet filtering software, see
SmartParent.com, Blocking/Filtering Software, available at http://www.smartparent.com/pro-
tect.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
437 See, e.g., Judith Lichtenberg, Beyond the Public Journalism Controversy, in CIVIL
SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 341, 342-44, 352. See also PETER LEVINE, THE NEW PROGRESSIVE
ERA: TOWARD A FAIR AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 157-65 (2000) (examining the public
journalism movement and the arguments of those who criticize it). On the subject of public
journalism generally, see ASSESSING PUBLIC JOURNALISM (Edmund B. Lambeth et al. eds.,
1998).
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that participation in voluntary associations (other than families) does not
necessarily produce or nurture moral values and practices of members.
Rather, it appears that people's moral values and attitudes are learned
primarily at home or in school and then become a significant determinant
of the likelihood that people will participate in civic life. Helping and
community-oriented behaviors in particular, as contrasted with self-inter-
ested behaviors, were found to be the product of friendship and other
social ties as well as socialization by parents. 438 Research has also
shown that altruistic and ideological motivations are better predictors of
civic activity than is economic self-interest or professional
advancement. 439
Research has, however, confirmed the correlation between partici-
pation in nonpolitical associations and certain types of involvement in
political life. Yet the causal link turned out not to be values or attitudes
of public-spiritedness or citizen responsibility learned from participation
in civil associations. Rather, it seems that self-selection by those who
join civil associations in the first place, coupled with mobilization of
some members by others within the group, are the primary reasons for
the correlation between participation in civil associations and political
participation. 440
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that participation in voluntary
associations can have a positive impact on members' moral values or
public-spiritedness, in particular, those associations whose mission in-
cludes character building. First and foremost, churches and religious in-
stitutions typically teach congregants the importance of helping those in
need, whether within or outside the religious community.'4 1 In addition,
several studies showed that, as a result of participation in non-religious
voluntary associations, participants experienced an increase in empathy,
nurturing, and self-confidence, although this effect was found only in
participants exhibiting altruistic behavior prior to joining.442 Further,
some studies have concluded that through associational life members'
pre-joining attitudes can be amplified and that members' attitudes change
only when a significant majority of the other members of the group ex-
438 See supra Part II.B.4.
439 See supra Part II.B.5.
440 See supra Part II.C.2-3.
441 See supra II.B.2. Faith-based institutions also provide occasions for adults with chil-
dren to have the values instilled at home reinforced by other members of the community and
for adults to meet socially with others who share similar moral values. Sometimes such enti-
ties organize mixed social and helping activities geared especially to pre-teens or teens, further
reinforcing these values.
442 See supra note 260 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 286-288 (empirical
data suggesting that self-interested people are more likely to join instrumental voluntary as-
sociations, whereas people with helping orientations are more likely to be members of expres-
sive organizations).
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hibit a particular attitude. 443 Thus, moral socialization within voluntary
associations typically depends on the prior existence of moral values
outside of organizations, i.e., members' pre-joining attitudes and values.
In other words, based upon the empirical evidence, the fourth perspective
is correct in focusing predominantly on the creation and cultivation of
moral and community-oriented values and practices outside associational
settings.
In sum, although the importance of participation as such for charac-
ter building has not yet been demonstrated, voluntary associations can
have a positive effect on the cultivation of moral values, both directly
and indirectly under certain conditions.
2. The Regulation of Exempt Organizations
The previous section has argued that voluntary organizations are
most useful for the maintenance or cultivation of civic health from the
fourth perspective to the extent that they assist members of families and
schools in conveying the basic moral norms essential for civic life.
Apart from religious or religiously-affiliated institutions, few voluntary
associations further this goal directly. The policy of the Internal Reve-
nue Service is to refrain from evaluating applications for charitable or
other categories of exempt status based upon substantive moral consider-
ations. Thus, both organizations that support and those that oppose a
position or objective with moral implications will receive exempt status,
unless they advocate violence, criminal behavior, or other forms of law-
lessness. On the few occasions in the past when the Service did deny
charitable or exempt status based upon its notion of moral norms, the
Service's actions were widely condemned and it eventually retreated.
4
"
Given the pluralistic nature of American democracy and the value ac-
corded to diversity and tolerance, the Service's present practice can be
defended on moral, as well as political and administrative, grounds. In
this respect, to tinker with federal tax law and its enforcement would risk
weakening the regulatory regime's contribution to the commitment to
pluralism that is part of the moral foundation of civic life in the United
States.
Because churches and other faith-based institutions are voluntary
associations that engage in character building, some might argue that
federal tax law should privilege them as compared with other voluntary
associations. In point of fact, the Code already does privilege churches
in various ways, e.g., by not requiring them to apply for recognition of
443 See supra notes 300-301 and accompanying text.
444 See supra note 371.
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exempt status, 445 exempting them from certain unemployment taxes,4 4 6
restricting the government's ability to examine financial records,447 ex-
empting them from the requirement to file annual information returns, 448
among other exceptions to the rules governing charitable exempt organi-
zations in general. 449
In the United States, privileging religious organizations always
raises special concerns, and lawmakers must walk a fine line between the
establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment. The
most heated church-related controversy with civic implications has to do
with what is known as "charitable choice," i.e., legislative authorization
permitting faith-based entities to compete for federal social service con-
tracts alongside other charitable organizations. 450 The most controversial
current tax law issue with implications for the role of churches in civil
society is raised by proposals to relax the rules governing advocacy en-
gaged in by religious organizations. 451 As is the case with other organi-
zations exempt as public charities, religious organizations are only
permitted to lobby if their lobbying activities are not substantial.452 They
are not permitted to make the section 501(h) lobbying election; however,
their exclusion from this provision was requested by the organizations
themselves.453 Like other exempt charitable organizations, religious in-
stitutions are absolutely prohibited from engaging in electioneering or
445 I.R.C. § 508(c) (2000).
446 I.R.C. § 3309(b)(1) (2000).
447 I.R.C. § 7611 (2000).
448 I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
449 For other examples of federal and state tax law exemptions for churches and certain
religious institutions, see generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" for Religious
Institutions Constitutionally Dependent on Benefits for Secular Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 805
(2001).
450 See Mike Allen, Bush Uses Fourth to Extol Role of Faith, WASH. POST, July 5, 2001,
at A2 (noting that faith-based initiatives have "run into opposition from lawmakers of both
parties who are concerned that it could blur the distinction between church and state and could
be challenged in court on constitutional grounds"); Dana Milbank, Bush Legislative Approach
Failed in Faith Bill Battle; White House is Faulted for Not Building a Consensus in Congress,
WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2003, at Al (noting that "'faith-based' legislation-central to Bush's
campaign promise to 'rally the armies of compassion'-had turned into a retreat"). For a
useful summary of public perceptions, see PEw RESEARCH CENTER, FAITH-BASED FUNDING
BACKED, BUT CHURCH-STATE DOUBTS ABOUND (2001), available at http://people-press.org/
reports/display.php3?ReportlD=15 (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
451 According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, 70 percent of respon-
dents believe that churches should not endorse candidates, although nearly half also believe
that churches should in general express positions about social and political topics. Pew Re-
search Center, Americans Struggle with Religion's Role at Home and Abroad, available at
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=388 (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
452 See supra note 341.
453 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1210, at 15-16 (1976); James H. Nix, Limitations on the Lobby-
ing of Section 501(c)(3) Organizations-A Choice for the Public Charities, 81 W. VA. L. REV.
407, 415-16 (1979).
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campaign activities. 454 The penalty for violating either advocacy rule
can be revocation of the organization's exempt status. 455 Alternatively,
or in addition to revocation, excise taxes may be imposed upon the relig-
ious institution and its managers.45
6
Bills have been introduced in Congress to permit more extensive
advocacy by churches. One such bill would enable houses of worship
and certain other religious entities to lobby up to an annual expenditure
cap of 20 percent of gross revenues and to engage in campaign activities
as long as expenditures for such activities do not normally exceed 5 per-
cent of gross revenues annually.457 The justification given by supporters
of the legislation is that the tax law limitations on advocacy violate the
free speech and free exercise rights of religious institutions.
458 Critics of
current tax law also argue that the advocacy restrictions interfere with
454 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). There is no de minimis exception to the prohibition.
455 Revocation of exemption rarely occurs. For a recent instance of revocation based
upon the prohibition against campaign activity, see Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d
137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See generally Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribu-
tion Deduction, supra note 336; Alan L. Feld, Rendering Unto Caesar or Electioneering for
Caesar? Loss of Church Tax Exemption for Participation in Electoral Politics, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 931 (2001); Patrick L. O'Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical Perspective
of the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733 (2001).
456 I.R.C. § 4955. The excise tax provision applies to violations by any entity exempt as a
public charity under section 501(c)(3). The counterpart excise tax for private foundations is
contained in I.R.C. § 4945.
457 See Bright Line Act of 2001, H.R. 2931, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001) (permitting such
organizations to spend a maximum of 20 percent of gross revenues for all forms of advocacy,
i.e. for lobbying and electioneering combined). The lobbying nontaxable amount for charita-
ble exempt organizations making the section 501(h) election is the lesser of $1,000,000 or the
amount determined by a table that takes into account the amount of exempt purpose expendi-
tures. I.R.C. § 4911 (c) (2000). There was no dollar maximum proposed in H.R. 2931. Thus,
the bill would authorize religious institutions to engage in more lobbying than is possible for
other exempt charities. See also Houses of Worship Political Speech Protection Act, H.R.
2357, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (2001) (introducing a "no substantial part" political campaign
activity standard for churches); Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, H.R. 235,
108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (permitting churches to engage in political endorsements during relig-
ious services, but not authorizing them to engage in campaign activities in general).
458 Review of Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) Requirements for Religious Orga-
nizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 107th Cong. 23-37 (2002) (statement of Colby M. May, Director, American Center for
Law & Justice) [hereinafter Hearing]; id. at 53-56 (statement of D. James Kennedy, President,
Coral Ridge Ministries). See also Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., On Not Rendering to Cae-
sar: The Unconstitutionality of Tax Regulation of Activities of Religious Organizations Relat-
ing to Politics, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1990) (concluding that tax law restrictions on the
activities of religious organizations encroach upon the free speech and free exercise rights of
such organizations); Steffan N. Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis
of IRS Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875,
887-94 (2001) (arguing that the two strongest state interests for content-based discrimination
do not qualify as compelling under First Amendment free speech doctrine); Glenn Goodwin,
Note, Would Caesar Tax God? The Constitutionality of Governmental Taxation of Churches,
35 DRAKE L. REV. 383 (1985-1986) (concluding that "any attempt to subject churches to taxa-
tion is unconstitutional").
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religious autonomy by legislating which religious beliefs can be ex-
pressed openly in houses of worship and which cannot.459 According to
some commentators, however, religious autonomy and the integrity of
the missions of houses of worship could be undermined, rather than
strengthened, by enhancing the ability of religious institutions and their
clergy to engage more frequently and openly in political campaigns or
legislative battles. 460
Whether the proposed liberalization of advocacy rules for houses of
worship is constitutionally permissible, required, or even prohibited, 46' is
beyond the scope of this Article. From a civic renewal perspective that
emphasizes the foundational role of moral renewal, the question is
whether the community-enhancing dimensions of religious organizations
that would be furthered by expanding their advocacy opportunities out-
weighs any harm such activity could cause. The empirical evidence dis-
cussed earlier makes clear that church membership and attendance are
positively correlated with civic involvement. 462 Participation in religious
institutions has also been shown to be an important source of skills train-
ing and building the confidence of people from lower socio-economic
classes so that they are equipped to participate in civic life.463 Further,
houses of worship have historically come to the aid of marginalized and
disenfranchised populations. These efforts enhance civil society directly
by alleviating poverty, hunger, and homelessness.
Permitting houses of worship to engage in greater amounts of advo-
cacy might, then, increase the opportunities for congregations to influ-
ence legislation or campaigns, intensify pressure on officials and parties
to adopt policies and enact legislation targeted to improve the conditions
459 See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 147 (1993).
460 See Frederick C. Harris, Black Churches and Civic Traditions: Outreach, Activism,
and the Politics of Public Funding of Faith-Based Ministries, in CAN CHARITABLE CHOICE
WORK? COVERING RELIGION'S IMPACT ON URBAN AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL SERVICES 140, 151-54
(Andrew Walsh ed., 2001); Hearing, supra note 458, at 42 (statement of Rev. C. Welton
Gaddy, Ph.D., Exec. Dir., Interfaith Alliance); id. at 48 (statement of Rev. Barry W. Lynn,
Exec. Dir., Ams. United for Separation of Church and State); id. at 59 (statement of Brenda
Girton-Mitchell, Assoc. Gen. Sec'y for Pub. Policy, and Dir., Washington Office, Nat'l Coun-
cil of Churches of Christ in the USA); id. at 93 (statement of the Islamic Supreme Council of
Am.); id. at 109 (statement of Bill Aiken, Dir. Of Pub. Affairs, Soka Gakkai International-
USA Buddhist Ass'n).
461 A liberalization of the advocacy rules for houses of worship could run afoul of the
Establishment Clauses by affording religious entities preferential treatment when compared
with other public charities. For example, previously, when Congress sought to authorize better
treatment for religious donations of debtors who file for bankruptcy than the Bankruptcy Code
affords to other preferential pre-bankruptcy transfers, it enacted legislation affording all pre-
petition charitable donations special status to avoid an Establishment Clause attack. See Relig-
ious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548 (2000).
462 Supra note 184 and accompanying text.
463 Supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
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of marginalized or other needy populations, and expand on the types of
civic skills that lead to an enhanced sense of political efficacy among
congregants who currently are unable or unwilling to participate in civic
life.
To evaluate these benefits, it is necessary to compare the range of
advocacy activities currently available to houses of worship with those
contemplated by the reform legislation. Under current law, churches,
like other organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3), are able to
lobby lawmakers at the federal, state, and local level as long as the extent
of such activities is not substantial, and they can lobby administrative,
executive, and judicial bodies without a dollar limit.464 Nonetheless, the
vagueness of the substantiality standard could chill advocacy by
churches. The solution is not, however, to permit them to lobby without
limit, as would be possible for affluent churches under one of the reforms
proposed.465 Rather, the lack of guidance for houses of worship should
be remedied by amending existing section 501 (h) to permit them to make
the lobbying election available to all other public charities.
The more significant reform proposed would permit houses of wor-
ship to engage in electoral politics. 4 66 Under existing law, charities, in-
cluding houses of worship, are permitted to discuss substantive issues
during a campaign, even if the same issues are being debated by candi-
dates, as long as they refrain from endorsing specific candidates during
the discussion or pointing out the positions of one or more candidates on
the issues being discussed. Clergy are permitted to express their own
political preference as long as they do not do so in their official capacity.
Churches are also permitted to allow candidates for elective office to
speak at church events as long as all candidates for the same office are
invited, no funds are raised, and no endorsements are made. Candidates
may appear in their individual capacity at church events during a cam-
paign, for reasons unrelated to their election, as long as the facts and
circumstances of the event taken as a whole do not constitute a candidate
endorsement by the house of worship or an event to support the individ-
ual as a candidate.467 Clergy are not permitted to engage in electoral
activities from the pulpit or at official church functions when they are
serving in their official capacity. Houses of worship are also not allowed
to distribute campaign literature or permit such materials to be distrib-
uted by others on their premises, although the distribution of nonpartisan
voter guides is permitted.
464 Supra notes 341, 381-382 and accompanying text.
465 See supra note 457.
466 See supra note 457.
467 Needless to say, the letter as well the spirit of the rule are often violated. To date,
however, the Service has chosen not to enforce compliance aggressively.
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It is unclear what would be the benefit to civic life were houses of
worship permitted to spend five percent of their gross revenues, includ-
ing contributions, on campaign activities and devote large amounts of
volunteer time to activities intended to elect or defeat particular candi-
dates. Because candidate debates and discussion of issues are already
permitted under current law, presumably the proposed liberalization of
the advocacy rules would enable churches to endorse candidates openly,
pay for fundraising literature or events, and pay for media and other
communications targeting the election or defeat of specific candidates.
One consequence of the liberalization would thus be to embroil houses of
worship in continuing controversies about the applications of campaign
finance laws. Another would be to invite increased IRS scrutiny of
church activities to determine whether statutory limitations were being
respected. Churches that do not see politics as integral to their spiritual
mission might nevertheless be diverted from their core mission because
of congregants who pressure them to commit resources toward election
activities. Houses of worship would risk becoming polarized whenever a
diversity of political orientations or candidate preferences were held by
congregants. And donations entitled to charitable contribution deduc-
tions would be spent on political activities, making churches the most
desirable vehicle for campaign finance purposes, putting further pressure
on them to consume their electioneering "allowance" to the maximum
extent possible under the law. These risks to the historic spiritual mis-
sion of churches counsel caution.
In sum, there are very limited opportunities for tax law regulation of
exempt organizations to promote the goals of the community morality
perspective. It seems that voluntary associations can increase members'
moral values and public spiritedness only when those who join already
possess such characteristics or when the views of a majority of the mem-
bers of an association converge on such values. Tax law, however, does
not regulate the composition of members of groups seeking exempt sta-
tus, nor should it. Character-building institutions already qualify for
favorable tax treatment, and, as argued in this section, liberalizing the
advocacy rules applicable to them would not necessarily enhance their
contribution to the morals or public-spirited values of their members. It
may be, therefore, that tax law best promotes the community morality
perspective by preserving the integrity of the nonprofit sector as a sector.
It does this through enforcing existing rules governing the organization
and operation of exempt entities and various anti-abuse measures de-
signed to prevent practices that can discredit the sector in the eyes of the
public in general and volunteers and supporters of charities in particular.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the civic renewal movement contains
within itself multiple understandings of the nature of civic health. It has
also taken the position that these understandings are sufficiently distinct
that civil society theorists need to reflect more on the precise nature of
their goals before advancing public policy objectives, especially in light
of the potential conflicts among the goals given priority by the different
perspectives. Because of the differences in the primary purposes associ-
ated with each of the four perspectives discussed in this Article, the civic
renewal movement cannot be said to argue for any particular tax regime
governing nonprofits, nor can the existing framework of regulation in the
Code be said to advance or retard civic renewal without qualification.
The analysis in Parts II and III, however, does permit some
generalizations.
Given the empirical findings explored in this article, it no longer
seems useful for civic renewal advocates to continue to portray associa-
tional life as critical for cultivating moral values and public spiritedness
in individuals or promoting attitudes and practices conducive to reflec-
tive self-governance. In general, voluntary associations can at most
serve as a vehicle for strengthening, harnessing, and directing their mem-
bers' existing moral and public-spirited attitudes. In addition, small,
highly participatory organizations may provide a forum for deliberation
in some civil and political settings, in particular in groups that provide
members with information, teach them skills, and afford them opportuni-
ties to entertain and discuss divergent views. However, such settings
appear to be infrequent and to have given way increasingly to organiza-
tions with passive members and professional staffs. Civic renewal advo-
cates who give priority to the deliberative or public-spirited aspects of
civic health would thus do well to revise their expectations of the poten-
tial benefits of voluntary associations and recognize that increases in the
"robustness of civic life," without more, could contribute to a civic cli-
mate at odds with the substantive civic values they seek to promote.
As was noted in Part III, there are few regulatory measures that can
address these shortcomings of associational life given the unsuitability of
the tax law-or any other regulatory regime-to scrutinize the composi-
tion of voluntary association members or the internal dynamics of such
organizations. At most, the Code might be amended to provide incen-
tives for contributions of service in addition to those currently available
for contributions of property and to encourage balanced advocacy com-
munications in more situations than is the case under current law. In
addition, the Service needs to provide much more extensive guidance
concerning the circumstances in which exempt organizations can dis-
tribute voter guides, legislative scorecards, and similar materials without
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violating the restrictions on political campaign activity so that these orga-
nizations can contribute to informing the public about the agendas and
accomplishments of public officials.
Voluntary associations can be effective in promoting some of the
outcomes sought by the collective action perspective. Both nonpolitical
and political associations have been shown to enable individuals to work
together and influence the policy-making and legislative processes at the
local, state, and national levels. This Article has argued that the Code's
restrictions on the advocacy activities of exempt organizations do not in
principle unduly restrict their ability to engage in these processes, al-
though in certain instances, the extent of such activity must be limited or
the activity undertaken through affiliated organizations in order to avoid
the possibility of a loss of exemption. In general, the advocacy rules
promote the integrity of the nonprofit sector by ensuring that organiza-
tions adhere to the mission for which they were originally granted ex-
empt status. The complexity of the lobbying rules, however, increases
the cost of compliance and may well cause some organizations, espe-
cially those with modest resources, to forego lobbying and grass roots
advocacy altogether rather than pay for technical advice or risk putting
their exemption in jeopardy. Civic life suffers when this happens, since
small and low-budget organizations are among the groups most likely to
provide opportunities for meaningful participation by members and
volunteers.
One possible solution to the cost of obtaining information about per-
missible advocacy would be for Congress to fund and the Service to en-
gage in educational outreach to such organizations, for example, through
a web site dedicated to presenting advocacy information and examples of
best practices in taxpayer-friendly language. The Service already has
published a certain amount of information of this kind in regulations,
rulings, and its Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional Education
Technical Instruction Program publications, but these are at present diffi-
cult for non-experts to find on the Internet, and they sometimes employ
technical distinctions that non-lawyers may not appreciate. Another so-
lution would be to make the definitions of lobbying and the exceptions to
the definitions uniform for all exempt organizations, regardless of
whether they are public charities, private foundations, or noncharitable
exempt organizations, and regardless of whether a section 501(h) elec-
tion is in effect. This would still permit distinctions to be made in the
rules applying these definitions to different categories of exempt entity,
e.g., by varying the amount of lobbying permissible for each.
Voluntary associations also contribute to some of the objectives of
the representative institutions perspective. Above all, such associations
can reflect and promote the views of individuals who are habitually un-
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derrepresented in the voting booth and in more intense forms of political
participation. When organizations promote the concerns of such individ-
uals, they have the potential to correct some of the imbalances in politi-
cal representation between those with influence and access and those
without. Associations thereby promote political equality by making the
views and needs of these populations known to lawmakers and other of-
ficials and, presumably, increasing the share of political outputs allocated
to their members or the populations they represent. In addition, to the
extent that such groups succeed in improving the educational, health, in-
come, and other conditions of underrepresented populations, they in-
crease the likelihood that the people thus benefited will become more
politically active in their own right, commensurate with their improved
socio-economic status and educational level.
Tax law treats exempt organizations dedicated to improving the ma-
terial conditions of the least advantaged in society in the same way as
exempt organizations organized and operated for any other charitable
purpose. This is consistent with Congress's apparent intent, and the Ser-
vice's customary practice, not to make value judgments about the rela-
tive merits of charitable endeavors. Although this approach is, in
general, to be preferred to the alternative, it seems consistent with several
of the civic renewal perspectives to create tax incentives for private
groups to work toward improving the material conditions of and educa-
tional opportunities for the least advantaged members of society with the
ultimate goal of improving their self-sufficiency and the likelihood of
their becoming more active participants in civic life. As described in
Part III, this could be accomplished in various ways using tax incentives
targeted at charities, other exempt organizations, or donors.
Other aspects of the rules governing the advocacy activities of ex-
empt organizations are ripe for review. Individuals have been shown to
"get involved" when they are recruited and mobilized by other individu-
als. Citizen recruitment in the form of voter registration, get-out-the-vote
drives, and other kinds of voter mobilization is crucial to this process.
However, the rules regulating the voter mobilization activities of chari-
ties and other exempt organizations are sparse, and they are often vague
when they exist. If the voter mobilization engaged in by a charity is
found by the Service to be partisan, the charity will violate the absolute
prohibition against political campaign activity and risk revocation of its
exempt status. Noncharitable exempt organizations risk suffering the
same fate if their voter mobilization activities cause them to exceed the
permissible amount of campaign activities. Given the documented im-
portance of recruitment for increasing political participation and the high
stakes for exempt organizations if they violate the rules, clarifying the
relevant rules should be an urgent priority. A regulations project or gui-
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dance initiative needs to be undertaken by the Service to elaborate in
detail and with concrete examples which mobilization activities are per-
missible so that exempt organizations and their members can be actively
involved in these activities without risk to their tax exempt status.
Proposals to revise the federal income tax law treatment of nonprof-
its with the goal of encouraging civic renewal should be guided by three
general considerations. First, it is important to recognize that there are
limits to the functions that organizations can serve. Second, in those
areas in which associations can make meaningful contributions to civic
life, different types of organizations and organizational activities are
likely to result in distinct, sometimes competing civic impacts. Finally,
efforts to improve civil society through the tax law must take into ac-
count the inherent limitations of tax law or any other legal regime in
furthering social goals, however worthy.
